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The first essay of this dissertation measures the real effect of increases in local deposit supply on 
local economic outcomes.  To identify this effect, I use exogenous variation in local deposit 
supply from oil and natural gas shale discoveries.  A change in deposit supply should have its 
largest effect on areas where credit supply frictions are the strongest.  I find that the effect is 
strongest in areas dominated by small banks. 
 The second essay analyzes the investment policies of public and private natural gas firms, 
and is joint work with Jérôme Taillard.  We find that privately held firms are 60% less 
responsive to natural gas price changes than publicly traded firms.  Additionally, we find that 
private firms do not respond to new shale investment opportunities, whereas public firms do.  
We believe these results are consistent with private firms having a higher cost of external capital. 
 The third essay empirically tests whether firms increase risk taking activity when they are 
close to distress due to the risk taking incentives of equity-holders.  I find that firms actually 
reduce risk taking when they are close to distress, and in the years prior to bankruptcy.  This 
evidence suggests that risk reduction incentives may be more important for the average firm as it 
gets close to distress. 
 This dissertation is the product of my work at Boston College, and I benefited 
significantly from the help of my advisor, Phil Strahan, and my dissertation committee: Edie 
Hotchkiss, Darren Kisgen, and Jérôme Taillard.  I also benefited from the help of the broader 
finance Faculty at Boston College as well. 
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Does Local Access to Finance Matter?
Evidence from U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Shale Booms
∗
Erik Gilje†
Abstract
I use oil and natural gas shale discoveries as a natural experiment to identify where
and when local access to ﬁnance is economically important for ﬁrms. Shale discoveries
lead to large unexpected personal wealth windfalls, which cause an exogenous increase in
local bank deposits and a positive local credit supply shock. After a credit supply shock,
business establishments increase in industries with high external ﬁnance requirements
relative to industries with low external ﬁnance requirements, but only in lending markets
dominated by small banks. The relative increase is 7.1% in lending markets dominated
by small banks, while there is no change in other lending markets. These results indicate
that economically important frictions related to local credit supply have the largest
impact on areas dominated by small banks, while these frictions are mitigated in other
lending markets.
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ESSAY 1
1 Introduction
In frictionless ﬁnancial markets, entrepreneurs and ﬁrms should be able to obtain funding
for all positive net present value projects. In such a world, changes in local credit supply
would have no eﬀect on real outcomes. However, if information or agency frictions interfere
with capital mobility then suboptimal outcomes can occur. Existing empirical literature has
focused on the real eﬀects of these ﬁnancing frictions.1 Understanding exactly when and
where these frictions are most important, however, has received much less attention.
There are reasons to believe that the importance of lending market frictions may vary,
due to the substantial variation that exists across local lending markets. For example, some
lending markets have large multi-market banks that can redeploy capital geographically (Gilje
et al. (2013)), while other markets are dominated by small banks that rely on local sources of
capital for lending (Houston et al. (1997), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Campello (2002)). Do
these diﬀerences result in diﬀerent exposures to lending market frictions? Do these diﬀerences
have real eﬀects? These questions have direct implications for our understanding of how real
outcomes are aﬀected by lending market frictions.
The goal of this study is to identify where and when lending market frictions have the
largest inﬂuence on real outcomes by measuring the eﬀect of similar changes in local credit
supply on real outcomes in diﬀerent lending markets. I use a novel source of exogenous vari-
ation in local credit supply from oil and natural gas shale discoveries to examine the eﬀect
of changes in credit supply on real outcomes. I identify shale discoveries (booms) at the
county level in the seven major shale producing U.S. states between 2003 and 2009 using
a unique dataset of 16,731 individual shale wells. Unexpected technological breakthroughs
in shale development have caused energy companies to make high payments to individual
mineral owners for the right to develop shale discoveries. I ﬁnd that the increase in individ-
ual mineral wealth associated with shale booms raises local bank deposits by 9.3%. These
deposits from newly wealthy mineral owners enhance a bank's ability to make new loans,
1This literature includes Peek and Rosengren (2000), Petersen and Rajan (2002), Ashcraft (2005), Becker
(2007), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), Butler and Cornaggia
(2011), Chava and Purnanandam (2011), Iyer and Peydro (2011), Schnabl (2011)
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resulting in a positive local credit supply shock.
To measure how a shale boom credit supply shock aﬀects real outcomes in a lending market
I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences empirical speciﬁcation to compare the number of business
establishments, my outcome measure, before a boom to after a boom across industries with
diﬀerent external ﬁnancing requirements.2 Because both credit supply and credit demand
may be changing in a shale boom I focus on within county-year comparisons. Speciﬁcally,
to identify the causal eﬀect of changes in credit supply I include county-year ﬁxed eﬀects, so
that any demand eﬀect which impacts industries similarly in a given county in a given year
is controlled for.
I ﬁnd that after a shale boom, the number of business establishments in industries with
high external ﬁnance requirements increases 4.6% relative to industries with low external
ﬁnance requirements.3 More importantly, for the purposes of this study, this ﬁgure varies
across diﬀerent lending markets. I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of changes in credit supply on local
ﬁrms is strongly linked with local banking market structure, with areas dominated by small
banks beneﬁting the most from an expansion in local credit supply. Speciﬁcally, after a boom
the number of business establishments in industries with high external ﬁnance requirements
increases 7.1% relative to the number with low external ﬁnance requirements in counties
dominated by small banks, whereas there is no change in other lending markets. This re-
sult indicates that cross sectional variation in the impact of credit supply frictions on real
outcomes is linked with a lending market's banking structure.
Why might local credit supply be particularly important in counties dominated by small
banks? If local banks are large, capital can be redeployed geographically to fund projects.
However, if local banks are small it could be more diﬃcult for capital to be redeployed from
other areas to be lent locally.4 Furthermore, small banks are typically more reliant on deposit
2A business establishment is an operating address of a ﬁrm; a single ﬁrm may have multiple business
establishments. I use this as my primary outcome measure as it is among the most granular economic data
available at the county-year-industry level during the sample period.
3I have excluded all economic outcome measures directly related to oil and gas extraction, construction,
real estate, and ﬁnancial services, because economic outcomes for these industries potentially improve due to
reasons unrelated to better local credit supply.
4Prior research discussing this issue includes Houston et al. (1997) and Jayaratne and Morgan (2000)
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funding than large banks, which suggests they may have more challenges in obtaining alter-
native external capital due to information and agency concerns. Prior research also suggests
that small banks may be more adept at lending to soft information borrowers (Stein (2002),
Berger et al. (2005)). If areas with more small banks have more soft information borrowers,
the inability of a small bank to obtain outside funding for these types of borrowers would also
lead to worse economic outcomes. The results of this paper indicate that the ultimate set of
information and agency frictions inﬂuencing outcomes are both frictions between borrowers
and banks as well as frictions between banks and funding sources.
Non-credit based interpretations of my results may be a concern.5 For example, some
industries could beneﬁt diﬀerentially from a shale discovery due to consumer demand shocks,
wealth shocks, or other non-credit based shocks associated with a shale discovery. If any of
these shocks are correlated with external ﬁnancing requirements, then a credit supply based
interpretation of the results could be problematic. However, for these alternative shocks
to alter the interpretation of my empirical design, they would also need to be correlated
with the size of a county's local banks. I ﬁnd no evidence that after booms demand shocks
diﬀer across counties with diﬀerent bank sizes. Speciﬁcally, retail sales, a proxy for local
demand, increase by similar amounts after booms in counties dominated by small banks as
they do in other counties. Additionally, there is no evidence that deposits increase more after
booms in counties dominated by small banks than in other counties, as one might expect
if demand shocks aﬀected counties diﬀerently. More broadly, the empirical design of this
paper requires an alternative, non-banking based, interpretation of results to reconcile why
outcomes for industries with distinct external ﬁnancing requirements respond diﬀerently after
a shale boom, and why these diﬀerent responses are larger in counties dominated by small
banks.
In placebo tests I show that the results of this study are not driven by pre-existing growth
5I follow the approach of other studies and focus on economic outcome variables, because detailed bank
level loan data is typically unavailable in the United States. Among banks which have all of their branches
in a shale boom county, which plausibly suggests that a signiﬁcant portion of the lending activity reported in
Call Report disclosures occurs in a shale county, I do conﬁrm that Commercial and Industrial loans increase
after a shale discovery.
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trends. I also demonstrate that the main results of this study are not driven by any single
industry or industry exposure to economic ﬂuctuations as proxied by industry asset beta.
Additionally, I conduct robustness tests related to local banking structure and ﬁnd that my
main results are not driven by changes to local banking markets after a boom, diﬀerent small
bank size deﬁnitions, or banks that are part of holding companies.
How are shale booms diﬀerent than other types of economic growth? I argue that the
key diﬀerentiator of shale booms is the signiﬁcant relative increase in local credit supply in
shale counties, relative to other types of growth shocks. Because county banking market
structure is not randomly assigned, a concern may be that the real outcomes I observe are
not driven by a deposit eﬀect, but instead, an omitted variable which aﬀects how certain
counties or certain industries respond to economic growth (e.g. rural and underdeveloped
areas may respond diﬀerently when there is growth). To attempt to identify how this might
be inﬂuencing my tests, I examine whether non-shale growth shocks aﬀect counties dominated
by small banks diﬀerently or ﬁrms with greater external ﬁnancing requirements diﬀerently.
I ﬁnd no evidence of diﬀerential aﬀects linked to county banking market composition or
industry external ﬁnancing requirements in response to non-shale growth shocks. This result
is consistent with the credit supply component of shale booms being a key factor for real
outcomes, relative to other types of economic growth.
Are banks using shale deposit windfalls to fund positive net present value projects? While
diﬃcult to test empirically, there are at least two pieces of suggestive evidence which indicate
that banks are not making bad loans. First, an analysis of banks which have all of their
operations in shale counties, for which Call Report data may be considered plausibly repre-
sentative of the loans a bank may be making in a shale county, I ﬁnd no evidence that a bank's
non-performing loan ratio increases after a shale boom. Second, establishments in industries
with high external ﬁnance requirements represent a smaller portion of the economy in lending
markets dominated by small banks. Speciﬁcally, in non-shale counties dominated by small
banks they comprise 37.8% of all establishments in 2009. In lending markets dominated by
small banks that have beneﬁted from a shale boom, this ﬁgure is 40.8%. This amount is
nearly equal to the 40.7% they comprise in lending markets with a greater presence of large
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banks. Thus, these additional establishments increase only to an amount similar to their
proportion in counties with a greater presence of large banks, the control group, they are not
increasing to a level signiﬁcantly higher than the control group, which might be a cause for
concern.
One should be cautioned against interpreting the results of this study as suggesting that
the existence of small banks is suboptimal. Due to the type of borrowers small banks may
serve, and the potential diﬀerence in borrowers in counties dominated by small banks relative
to other counties, it is not clear that more big banks would improve outcomes. Alternatively,
this study does suggest that improved access to funding in areas dominated by small banks
does lead to improved outcomes. The results would suggest that additional tools or inno-
vations which could mitigate information or agency frictions for small banks in obtaining
funding, may improve outcomes in areas dominated by small banks.
This study also highlights a bright side, linked to the limited impact of frictions in some
lending markets, as areas with a signiﬁcant presence of large banks are largely unaﬀected
by changes in local credit supply. This suggests that some economically important lending
frictions in some places have been mitigated, relative to what prior studies have found (Becker
(2007), Peek and Rosengren (2000)).
In Section 2 I provide an overview of the hypothesis tested in this study and the related
literature. Section 3 provides detail on my identiﬁcation strategy and background on my
natural experiment. Section 4 discusses data and variable deﬁnitions. Section 5 discusses my
results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Hypothesis Development and Related Literature
The underlying research question in this paper: Does local access to ﬁnance matter? is
a dual hypothesis test of two sets of frictions 1) frictions between borrowers and banks 2)
frictions between banks and access to funds for lending. Both sets of frictions have to be
present for the observed results.
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If ﬁrms could seamlessly access capital regardless of location, then neither local credit
supply, local banking characteristics, nor a local bank's ability to obtain external funds
for lending would matter for local economic outcomes. Any local negative credit shock
would be counteracted by distant lenders stepping in to fund positive net present value
projects. Recent research suggests that geography and distance currently play less of a role
in enhancing informational frictions between borrowers and banks due to improved use of
information technology. Berger (2003) documents the rise of internet banking, electronic
payment technologies, and credit scoring, while Loutskina and Strahan (2009) document the
importance of securitization. These advances would suggest a reduced importance of local
access to ﬁnance, because borrowers can more easily convey information about themselves to
banks that are farther away.
Regulatory based frictions in the U.S. have also eroded over time, reducing the impor-
tance of distance in lending relationships. Banking deregulation in U.S. states has aﬀected
output growth rates (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)), the rate of new incorporations (Black
and Strahan (2002)), the number of ﬁrms and ﬁrm-size distribution (Cetorelli and Strahan
(2006)), and entrepreneurship (Kerr and Nanda (2009)). Additionally, Bertrand et al. (2007)
document that banking deregulation in France leads to better allocation of bank loans to
ﬁrms and more restructuring activity.
If distance does aggravate information based frictions between borrowers and lenders,
then local credit supply may matter. In particular, if the cost to overcoming distance related
frictions is prohibitive as could be the case with soft information borrowers6, then local
credit supply could be important. In this setting, the frictions that a bank faces in obtaining
external funding become important for local economic outcomes. Existing literature suggests
that bank size is a key characteristic along which frictions in obtaining external capital may
vary. Kashyap and Stein (2000) document that monetary policy inﬂuences lending for small
banks more than for large banks, while Bassett and Brady (2002) document that small banks
rely more on deposit funding. Smaller banks also have fewer sources of funding outside a
6Small banks may focus more on relationship lending based on soft information relative to transaction
lending (Berger and Udell (2006)). Suﬁ (2007) documents that borrowers and lenders are geographically
close when information asymmetry is severe.
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local area (Houston et al. (1997), Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Campello (2002)). If small
banks need to raise capital externally, while large banks can redeploy capital internally across
diﬀerent geographic regions, then areas with more small banks may have more agency and
informational frictions related to obtaining external funding. These bank funding frictions
may mean that areas with a higher proportion of small banks could be less likely to have
access to funding beyond local deposits.
This paper is also more broadly related to other papers which use natural experiments
to document the importance of access to ﬁnance for economic outcomes in diﬀerent settings
earlier in the United States (Peek and Rosengren (2000), Ashcraft (2005), Chava and Pur-
nanandam (2011)) and internationally (Khwaja and Mian (2008), Iyer and Peydro (2011),
Schnabl (2011), Paravisini (2008)). In other related work, Guiso et al. (2004) use Italian
data to document the importance of ﬁnancial development on new ﬁrm entry, competition,
and growth. Recent literature has also used natural experiments in the U.S. to document
the importance of local access to ﬁnance for productivity (Butler and Cornaggia (2011))
and risk-management (Cornaggia (2012)). Additionally, Plosser (2011) uses shale discoveries
as an instrument for bank deposits, but focuses on bank capital allocation decisions during
ﬁnancial crises. My contribution diﬀers from these papers in that I identify signiﬁcant cross-
sectional variation in the eﬀect of changes in local credit supply on ﬁrms. Characterizing this
variation provides insight as to where and when information and agency frictions aﬀect the
ﬂow of capital in the banking system and have the largest impact on ﬁrms.
3 Identiﬁcation Strategy: Shale Discoveries
3.1 Natural Gas Shale Industry Background
The advent of natural gas shale development is one of the single biggest changes in the U.S.
energy landscape in the last 20 years. According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency,
in its 2011 Annual Energy Outlook, there are 827 Trillion Cubic Feet (Tcf) of technically
recoverable unproved shale gas reserves in the United States, this estimate is a 72% upward
revision from the previous year. 827 Tcf of natural gas is enough to fulﬁll all of the United
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States' natural gas consumption for 36 years. On an energy equivalent basis 827 Tcf represents
20 years of total U.S. oil consumption or 42 years of U.S. motor gasoline consumption. As
recently as the late 1990s, these reserves were not thought to be economically proﬁtable
to develop, and represented less than 1% of U.S. natural gas production. However, the
development of the ﬁrst major natural gas shale play in the United States, the Barnett
Shale in and around Fort Worth, TX, changed industry notions on the viability of natural
gas shale.
In the early 1980s Mitchell Energy drilled the ﬁrst well in the Barnett Shale (Yergin
(2011)). However, rather than encountering the typical, highly porous, rock of conventional
formations, Mitchell encountered natural gas shale. Shale has the potential to hold vast
amounts of gas, however, it is highly non-porous which causes the gas to be trapped in the
rock. Over a period of 20 years Mitchell Energy experimented with diﬀerent techniques,
and found that by using hydraulic fracturing (commonly referred to as fracking) it was
able to break apart the rock to free natural gas. With higher natural gas prices and the
combination of horizontal drilling with fracking in 2002, large new reserves from shale
became economically proﬁtable to produce. Continued development of drilling and hydraulic
fracturing techniques have enabled even more production eﬃciencies, and today shale wells
have an extremely low risk of being unproductive (unproductive wells are commonly referred
to as dry-holes).
The low risk of dry-holes and high production rates have led to a land grab for mineral
leases which were previously passed over. Prior to initiating drilling activities a ﬁrm must
ﬁrst negotiate with a mineral owner to lease the right to develop minerals. Typically these
contracts are comprised of a large upfront bonus payment, which is paid whether the well
is productive or not, and a royalty percentage based on the value of the gas produced over
time. Across the U.S., communities have experienced signiﬁcant fast-paced mineral booms.
For example, the New Orleans' Times-Picayune (2008) reports the rise of bonus payments
in the Haynesville Shale, which increased from a few hundred dollars an acre to $10,000
to $30,000 an acre plus 25% royalty in a matter of a year. An individual who owns one
square mile of land (640 acres) and leases out his minerals at $30,000/acre would receive
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an upfront one-time payment of $19.2 million plus a monthly payment equal to 25% of the
value of all the gas produced on his lease. The media has dubbed those lucky enough to
have been sitting on shale mineral leases as shalionaires. The signiﬁcant personal windfalls
people have experienced in natural gas shale booms has led to increases in bank deposits in
the communities that they live in. Since the ﬁrst major shale boom in the Barnett (TX),
additional booms have occurred in the Woodford (OK), Fayetteville (AR), Haynesville (LA
+ TX), Marcellus (PA + WV), Bakken (Oil ND), and Eagle Ford (TX).
3.2 Identiﬁcation Strategy
The booms experienced by communities across the U.S. due to shale discoveries are ex-
ogenous to the underlying characteristics of the aﬀected communities (health, education,
demographics etc). The exogenous factors driving shale development include technologi-
cal breakthroughs (horizontal drilling/hydraulic fracturing) and larger macroeconomic forces
(demand for natural gas and natural gas prices). Acknowledging the unexpected nature of
shale gas development John Watson, CEO of Chevron, stated in a Wall Street Journal (2011)
interview, that the technological advances associated with fracking took the industry by
surprise. The development of shale discoveries is typically undertaken by large publicly
traded exploration and production companies that obtain ﬁnancing from ﬁnancial markets
outside of the local area of the discovery. To track shale development I use a unique data
set which has detailed information on the time and place (county-year) of drilling activity
associated with shale booms.7 The exogenous nature of a shale boom and the eﬀect it has
on local deposit supply creates an attractive setting for a natural experiment, which I use to
identify the importance of local credit supply and local banking market structure.
7I use horizontal wells as my key measure of shale development activity. Horizontal drilling is a component
of the key technological breakthrough that enables the production of shale resources to be economically
proﬁtable. Nearly all horizontal wells in the U.S. are drilled to develop shale or other unconventional oil and
gas resources.
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3.2.1 Eﬀect of Boom on Deposits
The ﬁrst step in my analysis is to quantify the deposit shock in shale boom counties. Specif-
ically what is the impact of a shale boom on local deposit supply? In order to do this I
estimate the following regression model
Depositi,t = α + β1Boomi,t + Y ear FEt + County FEi + εi,t
Boomi,t is a measure of shale activity, in my tests I use both logarithm of total shale wells,
and a binary dummy boom variable to measure the shale boom. Depositi,t is either the
logarithm of deposits summed across all branches in county i at time t or the logarithm of
deposits per capita summed across all branches in county i at time t. County ﬁxed eﬀects are
included to control for time invariant county eﬀects and year eﬀects are included to account
for time-varying eﬀects, these enter the speciﬁcation in the form of Y ear FEt (year ﬁxed
eﬀect) and CountyFEi (county ﬁxed eﬀect). The key variable of interest in this speciﬁcation
is the coeﬃcient β1, which indicates the change in Depositi,t attributable to the Boomi,t
variable.
A primary concern in my empirical setting may be whether counties with diﬀerent bank
size characteristics experience similar shocks. If a deposit shock were correlated with the
underlying banking structure in a county it could suggest problems for my broader empirical
tests. To test whether counties with diﬀerent banking characteristics are aﬀected diﬀerently
by the deposit shock, I estimate the following regression:
Depositi,t = α + β1Boomi,t + β2Small Banki,t
+β3Small Banki,t ∗Boomi,t + Small Banki,t ∗ Y ear FEt + County FEi + εi,t
The key coeﬃcient of interest in measuring whether counties with diﬀerent bank size char-
acteristics experience diﬀerent deposit shocks is the interaction coeﬃcient (β3). This speciﬁ-
cation includes both Small Banki,t ∗ Y ear FEt to control for diﬀering deposit trends across
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counties with diﬀerent banking structures and County FEi to control for time invariant
county eﬀects on deposit levels.
3.2.2 Eﬀect of a Change in Credit Supply on Firms: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences
To identify the economic outcomes related to the local credit supply shock, I use a regression
speciﬁcation which distinguishes between economic outcomes for industries with high external
ﬁnancing requirements relative to those with low external ﬁnancing requirements. To achieve
this aim, I use a regression form of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, where the ﬁrst diﬀerence (β1) can
be thought of as the diﬀerence in economic outcomes between boom county-years and non-
boom county-years. To identify the eﬀect of the credit component of a boom I incorporate a
second diﬀerence (β3), the diﬀerence in economic outcomes for industries with high external
ﬁnance requirements and industries with low external ﬁnance requirements.
Establishmentsi,j,t = α + β1Boomi,t + β2Highj + β3Boomi,t ∗Highj
+IndustryY ear FEj,t + CountyIndustry FEi,j + CountyY ear FEi,t + εi,j,t
Where Establishmenti,j,t is either the logarithm of the number of establishments in county
i and industry group j at time t or the establishments per capita in county i and industry
group j at time t. I have grouped establishments into two industry types: one industry group
which has high requirements for external ﬁnance, for whichHighj = 1 and one industry group
with low requirements for external ﬁnance Highj = 0.
8 Thus, for every county I have two
industry groups, which are delineated by requirements for external ﬁnance. I also include
three sets of ﬁxed eﬀects. IndustryY earFEj,t control for time-varying diﬀerences in industry
growth, CountyIndustry FEi,j control for county speciﬁc diﬀerences in industry make-up,
while CountyY ear FEi,t absorbs any county-year speciﬁc eﬀects (e.g. demand eﬀects) which
8Highj is not reported in the regression results because this variable is subsumed by the county-
industry ﬁxed eﬀects, CountyIndustry FEi,j , while Boomi,t is not reported because it is absorbed by
CountyY ear FEi,t. The high dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects used for this study are based oﬀ of the techniques
outlined in Gormley and Matsa (Forthcoming)
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might eﬀect ﬁrms in both industry groups similarly.
This speciﬁcation is a regression form of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, with the key variable of
interest being the coeﬃcient on the interaction term, β3. If industries with a high dependence
on external ﬁnance beneﬁt more from shale booms, β3 would be positive, which would indicate
the importance of the credit supply component of a boom. Alternatively, if local credit supply
does not inﬂuence local economic outcomes, β3 would be zero. That is, while the boom may
beneﬁt all industries through the coeﬃcient β1 (overall increased demand for goods and
services), there would be no evidence that the credit supply component of a boom enhances
local economic outcomes.
3.2.3 Eﬀect of Bank Size and Credit Supply on Firms: Triple Diﬀerencing
To estimate the importance of local bank size for local credit supply I use a triple diﬀerencing
speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst two diﬀerences are: non-boom county-years vs. boom county-years,
high requirements for external ﬁnance vs. low requirements for external ﬁnance. The third
diﬀerence tests whether the eﬀect from the ﬁrst two diﬀerences is bigger in areas dominated by
small banks: high small bank market share vs. low small bank market share. SmallBanki,t is
a variable representing small bank market share in county i at time t. To measure small bank
market share, Small Banki,t, I use both the proportion of branches in a county which belong
to small banks as well as a dummy variable for the counties which are above median in small
bank branch market share in any given year. The interaction of SmallBanki,t with the other
terms in the speciﬁcation yields a regression form of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences.9
9Highj is not reported in the regression results because this variable is subsumed by the county-industry
ﬁxed eﬀects, CountyIndustry FEi,j , while Boomi,t, Small Banki,t, and Boomi,t ∗ Small Banki,t are not
reported because they are absorbed by CountyY ear FEi,t
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Establishmentsi,j,t = α + β1Boomi,t + β2Highj + β3Small Banki,t
+β4Boomi,t ∗Highj + β5Boomi,t ∗ Small Banki,t + β6Highj ∗ Small Banki,t
+β7Boomi,t ∗ Small Banki,t ∗Highj + IndustryTrends FEj,t
+CountyIndustry FEi,j + CountyY ear FEi,t + εi,j,t
In this regression the key variable of interest is β7. If industries with higher requirements
for external ﬁnance beneﬁt more from a local credit supply shock in counties dominated by
small banks this coeﬃcient would be positive.
4 Data and Variable Deﬁnition
For my panel data set I include the seven states that have experienced shale development
activity from 2000 through 2009. These are Arkansas, Louisiana, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. There are 639 counties in these states with at least
one bank branch over the sample period. This sample includes counties that have experienced
shale booms, as well as counties which have not, and it is these non-boom county-years which
serve as a control group in empirical tests. The data is constructed on an annual frequency
and compiled from four diﬀerent sources:
• Well Data (From Smith International Inc.)
• Deposit and Bank Data (From FDIC Summary of Deposits Reports)
• County Level Economic Outcome Data by Industry (Census Bureau, Establishment
Data)
• External Finance Requirement Measures (From Compustat)
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4.1 Well Data
Well data is used to calculate the Boomi,t variables in the regressions. The well data is ob-
tained from Smith International Inc. which provides detailed information on the time (year),
place (county), and type (horizontal or vertical) of well drilling activity. I use horizontal
wells as the key measure of shale development activity, as the majority of horizontal wells in
the U.S. drilled after 2002 target shale or other unconventional formations. In order to best
measure the inﬂuence of shale development activity I focus on two diﬀerent measures.
• Boomi,t = Dummyi,t : A dummy variable set to 1 if county i at time t is in the
top quartile of all county-years with shale well activity (total shale wells > 17) in the
panel dataset. Once the variable is set to 1, all subsequent years in the panel for the
county are set to 1. Based on this deﬁnition 88.1% of all shale wells are drilled in boom
county-years.
• Boomi,t = Log Total Shale Wellsi,t : The logarithm of the total number of shale wells
drilled in county i from 2003 to time t.
Regressions are based on the total shale wells drilled for the year leading up through March.
This corresponds to when the County Business Pattern Data are tabulated. Summary statis-
tics on sample states, counties, and well data are presented in Table 1 as well as a detailed
list of the shale boom counties used in this study. Figure 1 presents a map of the intensity
and location of shale development activity.
4.2 Deposit and Bank Data
Deposit and bank data are obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
Summary of Deposit data, which is reported on June 30 of each year and provides bank data
for all FDIC-insured institutions. I use the Summary of Deposit data as opposed to data
from the Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) because Summary of Deposit
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data provides deposit data at the branch level, while Call Reports only provide data at the
bank level. Additionally, Summary of Deposit data provides detailed information on the
geographic location of each branch that a bank has, so I can directly observe the branches
in boom counties and the banks they belong to. To obtain county level deposit data I sum
deposits across all branches in a county. To calculate small bank market share in a county
I calculate the proportion of branches in a county which belong to small banks. I deﬁne
small banks to be banks with assets below a threshold which could cause a bank to be
funding constrained. For the results in this paper I use $500 million (year 2003 dollars) as
the asset threshold for small banks.10 Prior literature (Black and Strahan (2002), Jayaratne
and Morgan (2000), Strahan and Weston (1998)), has suggested that banks with assets in
the $100 million to $500 million range may be funding constrained. In my empirical tests I
use two measures of small bank market share. Speciﬁcally, I use dummy variables set to 1
for the counties with high small bank branch market share (above median) in each year, and
0 otherwise. Additionally, I also use the ratio of small bank branches to total branches in a
county. Summary data for bank and branch variables are provided in Table 2.
4.3 County Level Economic Outcome Data by Industry
Economic outcome variable data by industry was obtained from the County Business Patterns
survey, which is released annually by the Census Bureau. It is worth noting, that the survey
provides data only at the establishment level, not the ﬁrm level, for example, a ﬁrm may have
many establishments. The survey provides detailed data on establishments and employment
in each county, by North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) code as of the
10 I document that the main results remain statistically signiﬁcant when using $200 million or $1 billion in
assets as the deﬁnition of a small bank. The results are also robust to basing this deﬁnition on bank holding
company assets.
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week of March 12 every year. My main results are based on economic outcomes grouped at the
two digit NAICS code level, which I match with corresponding Compustat two digit NAICS
code external ﬁnance requirement measures. More disaggregated NAICS codes (six digit
NAICS as opposed to two digit NAICS) provide fewer NAICS code matches to Compustat,
which I rely on for external ﬁnance requirement measures. I exclude codes 21 (Oil and
Gas Extraction), 23 (Construction), 52 (Financials), 53 (Real Estate) because they may
be directly inﬂuenced by booms. I exclude 99 (Other) due to lack of comparability with
Compustat ﬁrms.11
After matching County Business Pattern data with Compustat external ﬁnance require-
ment measures, I aggregate all industry codes into two industry groups, one with above
median requirements for external ﬁnance (high) and one with below median requirements
for external ﬁnance (low). The two digit NAICS code from the County Business Patterns
data is used to obtain an external ﬁnance requirement measure from Compustat, which is
described in more detail in the next subsection. The objective of the matching is to have
the cleanest sorting of NAICS codes into high external ﬁnance requirement and low external
ﬁnance requirement bins. Details on the industries in these bins are provided in Table 3.
While the County Business Patterns Survey provides detailed data on establishment
counts by industry, employment data may be suppressed, for privacy reasons, if there are
too few establishments in a particular industry. Employment data suppression is a particular
problem for counties with smaller populations, for this reason the number of observations in
employment regressions is reduced. Furthermore, this suppression of employment data makes
including employment in the regressions related to small bank market share problematic, as
62% of establishments in high small bank market share counties have employment reporting
suppressed, therefore I do not include employment as an outcome variable in my study.
11Using three digit NAICS code industries poses two problems 1) There are 71 industries as opposed to
14, so there are far fewer comparable Compustat ﬁrms for some industries 2) There was a change in industry
categorization that occurred in 2002-2003, which creates problems when constructing a pre-boom control
period for booms that occur in 2003 and 2004.
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4.4 External Finance Requirement Measures
I use an external ﬁnance requirement measure similar to the measure used by Rajan and
Zingales (1998). The main diﬀerence is that while they use this measure only for manufac-
turing ﬁrms, I use it for all industry groups similar to Becker (2007). Speciﬁcally, over the
1999 to 2008 time period for each ﬁrm in Compustat I sum the diﬀerence between capital
expenditures and operating cash ﬂow. I use the time period 1999 to 2008 because these
ﬁscal years, which end in December for most public ﬁrms, correspond most closely to March
of the following year (2000 to 2009), which is when the county business patterns survey is
conducted. By summing over several years the measure is less susceptible to being driven by
short term economic ﬂuctuations. I then divide this sum by the sum of capital expenditures.
Speciﬁcally, for ﬁrm n, the measure is calculated as:
ExtF inRequirementn =
∑2008
1999(CapitalExpendituresn,t −OperatingCashF lown,t)∑2008
1999CapitalExpendituresn,t
I take the median of this measure to get an industry's external ﬁnance requirement. The cal-
culation of this measure for each industry is displayed in Table 3. The underlying assumption
in the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure is that some industries, for technological reasons,
have greater requirements for external ﬁnancing than others. As Cetorelli and Strahan (2006)
highlight, using a measure based on Compustat ﬁrms may be considered a cleaner measure,
relative to the actual loan amounts small private ﬁrms may issue, of the true demand for
ﬁnancing of the ﬁrms in the sample. The measure is based on public ﬁrms in the United
States which have among the best access to capital of any ﬁrms in the world, therefore the
amount of capital used by these ﬁrms is likely to be a good measure of an industry's true
demand for external ﬁnancing. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) further document a correlation
between external ﬁnance requirement measures constructed from Compustat and those con-
structed from the Survey of Small Business Finance, providing further support for the use of
this measure.
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5 Results
5.1 Eﬀect of Shale Booms on Deposit Levels
Table 4 provides regression results of log deposits and log deposits per capita on diﬀerent
shale boom variables. The evidence suggests a causal relationship between shale booms and
bank deposits, speciﬁcally, that the individual mineral wealth generated by shale booms
translates into more bank deposits. In Panel A of Table 4 columns (1) and (2) provide
results on diﬀerent measures of the Boomi,t variable. In each case, the Boomi,t variable is
found to have both economic and statistical signiﬁcance. For example, the dummy variable
measure of Boomi,t can be interpreted as a boom increasing local deposits by 9.3%. To put
this in context, the average annual growth rate in deposits across all counties from 2000 to
2009 was 4.6%, so a boom county would experience an additional increase of 9.3% (4.6% +
9.3% = 13.9% total increase), or a total increase in deposits roughly triple its average annual
increase.
Further tests will focus on comparisons between counties with high small bank market
share and low small bank market share. An assumption in this comparison is that both types
of counties experience similar deposit shocks. To directly test this assumption I estimate in-
teractions of county bank size characteristics interacted with the shale boom variables. Panel
B reports the results of this speciﬁcation. The key coeﬃcient of interest in assessing whether
counties experience diﬀerent shocks based on their banking structure is the coeﬃcient on the
interaction term (β3). This coeﬃcient is neither economically nor statistically signiﬁcant,
suggesting that counties with diﬀerent banking structures receive similar deposit shocks.
An additional concern may be that deposits could be rising in anticipation of a boom, or
that there could be some spurious correlation in a county during part of the boom period
which is causing the result in Table 4. To test the precise timing of the boom relative to
deposit growth I replace the boom dummy variable used in Table 4 with dummy variables
based on the position of an observation relative to a boom. So, for example, if a boom
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occurs in 2006 in county i, then the observation in county i in 2003 would receive a t-3
boom dummy, county i observation in 2004 would receive the t-2 boom dummy and so on.
I include a set of dummies for each year relative to a boom from t-3 to t+3. Due to limited
observations beyond t+3, I group any observations after t+3 with the t+3 dummy (3+).
Figure 2 is a graph of the coeﬃcients from this regression, and provides visual evidence that
the deposit level does not change substantially until time 0, the ﬁrst year of the boom. This
serves to alleviate concerns regarding whether deposits rise in anticipation of a boom, as well
as concerns about possible spurious correlations during part of the boom period.
5.2 Eﬀect of Credit Supply Shock on Firms
In order to estimate the eﬀect of the credit supply shock associated with a shale boom on
ﬁrms, it is necessary to look at the diﬀerence between outcomes for ﬁrms in industries with a
high requirement for external ﬁnance compared to those with a low requirement for external
ﬁnance. To measure the credit supply eﬀect of a boom, I not only compare ﬁrms in diﬀerent
industries, but also include county-year ﬁxed eﬀects in regression speciﬁcations, therefore any
direct demand eﬀect that both industry groups experience is fully absorbed. Table 5 pro-
vides a direct estimate of the eﬀect of the credit supply shock on ﬁrms using a regression form
of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences. The coeﬃcient of interest for assessing whether improved local
credit supply plays a role in local economic outcomes is the interaction term Boomi,t ∗Highj.
The sign and magnitude of this term indicates whether one industry group is aﬀected dis-
proportionately when there is a credit supply shock. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, suggesting that ﬁrms in indus-
tries with high external ﬁnance requirements beneﬁt more than ﬁrms in industries with low
external ﬁnance requirements. The outcome measures used in the regressions are logarithm
of the number of establishments and establishments per capita in each industry group. The
economic interpretation of the interaction coeﬃcient in (1) of Table 5 is that, when there is a
boom, establishments in industries with high requirements for external ﬁnance increase 4.6%
relative to establishments in industries with low requirements for external ﬁnance. To put
20
this number in context, the average annual increase in establishments of ﬁrms in industries
with high external ﬁnance requirements from 2000 to 2009 is 0.9%. The interpretation of (3)
in Table 5 is that there are 3.6 additional establishments per 10,000 people after the credit
supply shock in industries with high external ﬁnance requirements relative to industries with
low external ﬁnance requirements. 12
There may be some concern as to the timing of the boom and changes in local economic
outcomes. If establishment levels of low external ﬁnance requirement industries and high
external ﬁnance requirement industries trend diﬀerently prior to the boom, they may be poor
control/treatment groups. Additionally, if high external ﬁnance requirement establishments
trend higher well before the boom, it would suggest a problem with my empirical design, as
the deposit levels in Figure 2 do not increase until time 0. To directly assess the validity of
these concerns I construct a graph similar to Figure 2, but for establishments. Speciﬁcally,
for each of the industry groups I estimate a regression, but replace the Boomi,t variable
with a set of dummy variables based on the time period of an observation relative to a
boom for any given county i (similar to what is done in Figure 2). The coeﬃcients from
this regression are graphed for each industry group in Figure 3. As can be seen, from
time t-3 to t-1, each industry group tracks relatively closely, then at time 0, the ﬁrst year
of a boom, there is a divergence in trends, which increases through t+3. This indicates
that when the boom occurs, establishments in high external ﬁnance requirement industries
beneﬁt disproportionately more compared to low external ﬁnance requirement industries.
The evidence presented in Figure 3 should serve to address concerns regarding the change in
establishment levels relative to the precise timing of a boom.
5.3 Eﬀect of Bank Size and Credit Supply on Firms
As previously discussed, local bank size composition could play a role in the importance of
improved local credit supply for economic outcomes. Speciﬁcally, counties dominated by small
12I document in Appendix A that for banks that have all branches in a single county, both deposits and
Commercial & Industrial loans increase after a boom. Overall interest income and interest paid on deposits
are unchanged after a boom. Lending driven purely by demand would be more likely to result in higher
interest rates and interest income.
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banks may beneﬁt more from a credit supply shock due to information and agency frictions
in the banking system. To test this in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework, I subdivide
counties into high small bank market share and low small bank market share counties, based
on whether a county is above median in small bank market share in a given year. I estimate
the speciﬁcation presented in Table 5 for each of these subgroups, and report the results in
Table 6.
In every speciﬁcation the counties dominated by small banks have a higher coeﬃcient
for the interaction term Boomi,t ∗ Highj. The magnitude of the diﬀerence is often quite
large, with high small bank market share counties (Bank = High Small Bank Mkt Share)
having coeﬃcients four to ﬁve times higher than the coeﬃcients of low small bank market
share counties (Bank = Low Small Bank Mkt Share), depending on the speciﬁcation. The
interaction coeﬃcient for lending markets with low small bank market share is often not
statistically signiﬁcant. The economic interpretation of (1) is that establishments in indus-
tries with high requirements for external ﬁnance increase 7.1% relative to establishments in
industries with low requirements for external ﬁnance after a shale boom. While the economic
interpretation of (2) is that establishments in industries with high requirements for external
ﬁnance increase 1.2% relative to establishments in industries with low requirements for exter-
nal ﬁnance, though this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. These results indicate that
there is signiﬁcant cross-sectional variation in the eﬀect of changes in credit supply linked to
banking market structure. In the absence of frictions changes in local credit supply should
not aﬀect local ﬁrms, because there is a larger eﬀect of changes in credit supply in counties
dominated by small banks, it suggests that these lending markets are where frictions in the
banking system are most problematic. Alternatively, in other lending markets, with a greater
presence of large banks, there is an economically negligible eﬀect on local ﬁrms, which is often
not statistically signiﬁcant. This indicates that the impact of some economically important
frictions in the banking system has been reduced in these areas.
In order to address concerns regarding anticipation and spurious correlations, I graph
coeﬃcients as in Figure 3, but further subdivide high external ﬁnance and low external
ﬁnance industries by bank size characteristics to form four separate subgroups in Figure 4.
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As can be seen, all subgroups trend similarly until time 0, when the subgroup that comprises
high external ﬁnance requirement industries in high small bank market share counties trends
higher.
To formally test the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients across speciﬁcations in Table 6 and Fig-
ure 4, I estimate a regression form of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, with the results
shown in Table 7. This is done by adding additional interactions with small bank mar-
ket share variables. The coeﬃcient of interest in these tests is the triple interaction term
Boomi,t ∗ Highj ∗ Small Banki,t. A positive coeﬃcient on the triple interaction term indi-
cates that industries with high external ﬁnance requirements beneﬁt more relative to indus-
tries low external ﬁnance requirements when there is a boom in an area with high small bank
market share compared to other lending markets. Speciﬁcally, the interpretation of (1) in
Table 7 is that high external ﬁnance requirement establishments increase by 6.2% relative
to establishments in industries with low requirements for external ﬁnance in boom counties
dominated by small banks relative to the diﬀerence between these industry groups in other
boom counties.13 Across all speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient on Boomi,t ∗Highj ∗ Small Banki,t
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, providing evidence suggesting that higher small bank
market share counties were more aﬀected by economically important frictions in the banking
system which may have disrupted the ﬂow of capital. Speciﬁcally, if there were no frictions in
the banking system to impede the ﬂow of capital, additional deposits from the boom should
not disproportionately aﬀect high external ﬁnance requirement industries in high small bank
market share counties.14
The results in Table 7 also address concerns regarding alternative explanations from the
prior diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences tests conducted. An important concern is whether industries
with high external ﬁnance requirements disproportionately beneﬁt from a boom for a reason
other than the credit supply component of a boom. For example, it could be the case
13Appendix B documents that similar and statistically signiﬁcant results are obtained when diﬀerent bank
size and holding company deﬁnitions are used. Appendix C documents that similar and statistically signiﬁcant
results are obtained when holding the banking structure constant as of the year prior to the shale discovery.
14Appendix D documents that the largest increase in establishments is among establishments with fewer
than 10 people, while establishment counts with 10 people or more are unaﬀected.
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that high external ﬁnance requirement industries beneﬁt more in general when there is an
economic boom (high asset beta). However, this explanation would not account for the
diﬀerential impact experienced in high small bank market share counties relative to other
lending markets. An additional concern may be that there could be more demand for goods
and services for industries in the high external ﬁnance dependence industry group. However,
in order for this explanation to be consistent with the results in Table 7, there would also
need to be a rationale for why this demand diﬀerential is relatively higher in counties with
high small bank market share.
5.4 Validity of Experimental Design
5.4.1 Sensitivity of Results to Industry Classiﬁcations
A potential concern with my empirical design is whether local economic outcomes for indus-
tries with higher requirements for external ﬁnance improve relative to outcomes for industries
with low requirements for external ﬁnance for some reason other than improved local credit
supply. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences tests help rule out several alternative expla-
nations, however, an additional test of this assumption is included in Table 8. Speciﬁcally, for
each industry group I calculate a measure of exposure to underlying economic ﬂuctuations,
asset beta, using two diﬀerent asset beta methodologies.
βAsset1 =
βEquity
1 + (1− Tax Rate) ∗ Debt
Equity
βAsset2 =
βEquity
1 + Debt
Equity
The asset betas used are industry median asset betas. If it is the case that the asset betas for
each industry group are diﬀerent it could be cause for concern, as this would suggest that one
industry group would be more sensitive to overall ﬂuctuations in an economy. The results in
Panel A of Table 8 provide evidence that the high external ﬁnance requirement industry group
does have a higher asset beta. However, when the two highest asset beta industry groups are
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dropped from the regressions causing both industry groups to have similar asset betas, as
in Panel B of Table 8, the interaction and triple interaction coeﬃcients from the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences regression and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression are still positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that the diﬀerence in underlying asset betas be-
tween the groups is not driving my main results. Additionally Table 8 provides evidence that
the regression results presented in Table 5 and Table 7 are not being driven by any single
industry group in the study.
5.4.2 Non-Shale Growth Shock
Banking market structure is not randomly assigned, therefore, one concern may be that
there are omitted factors which aﬀect both a county's banking market structure as well as
how certain industries (e.g. those with high external ﬁnance requirements) are aﬀected by
growth shocks. To attempt to assess whether such omitted factors may be aﬀecting my
estimates I conduct a test to assess whether non-shale growth shocks aﬀect one industry
group compared to another or one industry group relatively more in counties dominated by
small banks. Speciﬁcally, in Table 9 I use data from the states immediately adjacent to the
seven shale states to test whether non-shale growth shocks or booms aﬀect the number of
establishments in industries with high external ﬁnance requirements diﬀerently or the number
of establishments in high external ﬁnance requirement industries in counties dominated by
small banks diﬀerently. Growth Shocki,t dummy variables are inserted after high growth
county-years so that the number of growth shock county years is approximately the same
proportion as the number of shale boom county years obtained in the main sample (5% of
all county-years). I obtain growth shock years by identifying years which experience a large
increase in the number of business establishments, on average these growth shocks result in
a 17.6% increase in establishments across all industries, a ﬁgure signiﬁcantly higher than
shale booms. The key coeﬃcient of interest to test whether industries with high external
ﬁnance requirements are aﬀected diﬀerentially by these growth shocks is on the interaction
term Growth Shocki,t ∗ Highj, this coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. Additionally,
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the triple interaction term Growth Shocki,t ∗ Highj ∗ Small Banki,t is neither positive nor
statistically signiﬁcant. These results indicate that industries with high external ﬁnance
requirements and industries with high external ﬁnance requirements in counties dominated
by small banks are not diﬀerentially aﬀected by general economic growth.
The primary diﬀerence between the growth shocks identiﬁed in Table 9, and the shale
growth shocks used in this study is the relative importance of the credit supply component
of the growth shock. Speciﬁcally, in a shale boom, overall establishments increase by 2.2%
with signiﬁcant variation linked to external ﬁnance requirements (documented in Table 5
and Table 7), bank deposits increase by 9.3%, more than four times the overall establishment
increase. Alternatively, in the non-shale growth shocks establishments increase overall by
17.6%, while deposits increase by slightly less than half this amount, a deposit change of less
than half the establishment increase compared to the more than four times relative increase
in shale booms. These results suggest that the credit component of shale booms make shale
growth shocks unique from general localized growth shocks.
5.4.3 Pre-existing Trends Placebo Test
An identifying assumption of a natural experiment is whether treatment and control
groups would have behaved similarly in the absence of treatment. One way to provide
evidence in support of this assumption is to test whether there are diﬀerential trends prior to
treatment. To directly test whether any of the local economic outcome changes begin prior
to a boom, I include dummy variables for the two years prior to the ﬁrst shale development.
These enter the regressions in the form of the False Boomi,t variable. As can be seen
in the results in Table 10, neither the False Boomi,t variable, nor any of the interaction
variables are statistically signiﬁcant. This result provides direct evidence that the changes
in economic outcome variables documented in this paper do not occur prior to the onset of
shale development activity, and that there are no statistically signiﬁcant pre-existing trends.
Furthermore, because shale discoveries occur in diﬀerent years in diﬀerent counties (not just
a single event in all counties at the same time), alternative interpretations of results would
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need to address changes in economic outcomes that happen to coincide with boom events in
diﬀerent locations at diﬀerent points in time.
5.4.4 Are Demand Shocks from Shale Booms Correlated with Bank Size?
A potential concern for the validity of my empirical design is whether real shocks asso-
ciated with a shale boom are larger in counties dominated by small banks relative to other
counties. If this is the case, my interpretation of my empirical tests may be problematic. To
provide evidence to alleviate this concern, I use retail sales data from the Economic Census
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau every 5 years. For this test, I use data on retail sales
to proxy for demand in an area. The speciﬁc comparison I make is based on the 2002 and
2007 Economic Census data. Using this data I can test whether retail sales increase more
in counties dominated by small banks after a boom relative to other counties after a boom.
The key coeﬃcient of interest in this test, is the interaction term Boomi,t ∗ SmallBanki,t. If
this coeﬃcient is greater than 0, it would suggest that retail sales increase more in a county
with a particular type of bank structure, and therefore indicate that demand shocks may
be diﬀerent across diﬀerent counties. As can be seen in the speciﬁcations in Table 11, the
coeﬃcients on the interaction term Boomi,t∗SmallBanki,t are not statistically diﬀerent from
0, suggesting that demand shocks are not correlated with bank size.
6 Conclusions
The United States has one of the most developed banking systems in the world. Prior
research has demonstrated that deregulation, the adoption of lending technology and securiti-
zation, have led to improved economic outcomes. However, this paper provides new evidence
that, after these improvements, there is signiﬁcant cross sectional variation in the eﬀect of
information and agency frictions in the banking system. To identify this variation I use oil
and gas shale discoveries to obtain exogenous variation in local credit supply to document
where and when changes in local credit supply have the largest eﬀect on local ﬁrms. If capi-
tal were able to ﬂow, absent frictions, to fund positive net present value projects, changes in
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local credit supply would not aﬀect local ﬁrms. Given that changes in local credit supply do
aﬀect local ﬁrms, it suggests that economically important frictions adversely aﬀect the ﬂow
of capital in the banking system.
I ﬁnd that cross sectional variation in the eﬀect of changes in credit supply is strongly
linked to local bank size. Areas dominated by small banks experience the biggest beneﬁt,
in the form of more business establishments in industries with greater external ﬁnancing
requirements, indicating that these lending markets suﬀer the most from information and
agency frictions in the banking system. However, this paper also highlights an important
bright side, as other lending markets with a greater presence of large banks do not experience
changes in economic activity linked to changes in credit supply. This indicates that many
of the advances in ﬁnancial innovation, such as securitization and credit score models, may
have served to mitigate economically important frictions in lending in these markets.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that information and agency frictions in
lending aﬀect economic outcomes along two dimensions. In particular, the greater importance
of local credit supply in areas dominated by small banks suggests that the combination of
small banks facing frictions in obtaining external capital and borrowers in areas dominated
by small banks facing frictions in obtaining loans has the biggest overall adverse impact on
economic outcomes. These results would suggest that additional tools or innovations which
could mitigate information or agency frictions for small banks in obtaining funding, may
improve outcomes in areas dominated by small banks.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of States and Counties With Shale Booms
Panel A: States, Counties, Shale Well Activity
Number of States 7
Number of Counties 639
Number of Boom Counties 104
Total Number of Shale Wells 16,731
Time Period 2000 - 2009
Panel B: Shale Discoveries ("Booms")
County Boom Year County Boom Year
1 Bowman County, North Dakota        2003 53 Bosque County , Texas               2007
2 Brazos County, Texas               2003 54 Ector County , Texas               2007
3 Moore County, Texas               2003 55 Erath County , Texas               2007
4 Potter County, Texas               2003 56 Hill County , Texas               2007
5 Upton County, Texas               2003 57 Jack County , Texas               2007
6 Washington County, Texas               2003 58 Jasper County , Texas               2007
7 Haskell County, Oklahoma            2004 59 Madison County , Texas               2007
8 Pittsburg County, Oklahoma            2004 60 Midland County , Texas               2007
9 Denton County, Texas               2004 61 Panola County , Texas               2007
10 Fayette County, Texas               2004 62 Somervell County , Texas               2007
11 Grimes County, Texas               2004 63 Webb County , Texas               2007
12 Johnson County, Texas               2004 64 Zavala County , Texas               2007
13 Lipscomb County, Texas               2004 65 Cleburne County , Arkansas            2008
14 Maverick County, Texas               2004 66 Atoka County , Oklahoma            2008
15 Shelby County, Texas               2004 67 Latimer County , Oklahoma            2008
16 Terrell County, Texas               2004 68 Lincoln County , Oklahoma            2008
17 Wise County, Texas               2004 69 Roger Mills County , Oklahoma            2008
18 De Soto County, Louisiana           2005 70 Washita County , Oklahoma            2008
19 Billings County, North Dakota        2005 71 Andrews County , Texas               2008
20 McKenzie County, North Dakota        2005 72 De Witt County , Texas               2008
21 Williams County, North Dakota        2005 73 Edwards County , Texas               2008
22 Le Flore County, Oklahoma            2005 74 Ellis County , Texas               2008
23 Gaines County, Texas               2005 75 Freestone County , Texas               2008
24 Hardeman County, Texas               2005 76 Harrison County , Texas               2008
25 Lee County, Texas               2005 77 Hemphill County , Texas               2008
26 Nacogdoches County, Texas               2005 78 Hutchinson County , Texas               2008
27 Parker County, Texas               2005 79 Karnes County , Texas               2008
28 Pecos County, Texas               2005 80 Lavaca County , Texas               2008
29 Reeves County, Texas               2005 81 Live Oak County , Texas               2008
30 Tarrant County, Texas               2005 82 Montague County , Texas               2008
31 Tyler County, Texas               2005 83 Palo Pinto County , Texas               2008
32 Divide County, North Dakota        2006 84 Polk County , Texas               2008
33 Golden Valley County, North Dakota      2006 85 Robertson County , Texas               2008
34 Coal County, Oklahoma            2006 86 Winkler County , Texas               2008
35 Bee County, Texas               2006 87 Logan County , Arkansas            2009
36 Burleson County, Texas               2006 88 Bossier County , Louisiana           2009
37 Dimmit County, Texas               2006 89 Caddo County , Louisiana           2009
38 Hood County, Texas               2006 90 Red River County , Louisiana           2009
39 Houston County, Texas               2006 91 Sabine County , Louisiana           2009
40 Ochiltree County, Texas               2006 92 Bottineau County , North Dakota        2009
41 Roberts County, Texas               2006 93 Canadian County , Oklahoma            2009
42 Ward County, Texas               2006 94 Carter County , Oklahoma            2009
43 Conway County, Arkansas            2007 95 Johnston County , Oklahoma            2009
44 Faulkner County, Arkansas            2007 96 Marshall County , Oklahoma            2009
45 Van Buren County, Arkansas            2007 97 Greene County , Pennsylvania        2009
46 White County, Arkansas            2007 98 Washington County , Pennsylvania        2009
47 Burke County, North Dakota        2007 99 Cherokee County , Texas               2009
48 Dunn County, North Dakota        2007 100 Dallas County , Texas               2009
49 Mountrail County, North Dakota        2007 101 Leon County , Texas               2009
50 Ellis County, Oklahoma            2007 102 San Augustine County , Texas               2009
51 Hughes County, Oklahoma            2007 103 Wheeler County , Texas               2009
52 Oklahoma County, Oklahoma            2007 104 Wood County , Texas               2009
This table contains summary statistics for the well data used in this study. Development of shale and other unconventional formations is done
using horizontal drilling, so I use horizontal well activity as the primary method of measuring when and where booms occur. The states in the
sample are states situated in the primary shale development areas: Barnett (TX), Woodford (OK), Haynesville (LA + TX), Fayetteville (AR),
Marcellus (PA + WV), Eagle Ford (TX), Bakken (ND).  Well data was obtained from Smith International Inc.  
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Do Private Firms Invest Diﬀerently than Public Firms?
Taking Cues from the Natural Gas Industry∗
Erik Gilje† Jérôme P. Taillard‡
Abstract
We study the investment behavior of private and public ﬁrms using a unique dataset of
onshore U.S. natural gas producers. In ﬁrm-level regressions we ﬁnd that investments
by private ﬁrms are 60% less responsive to changes in natural gas prices, a measure
that captures changes in marginal q. Exploiting county-speciﬁc shale gas discoveries
as a natural experiment, we show that public ﬁrms increase investment in response to
new growth opportunities with large capital requirements while private ﬁrms do not.
We observe that private ﬁrms sell these capital intensive growth opportunities to public
ﬁrms. These ﬁndings are not driven by heterogeneity in ﬁrm size, product markets,
pricing or costs. Our evidence is consistent with the higher cost of external capital of
private ﬁrms being of ﬁrst order importance for their investment policies.
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ESSAY 2
1 Introduction
Due to the large role of private ﬁrms in the U.S. economy, understanding how and why
listing status inﬂuences investment decisions is important.1 Privately-held ﬁrms have more
concentrated ownership, which makes them less vulnerable to shareholder-manager agency
conﬂicts than publicly-traded ﬁrms. As such, private ﬁrms are less prone to the investment
distortions created by shareholder-manager agency conﬂicts (e.g. Stein (1989) and Jensen
(1986)). However, private ﬁrms are also more opaque than publicly-traded ﬁrms. This greater
information asymmetry results in greater agency conﬂicts between existing shareholders and
potential new investors, which in turn raise the cost of external capital for private ﬁrms. The
goal of this study is to investigate how these listing-related frictions aﬀect investment.
Analyzing the investment behavior of private and public ﬁrms presents many challenges.
First, data on private ﬁrms are typically unavailable. Second, accurately measuring ﬁrms'
investment opportunities is a source of contention in the literature (e.g., Erickson and Whited
(2000) and Alti (2003)). Third, listing status is an endogenously determined variable.
Our study contributes to the literature by focusing on a setting where (1) detailed invest-
ment data is available for both public and private ﬁrms; (2) accurate measures of marginal q
exist for both public and private ﬁrms; and (3) exogenous shocks aﬀect investment opportu-
nities for public and private ﬁrms that have similar cost structures, pricing, and technology.
We use a unique dataset to study the investment activity of all public and private ﬁrms in
the onshore U.S. natural gas industry between 1997 and 2012. With detailed data on 74,670
individual projects, we are able to precisely observe the investment behavior of 380 private
ﬁrms and 92 public ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that private ﬁrms' investment policies are less sensitive
to changes in investment opportunities. This diﬀerence in investment response is strongly
related to a project's capital requirements; we ﬁnd that private ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less
likely to pursue investment opportunities that require large capital outlays. We observe that
private ﬁrms sell these capital intensive growth opportunities to publicly-traded ﬁrms. This
suggests that the redeployment of projects with large capital requirements from private ﬁrms
to public ﬁrms can serve to mitigate potential underinvestment concerns.
1In 2008 we estimate that in the U.S. at least 94.3% of business entities were privately-held and 53.8% of
aggregate business net income was from privately-held ﬁrms. These calculations are based on data reported
by the Internal Revenue Service in its Integrated Business Dataset.
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The U.S. onshore natural gas industry oﬀers several advantages when studying corporate
investment policies. First, capital expenditures in this industry correspond to drilling new
wells, and we are able to observe where and when each new well is drilled over a 16 year period.
Second, all ﬁrms produce natural gas as their main output, therefore the proﬁtability of each
new well is directly tied to the price of natural gas, which is observable and exogenously given.
Third, we show that our sample ﬁrms have homogenous cost structures that exhibit minimal
returns to scale. Given these revenue and cost characteristics, changes in marginal q are
proportional to changes in natural gas prices for both public and private ﬁrms. Moreover,
technological breakthroughs in hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling in
2003 create signiﬁcant new investment opportunities over our sample period, which allow us
to compare investment responses of private and public ﬁrms in a natural experiment setting.
Using two distinct identiﬁcation strategies we ﬁnd that private ﬁrms' investment policies
are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities than those of public ﬁrms. The
ﬁrst strategy is based on an investment to q panel regression where changes in investment
opportunities are measured using changes in the price of natural gas. We ﬁnd that private
ﬁrms are 60% less responsive to changes in natural gas prices than their publicly-traded
counterparts. While diﬀerences in ﬁrm size exist across public and private ﬁrms, we obtain
very similar results when we match public and private ﬁrms on size, and when we add size
controls to our speciﬁcations.
Our second identiﬁcation strategy uses shale discoveries as a natural experiment; these
discoveries provide localized positive exogenous shocks to investment opportunities.2 These
new investment opportunities have the characteristic of requiring signiﬁcantly more capital
than non-shale projects. We apply a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach to shale discoveries
that occur between 2003 and 2010 in 102 separate counties. Speciﬁcally, we analyze county-
level investment decisions made by private and public ﬁrms both before and after a discovery.
We focus only on ﬁrms active in areas prior to a shale discovery, and ﬁnd that public ﬁrms
respond signiﬁcantly to this positive shock with a 40% increase in drilling activity, while
private ﬁrms do not increase their investment activity.
We undertake several tests of the internal validity of our natural experiment following
2Section 2 outlines evidence that these discoveries provide positive shocks to the investment opportunity
set of ﬁrms operating in the area of a discovery.
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Roberts and Whited (2012). A valid diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences empirical design requires that
the parallel trends assumption be satisﬁed. In our setting, this corresponds to public and
private ﬁrms having similar investment trends in the absence of a shale discovery. Using
falsiﬁcation tests, we gauge whether pre-discovery trends diﬀer between public and private
ﬁrms prior to a shale discovery and ﬁnd no diﬀerences between the two groups of ﬁrms. We
also graphically show that the timing of changes in investment response is closely linked with
the timing of shale discoveries. Importantly, our natural experiment is comprised of multiple
events staggered over time and across diﬀerent geographies; this empirical design limits the
potential impact of confounding variables driving investment behavior.
Given our empirical setting, there are two main competing explanations for the diﬀer-
ences in investment behavior we observe. First, in a traditional manager-shareholder agency
cost framework, managerial actions induced by the separation of ownership and control could
cause public ﬁrms to overinvest or empire build (e.g., Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990)). Alter-
natively, private ﬁrms may have lower investment responses because they face a higher cost
of external capital (Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), Brav (2009), Schenone (2010),
Saunders and Steﬀen (2011), Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang (Forthcoming)).
To assess the overinvestment hypothesis empirically we compare public and private ﬁrm
investment levels in bad states of the world (low natural gas prices), and ﬁnd similar in-
vestment intensity levels across the two groups. This is the case even late in our sample
when signiﬁcant new shale drilling opportunities have become available. These results are
not consistent with public ﬁrms overinvesting when faced with unattractive investment op-
portunities.
Second, we test whether our results are driven by public ﬁrms that are more susceptible
to manager-shareholder agency conﬂicts. Given that the potential for these conﬂicts is the
greatest for ﬁrms with low insider ownership, we estimate our main investment sensitivity
speciﬁcations excluding ﬁrms with below median insider ownership. We ﬁnd that private
ﬁrms react 73% less to changes in the price of natural gas relative to the subset of public
ﬁrms with high insider ownership, i.e. public ﬁrms with arguably fewer manager-shareholder
conﬂicts. This result is also not supportive of the overinvestment hypothesis.
Overinvestment is often linked to settings in which ﬁrms have positive free cash ﬂow
(Jensen (1986)). In our setting, public ﬁrms do not have positive free cash ﬂow on average,
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and are heavily reliant on external capital markets to fund capital expenditures. Using
the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of external capital, the average public natural gas
producer raises 34% of its capital expenditures from external capital markets during our
sample period. This suggests the free cash ﬂow-based argument for overinvestment may be
less applicable in our setting.
Diﬀerences in cost of external capital could also explain diﬀerences in investment behavior
between public and private ﬁrms. Public ﬁrms have market prices readily available for their
equity and publicly available ﬁnancial statements; both of which provide important infor-
mation for potential investors (Michaely and Roberts (2012)). Conversely, private ﬁrms do
not have the same disclosure requirements and do not face the same level of scrutiny by the
markets. These diﬀerences lead to greater information asymmetries for private ﬁrms between
existing shareholders and potential investors, which in turn lead private ﬁrms to face a higher
cost of external capital relative to public ﬁrms. Consistent with this theoretical argument,
the existing literature has documented that both equity (Brav (2009)) and debt (Pagano
et al. (1998), Schenone (2010), Saunders and Steﬀen (2011)) are more costly for private ﬁrms
to raise.
Our empirical setting oﬀers evidence that is largely consistent with the greater cost of
external capital hypothesis. First, we ﬁnd that public ﬁrms only invest more than private
ﬁrms when opportunities are the most attractive, namely in high natural gas price environ-
ments. Moreover, public ﬁrm investment in high natural gas price environments is facilitated
by access to external capital markets given that the average public ﬁrm in our sample raises
external capital equal to 15% of its assets in high natural gas price years, compared to just
6% in low natural gas price environments.
Second, while we observe that private ﬁrms do respond to changes in natural gas prices at
the county level for less capital intensive non-shale wells, we ﬁnd that they do not adjust their
investment behavior when new investment opportunities linked to more capital intensive shale
projects become available. Under the cost of external capital hypothesis, we would expect to
ﬁnd this diﬀerential in reaction given that shale projects require signiﬁcantly greater external
capital than the development of non-shale wells.
Diﬀerences in investment policies between private and public ﬁrms do not necessarily
lead to aggregate underinvestment. If private ﬁrms are relatively more capital constrained,
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assets may be redeployed to relatively unconstrained ﬁrms in order to generate a better
allocation of resources (Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). Therefore, one mechanism that would
allow attractive capital intensive projects to be pursued are asset sales of capital intensive
projects from private ﬁrms to public ﬁrms. We ﬁnd direct evidence of this transfer of capital
intensive projects in our data. Using detailed data on two shale discoveries, we ﬁnd that
private ﬁrms sell their shale drilling tracts to publicly-traded ﬁrms 63% of the time. This
compares to public ﬁrms selling drilling tracts 21% of the time, and only to other public
ﬁrms. This result provides a deeper understanding of how frictions related to listing status
can be mitigated.
An ideal empirical strategy would not only have exogenous changes in investment op-
portunities, but also random assignment of a ﬁrm's listing status. We do not have random
assignment of listing status in our setting. However, we show that private and public ﬁrms
share many similar characteristics in terms of cost structure, technology, output and prof-
itability. Therefore, our setting allows us to make some progress towards reducing potential
endogeneity issues. Furthermore, the cost of external capital interpretation of our results
relies on diﬀerent investment responses to projects based on capital requirements. Thus any
alternative interpretation would need to explain both the diﬀerences in investment responses
between public and private ﬁrms, and the diﬀerential response for projects which require more
capital versus less capital. We evaluate the plausibility of several alternative explanations
based on unobserved diﬀerences in risk aversion, risk management practices and manager-
shareholder agency conﬂicts. While we do not rule out that these alternative factors can
inﬂuence investment behavior, our evidence suggests that diﬀerences in the cost of external
capital are of ﬁrst order importance in explaining the diﬀerent investment policies of public
and private ﬁrms.
Sheen (2009) and Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2011) also compare the investment
behavior of public and private ﬁrms, albeit in diﬀerent empirical settings than ours. Sheen
(2009) analyzes multi-year plant expansion decisions in the chemical industry and shows
that private ﬁrms anticipate future demand better than their public counterparts, whereas
we focus on investment responses to changes in marginal q. Asker et al. (2011) make use
of a large dataset on private ﬁrms to show that public ﬁrms are less responsive to changes
in their investment opportunities than private ﬁrms. However, they measure investment
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opportunities for a given ﬁrm by its sales growth and its industry Q, both of which have the
potential for mismeasurement error. These papers rely on shareholder-manager agency-based
short-termism theories to explain their results (e.g., Stein (1989)). In particular, Asker et al.
(2011) show that their underinvestment result is driven by industries that have high stock
price sensitivity to earnings news, and therefore are more prone to myopic behavior. We do
not ﬁnd evidence of underinvestment by public ﬁrms. However, based on Asker et al. (2011)'s
measure, natural gas producers have stock price sensitivity to earnings news that is below
the Compustat median, therefore myopic behavior should be less prevalent in our setting.3
We show that public ﬁrms increase investments signiﬁcantly more than private ﬁrms
during periods of high natural gas prices. This increase in investment by public ﬁrms is
facilitated by greater access to capital markets. We also observe that public ﬁrms increase
investment when new projects with large capital requirements become available, while private
ﬁrms do not. These results imply that listing related frictions can have an economically
important inﬂuence on the investment behavior of private and public ﬁrms. We also show
that the impact of these frictions can be mitigated by the transfer of capital intensive projects
from private ﬁrms to public ﬁrms.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide details on our measures of
investment opportunities. In Section 3, we discuss our unique dataset. In Section 4, we
present our methodology and results. Section 5 provides a discussion of our results. Section
6 concludes.
2 Measures of Investment Opportunities
The Company can adjust quickly to the changes in commodity prices if necessary.
Equal has an extensive multiple year drilling inventory so it can increase capital
3 Asker et al. (2011) are able to replicate our ﬁrm-level results with their data by restricting their sample
to natural gas producers (NAICS 211111).
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spending in a higher commodity price environment.
- Equal Energy, publicly-traded natural gas producer
The onshore U.S. natural gas industry has several characteristics which make it an at-
tractive setting to test how public and private ﬁrms respond to changes in investment op-
portunities. First, changes in investment opportunities for both public and private ﬁrms can
be measured using commodity prices. Second, we can precisely measure capital expenditures
for every public and private ﬁrm in this industry as capital expenditures correspond to the
number of new wells being drilled. Moreover, all new wells drilled are directly observable in
our dataset for both public and private ﬁrms. Lastly, the natural gas industry has experi-
enced a technological shock in the last decade (fracking) which has made the development of
new reserves (shale) economically viable. We justify the use of this unexpected technological
shock as a natural experiment in this section.
2.1 Q theory, Marginal q and Natural Gas Prices
Neoclassical models show that the optimal investment intensity level of a ﬁrm is a function
of marginal q, whereby marginal q is equal to the expected present value of the proﬁts
generated from investing one additional unit of capital (e.g. Hayashi (1982)). Typically,
researchers can only observe average q which is the ratio of the market value of existing
capital to its replacement costs. Hayashi (1982) demonstrates that the marginal product of
capital is equal to the average product of capital only under perfect competition and when
there are no returns to scale. When these conditions are not satisﬁed, using average q leads
to well-known mismeasurement errors (e.g. Erickson and Whited (2000)). In this study, we
can circumvent this issue as we do not rely on average q. We use natural gas prices, which
are directly related to marginal q in our setting. Speciﬁcally, the expected present value of
the proﬁts generated from investing one additional unit of capital, marginal q, is proportional
to the natural gas prices a producer can obtain for new production.
Empirically, a key advantage of the natural gas industry is the high degree of commonality
between public and private ﬁrms in terms of the marginal returns to one extra unit of capital
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invested. Speciﬁcally, in order to make valid inferences within our investment regression
framework, we need changes in natural gas prices to aﬀect the marginal q of private and
public ﬁrms similarly. We oﬀer both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in support
of this assumption.
First, in terms of output, all projects yield the same fungible good and because natural
gas is provided by a competitive market of suppliers, all ﬁrms are price takers and thus
obtain similar prices for their product. While geographical diﬀerences may yield diﬀerent
output prices, we show in Appendix A that there is a very high correlation in natural gas
prices obtained across diﬀerent regions of the U.S. Second, the amount of gas produced
from one extra unit of capital needs to be the same across private and public ﬁrms. While
geographical diﬀerences can lead to discrepancies in terms of well productivity, the regressions
with ﬁrm-county-level ﬁxed-eﬀects control for potential discrepancies in project output linked
to diﬀerences in geography. Using two shale discoveries where we have detailed production
data, we show in Appendix B (Panel B) that the output for shale wells is not statistically or
economically diﬀerent across private and public ﬁrms operating in the same geography.
While gross proﬁts expand similarly for both private and public ﬁrms when natural gas
prices increase, one may be concerned that drilling costs could vary systematically in the
cross-section. In particular, some industries exhibit returns to scale on the cost side whereby
large companies can extract discounts from suppliers and contractors on investments due to
their scale. To test whether scale is a factor in per well costs, we hand-collect data on capital
expenditures and wells drilled from 10-K ﬁlings of publicly-traded ﬁrms in SIC 1311 from
2006 to 2009. We then compute the average well cost for each ﬁrm and analyze how it varies
within the universe of publicly-traded natural gas producers in our sample. The results from
this analysis are displayed in Appendix C and indicate that there is almost no discernible
diﬀerence between the median per well cost of large and small publicly-traded ﬁrms in our
sample, despite the fact that large ﬁrms are on average ﬁve to six times the size of small
ﬁrms. This evidence serves to alleviate concerns that cost heterogeneity in the cross-section
is driving our results.
Overall, the economics of this industry are such that all ﬁrms produce an exogenously
priced commodity and have a relatively homogeneous cost structure. Hence the net beneﬁts
of one extra unit of capital are similar across private and public ﬁrms. This feature creates
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an attractive setting to compare and contrast the investment responses of private and public
ﬁrms to changes in natural gas prices.
2.2 Natural Experiment: Shale Gas Discoveries
This section explains the key features of shale gas discoveries, which provides justiﬁcation
for their use in the context of a natural experiment setting.
2.2.1 Unexpected Development of Natural Gas Shale
Today's tight natural gas markets have been a long time in coming, and distant
futures prices suggest that we are not apt to return to earlier periods of relative
abundance and low prices anytime soon.
- Alan Greenspan, July 2003, Senate Energy Committee Testimony
Prior to the development of natural gas shale, the consensus view was that low supply
levels of natural gas would persist for the foreseeable future. As recently as the year 2000,
natural gas produced from shale comprised only 1% of natural gas production in the United
States. The technological breakthroughs occurring in 2003 that combined hydraulic fractur-
ing (fracking) with horizontal drilling enabled the economically proﬁtable development of
shale (Yergin (2011)). As a consequence, natural gas produced from shale today comprises
25% of all U.S. natural gas production and new natural gas reserves from shale are now
equivalent to a 100 year supply of U.S. natural gas consumption (Yergin (2011)). These
advancements have resulted in new investment opportunities for the development and pro-
duction of natural gas in the major natural gas shale ﬁelds that have been discovered to date.
Many shale discoveries have been made across the United States since 2003. In Panel A of
Appendix B we document the number of shale discoveries that occur each year.4
In our study, we compare investment decisions for shale projects versus non-shale projects.
An important feature of this comparison is the diﬀerence in capital requirements to drill
shale wells. While shale wells produce signiﬁcantly more than non-shale wells they are more
4For our study we focus on shale discoveries in the six states with major natural gas shale discoveries:
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia.
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expensive than non-shale wells. Lake et al. (2012) state that shale wells cost between $6.7M
and $9.5M, while non-shale wells usually cost less than $1M.
The development of shale uses drilling technology that is provided by third party con-
tractors (e.g. Halliburton). Therefore the technology for shale development is available to all
operators in our sample. This fact mitigates concerns regarding potential diﬀerences in access
to patents or technological know-how that could be problematic for tests using technological
breakthroughs in other settings.
2.2.2 Proﬁtability of Natural Gas Shale Drilling
We oﬀer three pieces of evidence which suggest that shale development is proﬁtable during
our sample period. The ﬁrst piece of evidence is based on a detailed evaluation of the cash
ﬂows associated with shale discoveries by Lake, Martin, Ramsey, and Titman (2012). Using
data from a Haynesville shale well and extensive simulations, they ﬁnd that most shale gas
wells are proﬁtable under their modeling assumptions. In particular, they ﬁnd that the key
driver of a well's NPV is the price of natural gas with a breakeven point of $3.80 per Mcf.
Over the time period of shale production in our study from 2003 to 2012 natural gas prices
averaged $5.30 on an annual basis, and only dipped below $3.80 in two out of ten years.
Additionally, to mitigate the risk of price ﬂuctuations after a well has been drilled, Lake
et al. (2012) point out that it is common for producers to hedge price risk for up to ﬁve
years using derivatives. There is a high correlation between the spot price of natural gas
and futures prices up to 36 months out (see Appendix Figure A). This feature of our setting
combined with the front loading of project cash ﬂows suggests that if a ﬁrm was concerned
about price ﬂuctuations, it could lock-in current prices for the most productive period of a
well.5
The second piece of evidence is based on market measures of project proﬁtability. If a
ﬁrm has positive NPV projects, we would expect it to have a market-to-book ratio (average
q) above one. This is because the numerator (market value) includes the net present value of
a ﬁrm's future investments or growth opportunities (Lindenberg and Ross (1981)). If shale
development were not proﬁtable we would expect the negative cash ﬂows from these projects
5An example of a typical well's production decline over time is depicted in Appendix Figure B. For
example, Lake et al. (2012) assume that 70% of available reserves are extracted in the ﬁrst year.
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to be recognized by the market and observe market-to-book values signiﬁcantly below one.
During the time period of signiﬁcant shale discoveries in our study (2003 to 2012), the average
market-to-book ratio for public ﬁrms in our sample was 1.52. This evidence is inconsistent
with shale projects being unproﬁtable. Furthermore, over this ten year time period, market
participants have had signiﬁcant time to analyze detailed data on the proﬁtability of these
projects, making it less likely that markets are misinformed about the proﬁtability of these
projects.
The third piece of evidence, which suggests that shale resources are proﬁtable to develop, is
the frequent need to access external capital markets by natural gas producers to ﬁnance their
capital expenditure programs. Natural gas producers raise 34% of their capital expenditures
from external sources during our sample period. This capital raising activity means that over
a sustained period of time investors have provided public ﬁrms with signiﬁcant funding for
shale investments. If shale investments were unproﬁtable, it is unlikely that capital markets
would continue to provide funding for them over a prolonged period of time. Taken together,
the evidence presented above implies that, during our sample period, shale discoveries provide
positive shocks to the investment opportunity set of ﬁrms active in the area of a discovery.
2.2.3 Characteristics of Shale Discoveries
In this subsection, we highlight two features of shale discoveries that make their use
particularly well-suited in the context of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. First, Panel
A of Appendix B shows the number of shale discoveries that occur each year in diﬀerent
counties. One advantage of our setup highlighted in this panel is the fact that we have 102
diﬀerent shocks to county-level investment opportunities over eight years. As suggested in
Roberts and Whited (2012), the fact that we have multiple staggered events alleviates the
risk that other confounding events could be driving the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences results.
Second, shale projects oﬀer very similar investment opportunities for both public and
private ﬁrms already operating in an area of a shale discovery. In particular, by making
use of a unique dataset from the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, we show that, in the
Woodford shale and Cana shale, private and public ﬁrms face similar development costs and
also obtain similar production levels. In speciﬁcation (1) of Panel B in Appendix B we regress
production volumes from a well's ﬁrst year of production on a private indicator variable. The
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economic interpretation of the coeﬃcient on the private indicator variable is that the ﬁrst
year of production from wells drilled by private ﬁrms is 4.4% less than wells drilled by public
ﬁrms, however, this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcation (2) of Panel B in
Appendix B shows that well costs for wells drilled by private ﬁrms are 3.7% lower. This
diﬀerence is neither economically nor statistically signiﬁcant. Taken together, this evidence
suggests that there are no economically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in production or costs for shale
projects related to a ﬁrm's listing status.6
3 Data
Data on investment activity for private and public ﬁrms is obtained from Schlumberger
Corporation's Smith International Rig Count, henceforth referred to as our drilling dataset.
Schlumberger reports information on every rig in the United States that is actively drilling
a natural gas well. This dataset provides detailed information on where a natural gas well
is being drilled, who is drilling it, and when it is being drilled, at a weekly frequency over
the period 1997 to 2012. Appendix D provides an example of the raw drilling data. The raw
dataset is comprised of rig-week data points, whereby a rig-week is deﬁned as the week that
a drilling rig is actively drilling a well. The number of rig-week observations corresponds to
the number of weeks it takes to drill a given well. Our study captures drilling activity not
through the rig-week measure but through the number of wells being drilled by a given ﬁrm.
Each well being drilled has a state/county/well name/well number identiﬁer in our rig-week
dataset. We describe in more detail below how we use the raw data on each individual well
to construct our ﬁrm-level and county-level variables.
We conduct Lexis Nexis and Internet searches to determine whether natural gas producers
in the drilling database are publicly-traded, a subsidiary of a publicly-traded ﬁrm or a private
ﬁrm. We only include ﬁrms in this study that could be conclusively validated as public or
private. Drilling activity of a subsidiary is combined with the drilling activity of its parent.
All publicly-traded ﬁrms not within SIC 1311 (Crude Oil & Natural Gas) are excluded from
our sample for ﬁrm-level regressions. In particular, this restriction eliminates all the vertically
6Our main shale tests are based on a much broader dataset of discoveries. The purpose of this detailed
analysis of two shale discoveries in Oklahoma is to document the homogeneity in shale projects across public
and private ﬁrms using unique production and cost data made available by the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission.
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integrated oil and gas companies, such as ExxonMobil, whose investment opportunity set is
not well captured by changes in the price of natural gas due to their diversiﬁed lines of
business (e.g. reﬁning). Lastly, we exclude the twelve ﬁrms that switch from private to
public or public to private during our sample period.
3.1 Firm-level Data
We make use of a unique dataset of all drilling activity conducted by onshore U.S. natural
gas producers to proxy for capital expenditures and net PP&E for each ﬁrm in our sample.
We aggregate the Smith International weekly Rig Count data into ﬁrm-year observations
to construct a panel that makes our estimations comparable to the existing literature. Our
measures of capital expenditures (CAPEX) and capital stock (PP&E) are derived from this
drilling dataset.
Having measures which are reasonable proxies of accounting-based capital stock and in-
vestment for both private and public ﬁrms is one of the main advantages of our empirical
framework. Because drilling is the primary investment activity of natural gas producers, we
use the number of wells for which drilling operations have been initiated in a given year as
our proxy for the amount of investment (I) a ﬁrm makes. The second metric we proxy for is
a ﬁrm's capital stock (K). Net Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) is typically used as
a proxy for the capital stock of a ﬁrm in large panel studies (e.g., Cleary (1999)). In the nat-
ural gas industry, net PP&E predominantly consists of proven reserves, i.e. reserves that are
meant to be recoverable with reasonable certainty under the current geopolitical, economic
and technological conditions (FASB 19). Hence, in order to increase its productive capital,
a natural gas producer must drill additional wells thereby increasing the amount of natural
gas it can book as reserves. We compute a proxy for capital stock from the drilling data
as the number of wells for which drilling operations have been completed in the prior three
years. We use three years to achieve a balance between having a reasonably sized sample and
having a good proxy for capital stock. Using the prior three years for our estimate of capital
stock requires that the sample for our regressions starts in the year 2000 rather than 1997,
which means we have 13 years of data for our ﬁrm-level panel regressions. By computing the
ratio of these two measures (I/K), we derive a measure of investment intensity that is often
used in the literature as the main dependent variable of interest for investment sensitivity
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regressions (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales (1997)).
To reduce the eﬀect of outliers and ensure we have reasonable estimates of a ﬁrm's invest-
ment and capital stock we apply a number of screens to the raw drilling data. Speciﬁcally,
we require that a ﬁrm must drill at least one well to have a ﬁrm-year observation in the sam-
ple. This restriction ensures that only ﬁrms with active investment programs are included.
We also require that a ﬁrm have a minimum capital stock of at least 10 wells in the prior
three years and we exclude observations with an I/K ratio above the 99th percentile. Table
1 outlines the main sample used for the ﬁrm level panel regressions. Our sample contains
380 unique private ﬁrms and 92 unique public ﬁrms, which have 1,813 and 569 ﬁrm-year
observations respectively over the 2000-2012 time period. Using the subset of Compustat
ﬁrms in our sample for which we have both drilling and accounting-based data, we show in
Appendix Figure C that our proxies for investment and capital stock enable us to construct
I/K measures that are comparable across the two datasets.
Lastly, we compute an annual measure of natural gas prices by computing the annual
average of the daily wellhead gas prices obtained by natural gas producers, as reported by
the U.S. Energy Information Administration.7 One signiﬁcant advantage of this measure is
that we smooth out some transient jumps in the daily wellhead prices linked to two January
cold snaps in 2001 and 2003 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
One issue highlighted in Table 1 is that private ﬁrms are on average smaller than their
publicly-traded counterparts. To assess whether diﬀerences in size between public and private
ﬁrms are responsible for how ﬁrms respond to changes in natural gas prices we undertake
several exercises. First we increase the minimum size requirement for inclusion in the sample.
Speciﬁcally, we require that both public and private ﬁrms have capital stock levels above
diﬀerent minimum threshold levels. Table 1 Panel B documents how the ﬁrm-size distribution
changes for both public and private ﬁrms when diﬀerent size cutoﬀs are used. While size
diﬀerences are reduced when we increase the size cutoﬀs, there remain signiﬁcant disparities
across the two types of ﬁrms.
To further address this size issue, we devise a second approach using a size-based matched
7We document in Appendix A that the wellhead price of natural gas is highly correlated with natural
gas strip futures prices and with the price of natural gas in diﬀerent regions in the United States. This
suggests that the wellhead price of natural gas is a reasonable proxy for the price a ﬁrm could obtain for its
production, as well as its investment opportunities regardless of a ﬁrm's speciﬁc region of operation.
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sample. We follow the same nearest-neighbor matching methodology as in Asker et al. (2011).
In particular, as soon as a private ﬁrm enters our sample we match it to a public ﬁrm based
on its capital stock value in the year it enters the sample. We keep the same match every
year until the private ﬁrm or the matched public ﬁrm drops out of the sample. If the matched
public ﬁrm drops from the sample, then we ﬁnd a new match for the private ﬁrm in that year
which is then kept going forward. Similar to Asker et al. (2011), we match with replacement
to ensure that we get the best match possible. After conducting this procedure, we end up
with a public-private sample matched on size, with 67 unique public ﬁrms and 354 unique
private ﬁrms, and a total of 3,176 ﬁrm-years. As Panel B of Table 1 documents, our size
matching generates remarkably comparable ﬁrm-sizes across public and private ﬁrms in the
year of the match, with a mean capital stock of public ﬁrms of 22.07 wells compared to a
mean capital stock of private ﬁrms of 22.15 wells.
Relative to Asker et al. (2011), we further impose a 10% discrepancy tolerance threshold
for each matched pair in the year of the match. It is important to note that our procedure
does not over-sample from a subset of small public ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the top decile of the
most sampled public ﬁrms is matched to 23.6% of all private ﬁrm-year observations.8
3.2 Natural Experiment: County-level Data
Our dataset contains speciﬁc information on the location of wells and well characteristics
that allows us to observe where and when a shale discovery occurs. We use the same deﬁnition
as Gilje (2011), which relies on the number of horizontal wells drilled in a given county.9
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a shale discovery to have occurred when there have been more than
20 horizontal wells drilled in the county. This threshold is set such that counties in the
top quartile of county-years with horizontal drilling activity are considered shale discovery
county-years. Using this deﬁnition implies that more than 90% of all horizontal wells in our
sample are drilled in county-years that are shale discovery county-years.
We focus only on the subset of ﬁrms that are active in a county prior to a shale discovery;
this guarantees that they have the right to drill new wells in a shale discovery county through
their existing leases. Speciﬁcally, if a ﬁrm was drilling non-shale wells in a county prior to
8Our main results are similar when we exclude these oversampled ﬁrms and their matches.
9Horizontal wells are the primary type of well used to develop shale gas.
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the discovery of shale, it now has valuable acreage that can be further developed to extract
the new shale resource by drilling horizontal wells in the shale rock below its existing wells.
Additionally, we require that a ﬁrm has some investment activity after the discovery of shale
in a county, which insures that they did not exit an area prior to the shale discovery. For
our shale discovery test, we use discoveries that are staggered across several years between
2003 and 2010 (see Appendix B). The end date for our shale discoveries is 2010 although we
have data until 2012. This restriction ensures that we have a three year pre and post-period
window for each shale discovery in our sample.
4 Methodology and Results
4.1 Investment Policies and Natural Gas Prices
In this section, we ﬁrst compare the investment levels of both public and private ﬁrms
during diﬀerent price regimes over our sample period. We then compare in a panel regression
framework the sensitivity of investment for both public and private ﬁrms to changes in
natural gas prices, our proxy for marginal q. Figures 1 and 2 provide suggestive evidence at
the aggregate level as to how ﬁrms in this industry react to changes in natural gas prices.
Figure 1 highlights a strong relationship at the industry level between aggregate investment
and changes in natural gas prices. However, Figure 2 shows that when this aggregate drilling
activity is broken down between public and privately-held ﬁrms, public ﬁrms appear to
be more sensitive to changes in natural gas prices than private ﬁrms. The diﬀerence is
particularly visible during the 2003-2008 run-up in natural gas prices whereby the drilling
activity of public ﬁrms follows the upward trend in natural gas prices while the drilling
activity of private ﬁrms remains relatively ﬂat over that time period.
Table 2 presents the results of univariate tests which compare investment intensity levels
of public and private ﬁrms at diﬀerent natural gas price levels. We split natural gas price
levels into terciles, and compare year-by-year investment intensity levels in the diﬀerent price
environments. In low price environments, public and private ﬁrms do not have statistically
diﬀerent investment intensity levels. Low price environments appear both at the beginning
and at the end of our sample; this is important because it suggests that even in the presence
of signiﬁcant shale-related drilling opportunities, both public and private ﬁrms reduce their
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investments in the face of adverse natural gas prices. In medium level price environments,
public ﬁrms' investment intensity is statistically signiﬁcantly greater than private ﬁrms' in
two of four years, while public ﬁrms invest signiﬁcantly more than private ﬁrms in all high
price years.
A second observation can be made from Table 2 regarding the investment sensitivity to
natural gas prices. Namely, public ﬁrms increase their investment activity signiﬁcantly more
than private ﬁrms when going from a low to a high price environment. For example, when
comparing the investment mean values from the low price environment to the highest, public
ﬁrms increase I/K from an average of 0.34 to 0.59, while private ﬁrms increase I/K from an
average of 0.29 to 0.40. In terms of percentage change, public ﬁrm investment increases 74%
from the low price environments to the high price environments compared to a 38% increase
from low to high price environments for private ﬁrms. These initial univariate tests provide
evidence that public ﬁrm investment is more sensitive than private ﬁrm investment to natural
gas prices.
We more formally test these univariate results in a regression framework. To do so,
we estimate a panel regression with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, controlling for any time-invariant
unobserved diﬀerences across ﬁrms. We also cluster the error terms by ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, we
run panel regressions for two measures of investments (I/K and log(I)) regressed on indicator
variables, Hight and Lowt, which are based on the natural gas price terciles during the sample
period from 2000 to 2012, respectively the highest and the lowest price terciles. These price
environment indicators are interacted with a private dummy also (Hight ∗ Privatei and
Lowt ∗ Privatei):
Investmenti,t = α + β1Lowt + β2Lowt ∗ Privatei+
β3Hight + β4Hight ∗ Privatei + β5Privatei + FirmFEi + εi,t
The key coeﬃcient of interest in determining whether private ﬁrms' investment levels are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those of public ﬁrms in high natural gas price environments is β4,
the coeﬃcient on the interaction term Hight ∗ Privatei. Similarly, the magnitude and sign
of β2, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term Lowt ∗ Privatei, provide an indication of how
private ﬁrms respond relative to public ﬁrms in low natural gas price environments. The
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private dummy, Privatei, is absorbed by the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in our regressions. Results are
shown in Table 3. We implement the test with a minimum size cutoﬀ in columns (1)-(2) and
(5)-(6) and on our size matched sample in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8).
We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on the interaction term Hight ∗ Privatei is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant in all our speciﬁcations. These results indicate that private ﬁrms in-
vest signiﬁcantly less in high natural gas price regimes than public ﬁrms. Conversely, the
coeﬃcient on the interaction term Lowt ∗ Privatei is positive but not statistically signiﬁ-
cant in all speciﬁcations. This result conﬁrms the asymmetry documented earlier in Table
2. The diﬀerences in investment behavior between private and public ﬁrms occur in high
price environments. When prices are high, public ﬁrms invest signiﬁcantly more than their
privately-held counterparts.
After analyzing investment levels across diﬀerent price regimes, we now turn to measuring
ﬁrm-level investment sensitivities to changes in natural gas prices, our proxy for marginal q.
We use a panel regression framework with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, controlling for any time-invariant
unobserved diﬀerences across ﬁrms. We also cluster the error terms by ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, we
run panel regressions for two measures of investments (I/K and log(I)) regressed on natural
gas prices (NGt) and natural gas prices interacted with a private dummy (NGt ∗ Privatei):
Investmenti,t = α + β1NGt + β2NGt ∗ Privatei + β3Privatei + FirmFEi + εi,t
The key coeﬃcient of interest in determining whether private ﬁrms respond diﬀerently to
changes in the price of natural gas is β2, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term NGt∗Privatei.
The magnitude and sign on the coeﬃcient of this term is an indication of how private ﬁrms
respond relative to public ﬁrms for a given change in natural gas prices.10
Results are shown in Table 4 Panel A for I/K and Panel B for the log(I) speciﬁcation.
To address concerns regarding diﬀerences in size, we implement several minimum size cutoﬀs
in speciﬁcations (1)-(6). Additionally, we also run our tests on our size matched sample in
speciﬁcations (7)-(8).
We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on the interaction term NGt ∗ Privatei is negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in all our speciﬁcations, including the matched sample. Speciﬁcally, the
10The private dummy, Privatei, is absorbed by the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in our regressions.
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magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the interaction term NGt ∗ Privatei is equal to 60% of the
magnitude of the coeﬃcient on NGt, which indicates that private ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less
responsive to changes in natural gas prices than their publicly-traded counterparts.
Do private ﬁrms respond at all to changes in the price of natural gas? To assess the
eﬀect of changes in the price of natural gas on private ﬁrms we need to test whether the
combination of the coeﬃcients on NGt and NGt ∗ Privatei is signiﬁcantly greater than zero
(H0: β1 + β2 = 0 vs. Ha: β1 + β2 > 0). The results for this test are shown below the main
regressions in both Panel A and Panel B of Table 4. For example, in speciﬁcation (2) of Panel
A we ﬁnd that the sum of the two coeﬃcients is equal to 0.026 (= 0.065 − 0.039), a ﬁgure
that is both positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This diﬀerence is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations found in Panel A and Panel B of Table 4. This result means
that private ﬁrms react to changes in natural gas prices, albeit at a signiﬁcantly lower degree
than their publicly-traded counterparts.
Relating the coeﬃcients in speciﬁcation (2) of Panel A to the median investment intensity
of each ﬁrm type implies that a one standard deviation increase in natural gas prices leads
public ﬁrms to increase their investment intensity ratio by 29% while the investment intensity
ratio of private ﬁrms only increases by 15%. Similarly, in speciﬁcation (2) of Panel B, with
log of investments as the dependent variable, we ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase
in the price of natural gas leads public ﬁrms to increase investment by 30% while private
ﬁrms increase investments by only 17%.
The sign and signiﬁcance of our results remain unchanged in most speciﬁcations, and the
magnitude of our coeﬃcient remains nearly the same throughout. When ﬁrms are matched
on size in speciﬁcations (7)-(8), we ﬁnd very similar and statistically signiﬁcant results.
This ﬁnding suggests that diﬀerences in size do not account for the observed diﬀerences in
investment behavior. To further investigate how ﬁrm size, as opposed to listing status, aﬀects
our results, we augment our baseline speciﬁcation by adding size controls in our regressions
in Table 5. To do so, we include an indicator variable for whether a ﬁrm is above the median
ﬁrm in terms of size in a given year, and when the left-hand side variable is the logarithm of
investments (log(I)), we include the logarithm of capital stock (log(K)) as a control variable
for size (Sizei,t). Moreover, we include an interaction term between these measures of size
and our investment opportunity measures NGt ∗Sizei,t to test whether being private proxies
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for a size eﬀect. When we add both the interaction of price with the private dummy and
price with size, we observe that the interaction with the private dummy remains statistically
signiﬁcant throughout all speciﬁcations in Table 5. This result provides further evidence that
diﬀerences in size between private and public ﬁrms are not driving our results.
In Table 6 we perform a variety of robustness tests on our baseline speciﬁcations. We ﬁrst
replace in columns (1) and (2) the spot price of natural gas with the futures price of natural
gas as our proxy for marginal q. We use 12 month futures strip prices as our measure
for futures prices. The strip price is the industry standard measure of futures prices and
corresponds to an arithmetic average of the natural gas futures prices with delivery dates
over next 12 months from a given point in time. Historically the strip price has been highly
correlated with spot prices but we test that the sensitivities estimated are robust to this
alternative speciﬁcation. Results in columns (1) and (2) show that we observe quantitatively
very similar results to our main regression when we use futures prices instead of spot prices.
We also test our main speciﬁcation in columns (3) and (4) at the quarterly frequency.
We observe coeﬃcients that are roughly a quarter in magnitude relative to those in our main
speciﬁcation in Table 4 Panel A. More importantly, the diﬀerences in sensitivities between
public and private ﬁrms at the quarterly frequency are of similar economic magnitudes as
those at the annual frequency.
In order to ensure that our results are not driven by the behavior of the largest ﬁrms in
our sample, we exclude ﬁrms with more than 500 wells drilled over the past three years in
columns (5) and (6) and observe similar results as Table 4. Lastly, when we include time-
ﬁxed eﬀects in columns (7) and (8), NGt is no longer identiﬁed, but NGt ∗ Privatei still is
and we observe an interaction coeﬃcient similar to our main speciﬁcation. Overall, our panel
regression results are robust to many alternative speciﬁcations. We ﬁnd that private ﬁrms are
signiﬁcantly less sensitive to changes in investment opportunities than their publicly-traded
counterparts.
The evidence provided in this section is both economically and statistically robust. The
univariate tests and regression results provided in Table 2 and 3 focus on the relative levels
of investment across public and private ﬁrms. We observe that both public and private
ﬁrms invest at similar levels in low natural gas price environments, which occur both at the
beginning and at the end of the sample period. However, in high price environments, public
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ﬁrms invest signiﬁcantly more than their privately-held counterparts. These results translate
directly into our ﬁrm-level investment sensitivity results. When prices increase, public ﬁrms
increase their investment intensity level more than private ﬁrms. And when prices drop
towards the end of the sample period, the reduction in investments is more pronounced
among public ﬁrms given that they invest at higher levels in the high price environment.
This pattern of behavior corresponds to the higher sensitivities of public ﬁrms to natural gas
prices observed in our ﬁrm-level sensitivity regressions.
4.2 Natural Experiment: Shale Gas Discoveries
In this section, we test how private and public ﬁrms respond to county-level shale discov-
eries. We use the unexpected investment opportunities created by shale gas discoveries as a
natural experiment. Speciﬁcally, we use data on ﬁrm investment activity at the county level
in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework to see how public and private ﬁrms with pre-existing
operations in counties with shale discoveries respond to the new investment opportunity. The
ﬁrst diﬀerence can be viewed as comparing investment pre-discovery versus post-discovery,
while the second diﬀerence can be thought of as the diﬀerence in how public and private
ﬁrms respond to the shale gas discovery.
By testing how private and public ﬁrms respond to shale discoveries, we can rule out
several ﬁrm-level diﬀerences as potential explanations for the diﬀerences in investment be-
havior we observe in the previous section. For instance, it could be the case that the results
of our ﬁrm-level speciﬁcations are driven by some unobserved heterogeneity between public
and private ﬁrms such as geographic diﬀerences in natural gas development opportunities,
which could then lead to transportation cost diﬀerences. Alternatively, it could be the case
that one set of ﬁrms is better at searching for new areas to drill. Our shale discovery natural
experiment design helps alleviate many of these concerns. In particular, because we require
all ﬁrms to be drilling in a shale county prior to a discovery, any diﬀerences in investment
activity between public and private ﬁrms cannot be explained by one set of ﬁrms always
having superior abilities to search and seek out new drilling opportunities. Furthermore, the
evidence presented in Section 2 suggests that private and public ﬁrm face similar costs and
generate similar production volumes when developing shale discoveries. Ultimately, shale
discoveries provide new growth opportunities at the same time and location, with similar
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costs and production volumes; providing for a comparison of similar investment opportuni-
ties across public and private ﬁrms.
The dependent variable in our natural experiment is Investmenti,j,t which corresponds to
investments made by ﬁrm i in county j at time t. To ensure that we have consistent standard
errors in our estimation we follow the approach recommended by Bertrand et al. (2004) and
collapse time periods for each discovery into two periods; one pre-period and one post-period.
Speciﬁcally, in a given county, the investment activity of a given ﬁrm is averaged across the
three years prior to the discovery and the three years after the discovery. Thus, for each ﬁrm
in each shale county we have two observations: One pre-discovery and one post-discovery.
The time period of shale discoveries in our sample spans from 2003 to 2010, this ensures that
we have a three year pre and post-event window for each discovery. For example, a discovery
occurring in 2010 will have a pre-period of 2007, 2008, 2009 and a post period of 2010, 2011,
and 2012.
In our baseline diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regressions, we explain Investmenti,j,t with a post-
discovery dummy variable (PostDiscoveryj,t) and post-discovery dummy interacted with a
private dummy (PostDiscoveryj,t ∗ Privatei):11
Investmenti,j,t = α + β1NGt + β2PostDiscoveryj,t + β3PostDiscoveryj,t ∗ Privatei
+β4Privatei + FirmCountyFEi,j + εi,j,t
The key coeﬃcient of interest in determining whether private ﬁrms respond diﬀerently to
shale discoveries is β3, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term PostDiscoveryj,t ∗ Privatei.
The magnitude and sign on the coeﬃcient of this term is an indication of how private ﬁrms
respond relative to public ﬁrms to a shale discovery in a given county. We also include ﬁrm-
county ﬁxed eﬀects to account for time invariant heterogeneity of ﬁrm investment policies in
diﬀerent counties.
Table 7 documents that county-level investment of public ﬁrms increases signiﬁcantly after
a shale discovery. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient on PostDiscoveryj,t in speciﬁcation (3) indicates
that public ﬁrms increase investment by 39.9% after a shale discovery. The interaction
coeﬃcient PostDiscoveryj,t∗Privatei is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, which indicates
11The direct eﬀect of being private (Privatei) is subsumed by the ﬁrm-county ﬁxed eﬀects.
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that private ﬁrm investment responds signiﬁcantly less than public ﬁrm investment to a shale
discovery. Furthermore, when testing whether private ﬁrms respond to a shale discovery
with any increased investment, we cannot reject the null that the increase in investment is
not statistically diﬀerent from zero, meaning that private ﬁrms do not show any statistically
signiﬁcant increases in their investment in shale discovery counties in the three years following
a discovery.12 We obtain similar results when using number of wells, instead of logarithm
of wells as the dependent variable in speciﬁcation (6). Changing the functional form of the
speciﬁcation and ﬁnding similar results provides a useful conﬁrmation of our main results.
In Table 8, we augment our baseline speciﬁcation to test whether size could be driving
diﬀerences in the responsiveness to shale discoveries. This new speciﬁcation is important
to test as size is a variable that aﬀects a ﬁrm's access to external ﬁnancing and hence its
ability to undertake shale drilling. Speciﬁcally, we include both a size indicator variable
(SizeDummyi,t) and the size indicator variable interacted with the post-discovery dummy
(PostDiscoveryj,t ∗ SizeDummyi,t). We use our proxy for capital stock at the ﬁrm-level as
our size variable; the indicator variable takes the value of one for ﬁrms with above median
size for the given three year period, and zero otherwise. The key coeﬃcient of interest when
testing whether larger ﬁrms (as opposed to public ﬁrms) are able to respond better to shale
discoveries is the coeﬃcient on the interaction term: PostDiscoveryj,t ∗ Sizei,t. If it is the
case that larger ﬁrms respond more to shale discoveries, then we would expect this interaction
term to be positive, yet it is close to zero, and not statistically signiﬁcant. Given that the
coeﬃcient on PostDiscoveryj,t ∗ Privatei remains negative and signiﬁcant even after the
inclusion of these size controls, we infer that size diﬀerences are not driving the observed
disparities in investment responsiveness between public and private ﬁrms. It is important
to note, that we do not include a matched sample in our natural experiment due to the
limited number of potential matches available among the public ﬁrms also operating within
the county prior to the shale discovery. At the ﬁrm level private ﬁrms have the full universe
of public ﬁrms to obtain a match from. However, at the ﬁrm-county level, a given private
ﬁrm has on average only 2.97 public ﬁrms to obtain a match from.
12To formally test this hypothesis, we test whether the linear combination of the coeﬃcient on the post-
discovery dummy and the coeﬃcient on the interaction term of private and post-discovery dummy is signiﬁ-
cantly greater from zero (H0:β2 + β3 = 0 vs. Ha: β2 + β3 > 0).
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Table 9 provides evidence as to the internal validity of our natural experiment in the form
of a falsiﬁcation test. The main assumption of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences empirical design is
the parallel trends assumption. In our setting this assumption corresponds to whether, in
the absence of a shale discovery, the investment patterns of public and private ﬁrms would
have had similar trends. We empirically test whether trends were diﬀerent for these two sets
of ﬁrms prior to a discovery by artiﬁcially moving the time of the shale discovery to be three
years earlier for every shale discovery county in our sample. The results on the interaction
term PlaceboDiscoveryj,t∗Privatei, as well as the direct eﬀect, PlaceboDiscoveryj,t, are not
statistically signiﬁcant, which suggests that there were no diﬀerences in investment trends
between public and private ﬁrms prior to a shale discovery. It also suggests that there was
no drilling made in anticipation of the shale discoveries from either public or private ﬁrms.
In Figure 3 we provide graphical evidence in support of the parallel trends assumption.
For both Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, we run a regression of investments made at the county
level on yearly indicator variables in event time. For Figure 3.2, the event time is artiﬁcially
moved forward by three years prior to shale discoveries, as in the falsiﬁcation test. For Figure
3.1, the event time is centered around the county-level shale discoveries. The ﬁgures plot
the yearly coeﬃcients around the event window from t − 3 to t + 2 relative to the baseline
eﬀect at t− 3 set at zero. Figure 3.2 shows no diﬀerence in trends in the pre-discovery time
period, which is consistent with the falsiﬁcation results shown in Table 9. In addition, Figure
3.1 sheds light as to the precise timing of the response to shale discoveries shown in Table 7.
It shows that both public and private ﬁrms invest similarly prior to a shale discovery, and
then public ﬁrms respond with a sharp increase in investment at the time of the discovery
while private ﬁrms do not. This result provides a graphical conﬁrmation as to the timing
and reaction to shale discoveries documented in Table 7.
Lastly, in order to shed additional light on the interpretation of our natural experiment
results, we compare the county-level shale discovery responses of our main diﬀ-in-diﬀ test
to non-shale county-level investment responses to changes in natural gas prices in Table
10. This allows us to compare two sets of investment responses at the county level, one
for capital intensive shale discoveries and one for less capital intensive traditional non-shale
wells. As Table 10 shows, the sum of β1 + β2 is statistically signiﬁcantly greater than zero in
both speciﬁcation (2) and speciﬁcation (4); therefore private ﬁrms do respond to changes in
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natural gas prices at the county level, though less than public ﬁrms. Relating the coeﬃcients
in speciﬁcation (4) of Table 10 to the average county-level well investment of each ﬁrm type
implies that a one standard deviation increase in natural gas prices leads public ﬁrms to
increase their investment by 27% while the investment of private ﬁrms only increases by
9%. Alternatively, in speciﬁcation (2) of Table 10, with log of investments as the dependent
variable, we ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase in the price of natural gas leads
public ﬁrms to increase investment by 16% while private ﬁrms increase investments by only
5%. Ultimately, we have investment responses for two diﬀerent project types, one with higher
capital needs (shale in Table 7) and one with lower capital needs (non-shale in Table 10),
and we observe a larger diﬀerence in response for the project type with high capital needs.
An interpretation of these investment responses needs to reconcile why two diﬀerent project
types, which diﬀer primarily on capital needs, experience such diﬀerential responses based
on a ﬁrm's listing status.
4.3 Corporate Activity and Shale Discoveries
In this section we provide details on corporate activity related to shale discoveries. First,
we focus on asset sales by providing a detailed analysis of asset sales after the discovery of
two shale plays. Second, we provide evidence on IPO and M&A activity during our sample
period.
4.3.1 Asset Sales
In this section, we study asset sales patterns around shale discoveries. Obtaining detailed
data on drilling tracts is challenging. Therefore, we focus our analysis on two shale discoveries
where data is made available by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, and land and
regulatory rules make asset sales straightforward to infer. Speciﬁcally, using production data
we can observe who owns the drilling tracts with existing producing wells prior to a shale
discovery. If subsequent shale development is performed on a tract by a ﬁrm other than the
ﬁrm with pre-existing producing wells, it means that the ﬁrm with pre-existing wells has sold
the asset (the right to drill shale) to a new ﬁrm. We use data covering more than 66,560 acres
in two shale discoveries in Oklahoma over the period 2003 to 2010: Speciﬁcally the Woodford
shale and Cana shale across four counties: (1) Canadian county (discovery in 2008); (2) Coal
county (discovery in 2006); (3) Pittsburg county (discovery in 2006), and (4) Hughes county
77
(discovery in 2006). We test whether drilling tracts are being transferred from private to
public ﬁrms in a signiﬁcant manner after these shale discoveries are made.
Across those two shale discoveries, we show in Table 11 that 63% of acreage tracts held
by private ﬁrms prior to a shale discovery are sold to public ﬁrms. In contrast, among public
ﬁrms, only 21% sell their drilling tracts, with all tracts being sold to other public ﬁrms
and none to private ﬁrms. The diﬀerences are statistically and economically signiﬁcant.
The evidence shown in this section is suggestive of a signiﬁcant transfer of capital intensive
projects from private to public ﬁrms.
4.3.2 IPO and M&A activity
In terms of IPO and M&A activity, we can only provide anecdotal evidence given the
scarcity of IPOs and takeovers in our dataset. Changing listing status is major corporate
decision and there are signiﬁcant costs associated with an IPO (Ritter (1987)). We ﬁnd only
12 IPOs occur after the advent of shale drilling. While we do not have enough IPOs for
statistical analysis, the qualitative evidence we collect in Appendix E documents that 11
out of the 12 IPOs after 2003 use proceeds from the IPO to fund costly capital expenditure
programs linked to shale-related opportunities.
During our time period, there are also only a dozen cases of public ﬁrms acquiring the
full operations of private ﬁrms. We believe that this result can be directly related to the
fungible quality of assets in this industry. Given the ease of transferring assets from one
operator to another, a ﬁrm will incur fewer transaction costs with an asset sale and this
would explain the prevalence of asset sales documented in the previous subsection. There is
some anecdotal evidence that ﬁnancing constraints are a signiﬁcant driver of full acquisitions
of private ﬁrms by public ﬁrms. For example, after the sale of privately held Stroud Energy
to publicly traded Range Resources Corp, Stroud's CEO Patrick J. Noyes stated that the
acquisition would allow for the accelerated development of our properties.
5 Interpretation and Discussion
Using two distinct methodologies, we have shown that private ﬁrms react less to changes
in investment opportunities than their publicly-traded counterparts. The unique features of
our empirical setting allow us to rule out many explanations based on diﬀerences in ﬁrm
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characteristics between private and public ﬁrms. In particular, they produce the same good
that is sold at a given market price and face similar cost structures. We further reﬁne
our comparison by using very granular data at the county-level and highlight diﬀerences in
responses to new investment opportunities made available to both public and private ﬁrms
already operating in the area. Hence, our natural experiment further controls for potential
geographical and technological diﬀerences between private and public ﬁrms. Additionally, we
show that private ﬁrms sell signiﬁcant amounts of their drilling tracts to public ﬁrms after a
shale discovery.
In this section we explore several potential alternative explanations for our results. The
two main explanations rely on agency conﬂicts. The ﬁrst conﬂict is between managers and
shareholders and aﬀects predominantly public ﬁrms, which have a more dispersed ownership
structure than private ﬁrms. This agency conﬂict can push public ﬁrms to overinvest relative
to private ﬁrms. The second agency conﬂict is between existing shareholders and potential
new investors; the greater the information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors,
the greater the cost of external capital. This conﬂict aﬀects private ﬁrms more given their
greater opacity. The higher cost of external capital faced by private ﬁrms may lead them to
underreact to investment opportunities.
We do not rule out that additional factors can inﬂuence investment decisions. In partic-
ular, we assess other channels at the end of this section that could help us understand the
observed diﬀerences in investment behavior between private and public ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally,
we discuss the potential diﬀerences in hedging behavior and risk aversion across public and
private ﬁrms.
5.1 Shareholder-Manager Agency Costs
The fact that public ﬁrms invest more and have greater investment sensitivities than pri-
vate ﬁrms could be consistent with public ﬁrms overinvesting (e.g. Jensen (1986)). However,
the results presented in Table 2 showed that (1) public ﬁrms invest more than private ﬁrms
when investment opportunities are the most proﬁtable, i.e. when natural gas prices are high,
and (2) public ﬁrms invest similarly to private ﬁrms in low price environments. These facts
are not consistent with the overinvestment theory.
We undertake two additional tests in this section to assess whether overinvestment, caused
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by shareholder-manager agency conﬂicts at public companies, can explain the investment
responses we observe. To do this, we compare both investment levels and investment sensi-
tivities for public ﬁrms that are more susceptible to shareholder-manager agency costs (low
insider ownership) and public ﬁrms that are less susceptible to agency costs (high insider
ownership). To the extent shareholder-manager agency costs are greater for ﬁrms in which
management has lower insider ownership; this proxy should capture a relative measure of the
importance of this agency cost in explaining why public ﬁrms react more than private ﬁrms
to changes in investment opportunities.
In Table 12, we provide an analysis similar to Table 2, except that we subdivide our public
sample into ﬁrms with low insider ownership and high insider ownership, deﬁned as being
below or above the median insider ownership in a given year. As can be seen from Table
12, ﬁrms with high insider ownership (less susceptible to manager-shareholder agency costs)
invest similarly to ﬁrms with low insider ownership (more susceptible to manager-shareholder
agency costs). If anything the ﬁrms less prone to agency costs invest at higher levels, though
not statistically signiﬁcant in most years, and have greater sensitivity to changes in natural
gas prices. For example, ﬁrms with high insider ownership have investment intensity 103%
higher in high price environments relative to low price environments, while ﬁrms with low
insider ownership have investment intensity by 61% in high price environments relative to
low price environments.
The diﬀerences in sensitivities observed in Table 12 are formally tested in a regression
framework in Table 13. To evaluate the overinvestment hypothesis further, we test whether
the diﬀerence in investment behavior observed between public and private ﬁrms is driven
by ﬁrms that are more prone to agency conﬂicts. Given that the potential for manager-
shareholder conﬂicts is the greatest for ﬁrms with low insider ownership, we estimate ﬁrm-level
investment regressions excluding the subset of public ﬁrms with the lowest insider ownership
(below median). We show in Table 13 that public ﬁrms with higher insider ownership (lower
agency conﬂicts) are still more reactive to changes in their investment opportunity set than
private ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, in speciﬁcation (2) of Panel A in Table 13 we ﬁnd that private
ﬁrms are 73% less reactive to changes in investment opportunities than public ﬁrms. This
result provides further evidence against the overinvestment hypothesis.
80
5.2 Cost of External Capital
In this section, we ﬁrst present evidence from the literature that private ﬁrms face greater
costs of external ﬁnance. In particular, it is well established that private ﬁrms face both
greater costs of debt and equity. We then assess whether the evidence on investment patterns
made by private and public ﬁrms provided in Section 4.1 and 4.2 as well as the evidence on
corporate activity provided in Section 4.3 are consistent with ﬁnancing constraints being of
ﬁrst-order importance in understanding why private ﬁrms have diﬀerent investment policies
relative to their publicly-traded counterparts.
5.2.1 Cost of Debt
Several studies have documented that private ﬁrms have a higher cost of debt. For example,
Saunders and Steﬀen (2011) document that private ﬁrms have loan spreads that are on
average 27 basis points higher, as compared to publicly traded ﬁrms, even after controlling
for loan and borrower characteristics. Schenone (2010) ﬁnds that loan spreads are 21 basis
points higher before an IPO versus after an IPO, and Pagano et al. (1998) ﬁnd that for
IPOs in Italy this ﬁgure is 40 to 70 basis points. While these magnitudes are economically
meaningful, it is unlikely that loan spread diﬀerentials of 21 to 70 basis points alone would
be driving diﬀerences in investment responses as large as we observe in our setting.
However, there are other aspects of a borrower-lender relationship to consider beyond the
interest rates charged on existing outstanding debt. For example, Schenone (2010) suggests
that one of the reasons ﬁrms have a higher interest rate pre-IPO is that banks exploit an
information based monopoly from a locked-in client ﬁrm. This view is empirically supported
by Saunders and Steﬀen (2011) and theoretically supported by Sharpe (1990) and Rajan
(1992), who suggest that lending relationships could be problematic for ﬁrms if they become
informationally locked in.
Being locked in a lending relationship also imposes a borrowing constraint. Speciﬁcally,
banks have regulatory limits on the amount they can lend to any single borrower, and often
have additional limits based on internal risk controls. If a borrower is locked into a lending
relationship, a critical issue for its cost of obtaining external capital is the upper bound in
lending limits it faces from its bank. Switching or adding relationships creates further uncer-
tainty and associated costs. For the average U.S. bank the maximum regulatory limit that
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can be lent to a given borrower is $26 million.13 The impact of lending limits is particularly
important for private ﬁrms which may have developed long standing lending relationships
prior to unanticipated large growth opportunities such as shale projects.
5.2.2 Cost of Equity
There is both empirical and theoretical evidence which suggests that the cost of equity for
private ﬁrms is greater than for public ﬁrms. Brav (2009) documents that private ﬁrms have
leverage that is 50% higher than public ﬁrms, and attributes this to private equity being
more costly than public equity. Additionally, when private ﬁrms raise external capital they
favor debt more than equity. Speciﬁcally, Brav (2009) ﬁnds that when external capital is
needed, private ﬁrms raise equity only 10% of the time, while public ﬁrms raise equity 40%
of the time. The economic magnitudes of these diﬀerences are large, and indicate signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the cost of equity between private ﬁrms and public ﬁrms.
Brav (2009) suggests that the higher cost of equity for private ﬁrms is driven by concerns
regarding information asymmetry and control. Private ﬁrms are more informationally opaque
than public ﬁrms, which makes agency costs between existing shareholders and potential new
investors more acute for private ﬁrms. Since equity is a more junior security than debt in
the capital structure, equity is likely to be more sensitive to information asymmetry issues
(Myers and Majluf (1984)). This information asymmetry will mean that the cost of equity
for private ﬁrms will be greater because private ﬁrms do not oﬀer minority shareholders the
same disclosure and protection a public ﬁrm does.
Brav (2009) suggests that maintaining control is one of the main advantages of being
privately-held. Closely held private ﬁrms are not subject to the same agency conﬂicts as
public ﬁrms. As such, surrendering a signiﬁcant amount of control to pursue new growth
opportunities may oﬀset the beneﬁt these growth opportunities would provide to the ﬁrm's
owners. Of signiﬁcance, this suggests that greater cost of external capital need not be ex-
ternally imposed by markets, but may be self-imposed by a ﬁrm's owner who is unwilling to
13FDIC Part 32.3 and Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision (OTS) Section 211 limit lending to any single borrower
to 15% of a bank's unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus. We computed the unimpaired capital and
unimpaired surplus for each bank using Call Report data. The average unimpaired capital and unimpaired
surplus was $173 million; of which 15% corresponds to $26M.
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dilute control. The cost of relinquishing control will be greater when more external capital is
needed. Given the signiﬁcant capital needs for shale development, the associated dilution in
control could lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the cost of external capital across private and
public ﬁrms.
The mechanisms discussed in this section can have a large eﬀect on a private ﬁrm's ability
and willingness to raise external equity capital. The net eﬀect is that private ﬁrms face greater
costs of external equity capital; furthermore the leverage choice and equity raising activity
documented by Brav (2009) indicate that the diﬀerences in cost of equity capital between
public and private ﬁrms are economically large.
5.2.3 Cost of Capital, Investments and Asset Sales
Our ﬁrst result shows that private and public ﬁrms invest at similar levels in low price
environments, while public ﬁrms invest signiﬁcantly more than private ﬁrms in response
to higher natural gas prices. In our second empirical approach, we ﬁnd that only public
ﬁrms increase drilling activity in response to the improvement in capital intensive investment
opportunities provided by shale discoveries. While private ﬁrms respond to increases in
natural gas prices for low capital intensity non-shale wells, they do not respond to more capital
intensive investment opportunities provided by shale. Both the ﬁrm-level and county-level
evidence can be understood in the context of private ﬁrms facing a higher cost of external
capital. If private ﬁrms are more capital constrained, they will not be able to pursue all
projects, in particular those that are more capital intensive.
A ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm can undertake several actions to alleviate the impact of
higher cost of external capital. Going public is one way to obtain access to more external
ﬁnancing. We observe a dozen ﬁrms going public in the period of shale drilling and all but
one mention access to capital in order to pursue shale drilling as a reason for the IPO. A
constrained ﬁrm can also sell a portion or the entirety of its operations to a ﬁrm with better
access to capital markets. The unconstrained ﬁrm creates value by providing the funds to
pursue all the positive net present value projects of the constrained target. Erel et al. (2012)
ﬁnd evidence consistent with the view that full acquisitions can ease ﬁnancial constraints
faced by target ﬁrms. Each of these mechanisms provides a channel for private ﬁrms to
alleviate the eﬀects associated with having a higher cost of external capital.
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Beyond the anecdotal evidence provided by IPOs and takeovers, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant ev-
idence that private ﬁrms active in areas with shale discoveries sell their rights to develop
shale acreage to public ﬁrms. The corporate activity observed during the period of shale
discoveries is consistent with a rational response by private ﬁrms to defer capital intensive
projects to public ﬁrms, which have a lower cost of external capital (see Shleifer and Vishny
(1992)). These transactions suggest that even if private ﬁrms do not exploit their drilling
rights in the wake of shale discoveries, proﬁtable projects are still being undertaken with an
eﬃcient redeployment of assets towards the less ﬁnancially constrained public ﬁrms.
5.3 Hedging
Hedging has two eﬀects within the context of our study. The ﬁrst, which we outlined previ-
ously, is that it enables ﬁrms to lock-in the proﬁtability of a project using futures contracts.
The second eﬀect is that hedging undertaken in prior years may aﬀect a ﬁrm's current inter-
nal cash ﬂows positively or negatively. However, the only diﬀerence between a hedged and
an unhedged ﬁrm will be in terms of internal cash ﬂow generation, not in terms of changes in
investment opportunities. An increase in natural gas prices provides the same improvement
in marginal q, i.e. the proﬁtability of drilling a new well, for a ﬁrm that has hedged its
existing production relative to an unhedged ﬁrm. Furthermore, a more fully hedged ﬁrm has
the same access to new shale discoveries from existing acreage as an unhedged ﬁrm.
Haushalter (2000) shows that ﬁrms more subject to ﬁnancing constraints are more fully
hedged. Given that private ﬁrms have a higher external cost of capital, they could be more
hedged at any point in time than public ﬁrms. As such, hedging might adversely aﬀect
private ﬁrms' internal cash ﬂows relative to than public ﬁrms, yet it is unlikely to be the
main driver behind our results. The reason is that most ﬁrms in our sample are highly
dependent on external capital. Using the measure developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998),
we ﬁnd that the median public natural gas producer raises an average of 34% of its annual
capital expenditures from public equity and debt issuances in order to respond to changes
in its investment opportunities. This signiﬁcant need for external ﬁnancing suggests that
the eﬀect of hedging on internal cash ﬂow is unlikely to be the main driver behind the large
observed diﬀerences in investment behavior.
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5.4 Risk Aversion
Private ﬁrms might diﬀer systematically from public ﬁrms in terms of risk aversion. In par-
ticular, one might argue that private ﬁrms are run more conservatively than public ﬁrms.
First, private ﬁrms have more concentrated ownership, characterized by long-term investors
with substantial wealth at risk. Second, the population of private ﬁrms may have a greater
proportion of family ﬁrms, which tend to be relatively more concerned with long-term sur-
vival and reputation (Anderson et al. (2003)). These concerns could directly inﬂuence the
investment decisions of private ﬁrms.
Risk aversion may play a role in explaining our results. For private ﬁrms, equity is
provided by a limited number of shareholders who potentially have a signiﬁcant portion of
their wealth tied to the fortune of the ﬁrm. If that is the case, their risk aversion will factor
directly into the cost of equity.
We would argue, however, that there are at least two reasons why it is less plausible that
diﬀerences in risk aversion would be the ﬁrst order explanation behind our results. First, we
observe that private ﬁrms respond to projects diﬀerently based on a project's capital needs.
Therefore, a risk aversion based explanation would need to reconcile a diﬀerential response
for projects that require more capital relative to projects that require less capital. To the
extent that higher risk aversion may be linked with the amount of capital outlay a project
requires, it is likely due to an owner's inability to diversify the risk by issuing equity for the
larger project or potentially having to face more adverse terms for a larger amount of debt
necessary to ﬁnance the new project (e.g. personal guarantees). These explanations would
both be linked to a private ﬁrm facing a higher cost of external capital. In such cases, risk
aversion need not be a mutually exclusive explanation from a cost of external capital based
interpretation.
Second, higher risk aversion would imply that for a given natural gas price environment
private ﬁrms invest less than public ﬁrms in all states of the world. However, the results
in Table 2 indicate that private ﬁrms only invest signiﬁcantly less than public ﬁrms when
natural gas prices are higher, precisely when investment opportunities are better. In low
natural gas price environments when investment opportunities are less attractive, private
and public ﬁrms invest at similar levels. These results suggest that potential variation in risk
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aversion across public and private ﬁrms is not the ﬁrst order explanation for the observed
diﬀerences in investment responses.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we exploit a unique dataset of onshore U.S. natural gas producers to study how
private and public ﬁrms diﬀer in their investment behavior. We ﬁnd that private ﬁrms respond
less to changes in their investment opportunities than their publicly-traded counterparts.
We reach this conclusion by analyzing the investment behavior of private and public ﬁrms
using two diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies. The ﬁrst is based on ﬁrm-level investment to q
regressions where changes in investment opportunities are measured by changes in natural gas
prices. In this setting, private ﬁrms are 60% less responsive to changes in marginal q relative
to public ﬁrms. The second approach implements a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology
using county-level shale discoveries as a natural experiment to assess the responsiveness of
private and public ﬁrms' investments to capital intensive growth opportunities. Following a
shale discovery, we ﬁnd that public ﬁrms increase their county-level investment activity by
40%, while private ﬁrms do not pursue these capital intensive shale projects.
Our empirical setting oﬀers several advantages beyond studying the investment activity
of a large sample of both public and private ﬁrms. First, due to the economics of our setting,
changes in natural gas prices are exogenously given and directly related to changes in marginal
q for both private and public ﬁrms. This fact oﬀers an improvement on most of the literature
using average q to proxy for marginal q. Second, we are also able to make use of signiﬁcant
shale gas discoveries in speciﬁc counties to design a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences test that rules
out potential alternative explanations for our ﬁndings. As such, our results are not driven
by heterogeneity in ﬁrm size, product markets, technology, pricing, or costs.
We evaluate two main competing explanations for our results. First, public ﬁrms could be
overinvesting due to manager-shareholder agency conﬂicts. However, we ﬁnd little support
for the overinvestment hypothesis. In particular, public ﬁrms do not invest more than private
ﬁrms in low natural gas price environments and public ﬁrms that are more prone to manager-
shareholder agency conﬂicts are not the ones driving the wedge observed between public and
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private ﬁrms' responses to changes in investment opportunities.
Alternatively, the relative lack of investment response by private ﬁrms to both high natural
gas price environments and capital intensive shale projects could be consistent with private
ﬁrms facing a higher cost of external capital. We show that the increased investment by
public ﬁrms in high natural gas price environments is facilitated by access to external capital
markets. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that diﬀerences in investment responses between
private and public ﬁrms are more pronounced for projects that require large capital outlays.
These results imply that listing related frictions have an economically important inﬂuence on
the investment behavior of private and public ﬁrms. We also show that the impact of these
frictions can be mitigated by the transfer of capital intensive projects from private ﬁrms to
public ﬁrms.
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Do Firms Engage in Risk Shifting? Empirical Evidence∗
Erik Gilje†
Abstract
I empirically test whether ﬁrms engage in risk-shifting in a setting where corporate in-
vestment risk measures are available in SEC disclosures. Contrary to what risk-shifting
theory predicts, I ﬁnd that ﬁrms reduce investment risk both when leverage increases
and when they approach distress. In ﬁrm-level panel regressions I ﬁnd that ﬁrms reduce
the riskiness of capital expenditures by 21.6% when leverage is high, relative to the
average ﬁrm. In a second test, I use a natural experiment with exogenous shocks to
leverage, and ﬁnd that ﬁrms with exogenous increases in leverage reduce risk taking.
This result suggests risk reducing incentives during distress, such as borrower reputa-
tion and managerial reputation concerns, outweigh risk-shifting incentives in investment
decision making.
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ESSAY 3
1 Introduction
How does corporate investment risk taking change when a ﬁrm has high leverage or ap-
proaches distress? In high leverage states of the world equity holders beneﬁt from successful
outcomes of high risk projects, while losses from unsuccessful outcomes are borne by debt-
holders. This asymmetry between who receives the gains and losses from a project could
make it optimal for equity holders to maximize the amount of risk a ﬁrm undertakes when
leverage is high. This hypothesized increased risk taking in a ﬁrm's investments, referred to
as risk-shifting or asset substitution, could result in an overall cost to the ﬁrm (Jensen and
Meckling (1976)).
Concerns about the size, prevalence, and mitigation of these costs have been the focus
of substantial theoretical work.1 However, there is little empirical evidence on the size or
pervasiveness of changes in investment risk taking when leverage is high or when a ﬁrm is
in ﬁnancial distress. The empirical challenges are two-fold. First obtaining a measure of
the riskiness of a ﬁrm's overall capital expenditures is challenging in most settings. Second,
distress and high leverage are not randomly assigned to ﬁrms. To the extent a corporate in-
vestment plan and high leverage/distress are jointly determined, or are caused by an omitted
variable, obtaining clean identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of distress or leverage on risk taking is
problematic. The contribution of this paper is to provide empirical advancements on both
these fronts. First, I focus on a setting where a ﬁrm's investment risk taking is clearly deﬁned
by measures of investment risk from SEC disclosures. Second, I use quasi-random shocks to
leverage to identify the eﬀect of an increase in leverage and distress on investment risk taking.
I use a setting in which investments can be categorized into two diﬀerent types of activ-
ities, one that is high risk and one that is low risk. To do this, I focus on the oil and gas
industry, where exploratory projects (high risk) are nearly six times more likely to result in
an unproductive project than development projects (low risk).2 Moreover, these categories
1Existing theoretical work related to the size and mitigation of risk-shifting includes: Smith and Warner
(1979) (covenants), Green (1984) (convertible debt), Barnea et al. (1980) (debt maturity), John and John
(1993) (managerial compensation).
2The ﬁrms in my sample drilled a total of 12,574 exploratory wells of which 3,326 were unsuccessful
(26.4%), and drilled 88,277 development wells of which 3,809 were unsuccessful (4.3%). Additionally, in
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have clear deﬁnitions outlined by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and are
disclosed in SEC ﬁlings, so there is a standardization in these measures across ﬁrms and over
time, which is typically unavailable in other settings. I construct a dataset from hand col-
lected data on investment risks from the 10-Ks of 184 ﬁrms in the oil and gas industry. Using
these risk disclosures, I test how the proportion of high risk investment to total investment
changes as leverage increases as well as when ﬁrms approach distress.
Contrary to what risk-shifting theory would predict, in ﬁrm-level panel regressions I ﬁnd
that high leverage reduces the riskiness of a ﬁrm's investments. A one standard deviation
increase in leverage reduces the proportion of a ﬁrm's high risk investments to total investment
by 8.5% relative to the mean level of ﬁrm risk taking. I also ﬁnd that the proportion of high
risk investment to total investment is reduced by 21.6% for ﬁrm-years in which leverage is in
the top quartile of the sample. Furthermore, this risk-reducing behavior also occurs in the
years prior to declaring bankruptcy.
One concern with ﬁrm-level panel regression results could be reverse causality. For ex-
ample, it could be that a ﬁrm increases its leverage because it is planning to reduce its
investment risk in the future. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm, or its lender, may feel more comfortable
with higher leverage if the ﬁrm has less cash ﬂow uncertainty from its future investments.
Such an argument would suggest that ﬁrms are not reducing the riskiness of their invest-
ments because they have high leverage, but that they increase their leverage because they
are planning to reduce investment risk in the future.
To address the simultaneity and omitted variable endogeneity concerns and rule out other
alternative explanations I use a natural experiment to test how risk taking changes with lever-
age during two signiﬁcant commodity based negative leverage shocks in 1998 and 2008. I
focus on ﬁrms with similar pre-event book leverage, but whose existing assets are diﬀeren-
tially aﬀected by the commodity price shocks due to diﬀerent mixes of oil and gas assets
or diﬀerent geographic locations. Despite similar pre-event book-leverage, the diﬀerential
eﬀect of the commodity price shocks result in the Merton (1974) distance to default (DD)
comparing reserve additions from discoveries relative to exploration capital expenditures, in 27% of all ﬁrm
years, ﬁrms failed to add reserves through discoveries that exceeded their exploration spending.
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default probability increasing from 0.03 to 0.44 for treatment ﬁrms, but only from 0.04 to
0.18 for control ﬁrms. I use oil and gas reserve changes due to commodity prices to isolate
the component of the leverage changes which are due to exogenous commodity price shocks.
I designate treatment ﬁrms as ﬁrms with shocked book leverage in the top quartile of all
ﬁrms, control ﬁrms are ﬁrms matched on pre-event book leverage to the treatment ﬁrms. I
show that treatment and control ﬁrms have a number of similar observable characteristics.
Using a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach, I ﬁnd that treatment ﬁrms reduce investment risk
taking after exogenous shocks to book leverage relative to control ﬁrms.
A key potential concern related to using commodity price shocks as part of an identiﬁca-
tion strategy is whether ﬁrms whose existing assets are adversely aﬀected by a commodity
price shock, may choose to undertake a diﬀerent investment program for a reason other than
the eﬀect of the commodity price shock on leverage. To mitigate this concern I test whether
there is a direct eﬀect of changes in prior period reserves on ﬁrms' investment programs.
Thereby measuring how changes in reserves due to commodity prices aﬀects investment, but
without conditioning on ex ante leverage as in the natural experiment. I ﬁnd in both the
full sample and a limited sample (excluding the years of the natural experiment) that prior
period changes in existing reserves due to commodity prices does not aﬀect a ﬁrm's mix
of exploratory versus development drilling. This is consistent with the view that the new
projects a ﬁrm undertakes is likely going to be based on where the best new opportunities
are, versus where it's existing assets are.
Existing empirical literature has studied the risk-shifting incentives of equity holders in
a variety of ways. Initial work by Andrade and Kaplan (1998) studies 31 ﬁrms in ﬁnancial
distress and ﬁnds no evidence that distressed ﬁrms made large or unusually risky investments
or acquisitions. Rauh (2009) studies how risk taking in pension funds change in relation to
the ﬁnancial condition of a ﬁrm. Consistent with the ﬁndings in this paper Rauh (2009) ﬁnds
that risk taking in pension funds is reduced as the ﬁnancial conditions of a ﬁrm deteriorate.
Parrino and Weisbach (1999) utilize simulation and ﬁnd that risk-shifting is not a primary
driver of capital structure decisions. Gormley and Matsa (2011) ﬁnd that ﬁrms respond
to exogenous increases in liabilities by undertaking diversifying acquisitions. Furthermore,
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survey evidence from Graham and Harvey (2001) suggests that risk-shifting concerns are the
least important factor for CFOs in determining the maturity of debt a ﬁrm issues as well as
whether a ﬁrm issues convertible bonds. Alternatively, Eisdorfer (2008) studies risk-shifting
within the context of a real options framework, and ﬁnds that, consistent with risk-shifting
theory, volatility increases investment by distressed ﬁrms.3 However, to my knowledge, my
study is the ﬁrst to use exogenous variation in leverage and ex-ante investment risk measures
from SEC disclosures to directly test whether ﬁrms engage in risk-shifting behavior.
Because direct measures of risk are diﬃcult to obtain, prior literature has often used
diﬀerent proxies for ﬁrm risk taking activities. For example, standard deviation of changes
in quarterly ROA and equity price volatility have been used in the past. I document that
the standard deviation of changes in ROA and equity price volatility have a low, but positive
correlation with my measure of investment risk, suggesting that existing proxies do not
capture the investment risk captured by my measure. Additionally, these measures likely
capture many eﬀects other than just the operating policies and risk-taking decisions that are
made by management. For example, product market competition, ﬁnancial market volatility,
changes in government regulatory regimes as well as other factors could be aﬀecting these
measures.
Research & Development (R&D) spending has also been used as a proxy for risk taking,
however, due to the multi-year life cycle of typical R&D projects it is diﬃcult to envision
that an increase in R&D in a year of ﬁnancial distress would result in an outcome the
following year which could save the ﬁrm from further distress or bankruptcy. Alternatively,
the primary project type for oil and gas companies, the drilling of a well, typically has a very
short project length, ranging from a month to a few months depending on where the well is
being drilled. Thus, it is plausible that a successful major exploratory well could alter the
fortunes of a company in a short period of time. There is a strong empirical relationship
between exploration capital expenditures and reserve additions from discoveries in a given
3Additional work has focused on risk-shifting incentives of banks during the S&L crises and more recently
in the sub-prime crisis (Landier et al. (2011)), however, the government role in ﬁnancial institutions and the
mortgage market makes it unclear whether these ﬁndings would be applicable to industrial ﬁrms (Almeida
et al. (2011)).
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year.4 This short project time-line also would suggest that if risk-shifting were to occur, it
would be more likely to occur in this setting than in others. Furthermore, the higher than
average capital intensity of this industry suggests that current period investment can have a
large eﬀect on the overall riskiness of the ﬁrm, whereas year to year changes in R&D may be
less likely to inﬂuence the overall risk level of a ﬁrm.
This paper provides evidence on how ﬁrms change their risk taking behavior as leverage
changes and ﬁrms approach distress. In particular, the results highlight that ﬁrms reduce risk
taking when leverage increases and when they approach distress. This suggests that while
ﬁrms may have a risk-shifting incentive (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), other risk mitigat-
ing incentives may outweigh risk-shifting incentives in their decision making. For example,
managers may have career reputation concerns which result in a reduction in investment risk
taking (Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992)). Firms too, likely have incentives to ensure that they
have a good reputation to ensure access to debt markets (Diamond (1989)), which can aﬀect
their ability to pursue future positive NPV projects (Almeida et al. (2011)).
This paper proceeds in the following order, Section 2 discusses motivation and related
literature. Section 3 outlines the data that is used. Section 4 discusses identiﬁcation and the
empirical design. Section 5 reports the results of the empirical tests, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivation and Related Literature
Why might risk-shifting not be observed in empirical tests? A potential explanation that
prior theoretical literature has focused on is the reliance of the Jensen and Meckling (1976)
risk-shifting result on a single period framework; in other words, agents make decisions as
if there is no tomorrow. Jensen and Meckling (1976) directly acknowledge that when their
framework is applied to a multi-period setting diﬀerent outcomes may occur:
It seems clear for instance that the expectation of future sales of outside equity
and debt will change the costs and beneﬁts facing the manager in making decisions
which beneﬁt himself at the (short-run) expense of the current bondholders and
4Evidence documenting this relationship is in Appendix A.
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stockholders. If he develops a reputation for such dealings he can expect this to
unfavorably inﬂuence the terms at which he can obtain future capital from outside
sources. This will tend to increase the beneﬁts associated with sainthood and
will tend to reduce the size of the agency costs. 
- Jensen and Meckling (1976)
Existing theoretical literature using multi-period settings has suggested several possible ex-
planations for why a ﬁrm may choose to not undertake risk-shifting. Diamond (1989) suggests
that ﬁrms may avoid risk-shifting due to borrower reputational concerns, while Hirshleifer
and Thakor (1992) suggest that manager reputational concerns leads managers to reduce
risky investment. Almeida et al. (2011), suggest that concerns for the ability to fund future
projects may cause ﬁrms to reduce risk, so that positive NPV projects can be funded in the
future.
Covenants on loans and bonds may also play an important role in a ﬁrm's investment
policies. While the clear accounting based deﬁnitions of investment risk used in this study
enable tests on risk-shifting, they also would enable a ﬁnancial covenant to be designed to
limit the amount of capital being invested in high risk projects. However, in this setting, as
with pension funds in Rauh (2009), I do not ﬁnd any limitations on risk taking for investments
in loan or bond covenants. However, this does not rule out the possibility of other covenants
indirectly eﬀecting a ﬁrm's risk taking. For example, conditional on being limited to a
certain investment amount, a ﬁrm may elect to invest in lower risk projects, while if it were
unconstrained in the amount it could invest it may have elected to pursue higher risk projects.
It could very well be the case that the need for explicit limits on risk taking for a given level of
investment are not needed as other covenants may make investing in low risk projects in high
leverage states of the world the most attractive choice for a ﬁrm's managers/equity-holders.
3 Data Industry Background
I use hand collected data on investment risk from the 10-K disclosures of all publicly traded
U.S. domiciled oil and gas ﬁrms (SIC 1311 Crude Oil & Natural Gas) from 1997 to 2010 for
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this study. The resulting data set is composed of 184 ﬁrms and 1,208 ﬁrm years. Standard
accounting variables were obtained from Compustat, while the detailed hand collected 10-K
data was used to develop investment risk measures.
3.1 Investment Risk Variable Deﬁnition
Each ﬁrm in the study provides disclosures for the Costs Incurred in Natural Gas and Oil
Exploration and Development, Acquisitions and Divestitures. These disclosures provide
information on expenditures for high risk (exploratory) capital and low risk (development)
capital. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) provides clear guidance for the
deﬁnitions of exploratory and development activities which I outline below:
Exploratory well - An exploratory well is a well drilled to ﬁnd a new ﬁeld or to ﬁnd a
new reservoir in a ﬁeld previously found to be productive of oil or gas in another
reservoir.
Development well - A development well is a well drilled within the proved area of an oil
or gas reservoir to the depth of a stratigraphic horizon known to be productive.
I categorize all activities associated with exploratory drilling as high risk, this includes both
the capital to drill and the capital to acquire the unproved acreage to drill. All activities
associated with development drilling, which include the drilling of development wells and
the acquisition of proved/producing acreage for development drilling, I classify as low risk.
Moreover, the total capital across all these categories is comparable to the ﬁgure reported in
Compustat, although there are some slight diﬀerences due to the expensing of some types of
capital expenditures for oil and gas companies. The unit of observation used in this study is
ﬁrm-year, ﬁrm i in year t, so my primary measure of risk is calculated as the proportion of
high risk projects to total costs incurred as shown below:
HighRiskCapexi,t = ExploratoryDrillingi,t + AcquisitionOfUnprovedAcreagei,t
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LowRiskCapexi,t = DevelopmentDrillingi,t + AcquisitionoOfProvedAcreagei,t
RiskRatioi,t =
HighRiskCapexi,t
HighRiskCapexi,t + LowRiskCapexi,t
The diﬀerence in risk between high risk and low risk activities is also documented in
the success rate of each activity type. In additional disclosures, ﬁrms disclose the number
of successful wells and number of unsuccessful wells for both exploratory and development
wells. The ﬁrms in my sample drilled a total of 12,574 exploratory wells of which 3,326
were unsuccessful (26.4%), and drilled 88,277 development wells of which 3,809 were unsuc-
cessful (4.3%). Thus on average an exploratory well was nearly six times more likely to be
unsuccessful than a development well.
In order to assess how exploratory capital expenditures aﬀect a ﬁrm's reserve additions
(e.g. project proﬁtability), I plot the distribution of reserve additions divided by exploratoty
capital expenditures. A ratio above one indicates that a ﬁrm added more proved reserves
from discoveries than it spent on exploration. As can be seen in Figure 1, there is signiﬁcant
variability in the payoﬀ of exploratory drilling in a given year. For example, in 27% of ﬁrm
years, companies do not recover drilling costs. Alternatively, in 13% of ﬁrm years, companies
gain 10x their investment in exploratory wells in the form of proved reserves.
3.2 Leverage and Distress Deﬁnitions
Existing literature has used diﬀerent deﬁnitions of leverage. In this study I use a market
based deﬁnition of leverage from Welch (2004). The book leverage and market leverage
deﬁnitions are outlined below:
MarketLeveragei,t =
Di,t
Ei,t +Di,t
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BookLeveragei,t =
Li,t
Ai,t
Where Ei,t is the equity market capitalization for ﬁrm i in year t, and Di,t is the book value
of total debt for ﬁrm i in year t. Similarly, Li,t is the total liabilities for ﬁrm i in year t,
and Ai,t is the book value of assets for ﬁrm i in year t. While the market leverage of a ﬁrm
is bounded between 0 and 1 by construction, a ﬁrm could have a book leverage of greater
than 1 if its liabilities exceed its assets. To ensure that coeﬃcients retain an economically
meaningful interpretation and minimize the amount of data that is excluded from the study
I winsorize any values of book leverage greater than 1 to 1. Additionally, in all of my tests
I use dummy variables for diﬀerent leverage levels based on market leverage quartiles for
the sample, this enables the measurement of any non-linear eﬀects of leverage on investment
risk taking. Several other controls are included in the main regressions, these include log of
assets, market to book, proﬁtability, and proportion of short term debt.
I follow the method of Bharath and Shumway (2008) in calculating the Merton (1974)
distance to default (DD) model probability of default. The Merton DD model uses an option
framework to calculate the probability of default. It does so by viewing the equity as a call
option on the value of a ﬁrm, and using the strike price for the option as the value of a ﬁrm's
debt. By using the equity and debt values of the ﬁrm and the volatility of a ﬁrm's equity,
the overall value of the ﬁrm and volatility of ﬁrm value can be calculated, using the iterative
procedure outlined in Bharath and Shumway (2008). The model provides a z-score which
can be used to calculate a probability of default based on the normal cumulative density
function.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the ﬁrm-years of the sample used in this study. The
key dependent variable of interest is the risk ratio (previously deﬁned), the higher the risk
ratio the more risky a ﬁrm's capital investment is in a given year. Across all ﬁrm-years the
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average value for the risk ratio is 32%, which can be interpreted as a ﬁrm spending 32% of
its capital expenditures on high risk projects. The average market leverage for ﬁrm-years in
the sample is 0.28, while the average book leverage is 0.52. The average Merton DD default
probability is 0.08.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the correlation of the risk ratio constructed for this study
with other proxies that other studies have used for risk taking. The correlation with my risk
measure is low but positive. This suggests that the investment risk measure I use from SEC
disclosures captures important risk taking activity not captured by the other measures.
4 Identiﬁcation and Empirical Design
4.1 Firm-Level Panel Regressions
The ﬁrst set of ﬁrm level panel regressions estimated in this study are designed to test whether
there is a correlation between diﬀerent measures of leverage and distress with the risk ratio
(investment risk) of a ﬁrm. By including a number of controls, I can rule out some potential
explanations. The main ﬁrm-level panel regressions estimated in this study are of a form
similar to what is outlined below:
RiskRatioi,t = α + β1Leveragei,t−1 + Controlsi,t−1 + FirmFEi + Y earFEt + εi,i
RiskRatioi,t = α + β1Distressi,t−1 + Controlsi,t−1 + FirmFEi + Y earFEt + εi,i
The primary deﬁnitions of leverage used are the market leverage and book leverage variables
deﬁned in the data section. The main measure of distress used is Merton DD default prob-
ability, which takes a value between 0 and 1. Additionally, leverage dummy variables are
used to allow for non-linearity in the relationship between leverage and investment risk. The
timing convention of this speciﬁcation tests the eﬀect of the beginning of year leverage or
distress (leverage and distress is measured at the end of year t − 1) on the investment risks
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taken in year t. For example, the impact of December 31, 2009 leverage is being measured
on the investment risks taken during the year in 2010. Thus, all leverage measures, distress
measures, and controls are measured prior to when investment dollars are spent.
The Controlsi,t−1 are comprised of size, proﬁtability, market to book, and proportion
of short term debt. Size is proxied by the log of assets at time t − 1, while proﬁtability is
measured as operating income before depreciation divided by assets at time t − 1. Market
to book is included as a proxy for investment opportunities, this is measured as the market
value of assets divided by book value of assets at time t− 1. Debt maturity could also have
implications for investment risk, this is controlled for as the proportion of debt due in the
next year divided by total debt at time t−1. As with the leverage variable, by using time t−1
for the control variables, the impact of variables measured at year-end are being compared
to investment risks taken in the following year. For example, the inﬂuence of proﬁtability
during 2009 or market to book at December 31, 2009 is compared to investment risks in 2010.
Additional controls for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects FirmFEi,t and time ﬁxed eﬀects TimeFEi,t are
included. The inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects controls for any time invariant heterogeneity (for
example time invariant lending relationships, CEO characteristics etc.). Time ﬁxed eﬀects
are included to control for any time period speciﬁc shocks, this is particularly important
given that the ﬁrms in the sample all produce commodities. By including time ﬁxed eﬀects
in the speciﬁcation changes in investment opportunities due to changes in commodity prices
are controlled for, to the extent these shocks aﬀect all ﬁrms the same.
4.2 Natural Experiment: Commodity Based Leverage Shocks
While the ﬁrm-level regressions outlined above could allow me to establish a basic relationship
between leverage and investment risk, with some observables and time invariant heterogeneity
controlled for, better inference can be achieved by using a natural experiment framework.
The natural experiment I use is two commodity driven leverage shocks. The commodity
shocks I use in 1998 and 2008 were driven by unexpected economic collapses, which make
them an attractive setting for a natural experiment. Speciﬁcally, the price collapse in 1998
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was due to the Russian default and Asian ﬁnancial crisis, these events were not anticipated.
In January 1998 futures contracts indicated natural gas prices of $2.46/mmbtu and oil prices
of $18.56/barrel for December 1998, while actual realized prices were $1.95/mmbtu and
$11.35/barrel respectively. The price collapse in 2008 was due to the ﬁnancial crisis in the
fall of 2008, and also was not anticipated. In January 2008 futures contracts indicated natural
gas prices of $9.00/mmbtu and oil prices of $94.05/barrel for December 2008, while actual
realized prices were $5.94/mmbtu and $41.12/barrel respectively.
Commodity prices are exogenous, as no single ﬁrm can control prices for oil or natural
gas. The price collapses experienced by commodities in 1998 and 2008 inﬂuenced the leverage
levels of ﬁrms diﬀerently based on 1) the amount of leverage a ﬁrm had prior to the shock
and 2) the precise exposure a ﬁrm's existing assets had to the commodity shock based on its
mix of oil and natural gas reserves 3) The geographic location of a ﬁrm's existing assets.
The initial diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences framework can be thought of as 1) the diﬀerence
between pre-shock and post-shock behavior 2) the diﬀerence in behavior of ﬁrms more aﬀected
by the shock (treatment) and ﬁrms less aﬀected by the shock (control). As mentioned above
whether a ﬁrm is considered treatment or control is a function of commodity prices on its
leverage via the revaluation of its existing assets. Book leverage prior to the shock, can be
calculated directly from Compustat data. To calculate the eﬀect of the commodity price
shock on a ﬁrm's leverage I can take advantage of additional unique disclosures in the oil and
natural gas industry. Speciﬁcally, in every 10-K a ﬁrm has to report the diﬀerent components
of changes to the dollar value of its reserves (acquisitions, discoveries, commodity prices etc.),
with this data I can isolate the precise eﬀect of commodity prices on a ﬁrm's reserves, distinct
from any management action to alter or improve dollar reserves. This enables me to calculate
what a ﬁrm's book leverage would be if the only event that occurred was the commodity
shock, the calculation is as follows:
˜BookLeveragei,Post =
TotalLiabilitiesi,P re
TotalAssetsi,P re + $ChangeReservesPricesi,Post
For example, in the case of the shock that occurred in 2008, the total liabilities as of December
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31, 2007 are used in conjunction with the change in reserves due to commodity prices during
2008 to calculate the market leverage as of December 31, 2008. The ﬁrms in the top quartile
of leverage using the above calculation are used as treatment ﬁrms, while the control ﬁrms
are obtained by matching on December 31, 2007 book leverage. To mitigate any issues with
concurrent changes in investment policies, I exclude the year of a shock. So in the case of
2008, I compare investment risks taken in 2007 to investment risks taken in 2009. For the
natural experiment I focus on book leverage as this is what is most closely related to the
reserve changes a ﬁrm has on its balance sheet.
I use a regression form of diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences to test the eﬀect of leverage on invest-
ment risk in a natural experiment framework. The speciﬁc regression I estimate is below:
RiskRatioi,t = α + β1Treatmenti,t + β2Posti,t + β3Treatmenti,t ∗ Posti,t
+Controlsi,t−1 + FirmFEi + Y earFEt + εi,i
Where the Treatmenti,t is a 0 or 1 dummy variable constructed from the reserve based book
leverage calculation outlined above and Controlsi,t−1 are similar to the panel regression. The
key coeﬃcient of interest in this speciﬁcation is β3, which measures how the treatment group
is diﬀerentially aﬀected by the shock. For example, if ﬁrms whose leverage is more aﬀected
by a commodity shock reduce investment risk after the shock, then β3 would be negative.
5 Results
5.1 Firm Level Panel Regressions
Table 2 reports results from ﬁrm-level panel regressions of diﬀerent measures of investment
risk on measures of leverage and distress. Every measure of leverage and distress has a nega-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the investment risk taken by a ﬁrm. The coeﬃcient
on market leverage in speciﬁcation (1) can be interpreted as a one standard deviation in-
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crease in leverage reducing the investment risk ratio by 8.5% relative to the mean ﬁrm-year
investment risk ratio. Alternatively speciﬁcation (5) can be interpreted as a ﬁrm reducing
its risk taking by 21.6% relative to the mean ﬁrm-year, when it is in the top quartile of
sample leverage. The coeﬃcient on the Merton DD default probability can be interpreted
as a one standard deviation increase in default probability reducing a ﬁrm's risk-taking by
6.8% relative to the mean ﬁrm-year investment risk-ratio.
A concern in the interpretation of the ﬁrm-level regression results reported in Table 2
is how reverse causality might explain the observed coeﬃcient estimates. It could be the
case that ﬁrms are increasing leverage because they are planning to reduce investment risk,
and are more comfortable with a higher debt load as they reduce their investment risk. One
test of the plausibility of the reverse causality argument is in Table 3, which reports how
ﬁrms change their risk taking prior to bankruptcy. There are only 16 bankruptcies in the
sample, yet the reduction in risk in the years prior to bankruptcy is large enough that there
is statistical power even for this small number of observations. The economic interpretation
of the coeﬃcient in speciﬁcation (1) is that in the year prior to bankruptcy ﬁrms reduce
investment risk taking 23.8% relative to the investment risk taking of the mean ﬁrm. A
result inconsistent with the reverse causality explanation above, as ﬁrms that are in distress
and about to declare bankruptcy are less likely to be increasing their leverage deliberately.
5.2 Natural Experiment
A key assumption when using a natural experiment framework is the conditionally random
assignment of treatment. Treatment in the setting of my natural experiment is based on the
eﬀect of a change in existing assets caused by commodity price shocks on leverage. Because
leverage is a ﬁrm decision, pre-shock diﬀerences in leverage may be a cause for concern
regarding the conditionally random assignment assumption. As Table 4 Panel A shows,
there are economically signiﬁcant and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in leverage between
all ﬁrms and the treatment ﬁrms. This is not surprising given that pre-existing book leverage
aﬀects a ﬁrm's probability of being treated. Interestingly, treatment ﬁrms are very similar
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across other observable dimensions, when compared to the other ﬁrms in the sample.
To mitigate concerns regarding pre-shock diﬀerences in leverage I undertake two matching
procedures in Panel B and Panel C. Speciﬁcally I match ﬁrms on pre-shock book leverage
(book leverage as of Dec 31, 1997 or Dec 31, 2007), both with replacement (Panel B) and
without replacement (Panel C). In both panels the matching procedure results in ﬁrms with
similar pre-shock book leverage. Additionally, with the exception of log assets in Panel C,
ﬁrms in the treatment and control groups match well across market to book, proﬁtability,
and market leverage.
Table 5 reports the eﬀect of the commodity price shock on treatment and control ﬁrms.
Speciﬁcally, the shocked book leverage reported is based on the book leverage prior to the
shock (book leverage as of Dec 31, 1997 or Dec 31, 2007), adjusted only for the eﬀect of
the change in commodity prices on a ﬁrm's existing assets. This variable is unaﬀected
by any management actions that occur during the period of the negative commodity price
shock. Because shocked book leverage is the variable that determines treatment, it is not
surprising to see large economically signiﬁcant and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the treatment ﬁrms and other ﬁrms. Additionally, there are also economically signiﬁcant and
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between treatment ﬁrms and control ﬁrms in Merton DD
default probability and market leverage. Panel B and Panel C of Table 5 indicate that
despite treatment and control ﬁrms having similar observable characteristics and similar pre-
shock book leverage, the eﬀect of the negative commodity shock on treatment ﬁrms, results in
treatment ﬁrms being closer to distress than control ﬁrms. In essence, this framework relies on
negative commodity shocks having quasi-random eﬀects on ﬁrms with similar characteristics.
Given that the diﬀerential eﬀect of commodity price shocks on oil versus gas, or on one
geography versus another geography was unpredictable, this framework yields quasi-random
assignment of treatment and control.
Table 6 reports the results of a regression form of diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences. This speci-
ﬁcation uses exogenous variation in leverage caused by negative commodity shocks in 1998
and 2008 to identify the inﬂuence of leverage on investment risk taking. The key coeﬃcient
of interest is the coeﬃcient for the interaction term Treatmenti,t ∗Postt which measures how
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ﬁrms with leverage that is more aﬀected by the commodity shock change their investment risk
relative to ﬁrms less aﬀected by the commodity shock. This coeﬃcient in speciﬁcation (1) is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations, and matching group methodolo-
gies. The economic interpretation of the interaction coeﬃcient in (2) is that treatment ﬁrms
reduce risk taking by 75.3% relative to the mean ﬁrm risk level in response to the leverage
shock relative to the investment risk taking of control ﬁrms. The control variables used in
Table 6 are based on t-1 variables, or variables prior to the commodity price shock, as many
of the controls themselves are aﬀected by the commodity price shock they could be consid-
ered bad controls. Speciﬁcally, investment risk taking in 2007 uses control variables from
2006, while investment risk taking in 2009 uses year end 2007 (pre-shock) control variables,
as these are unaﬀected by the shock. The results in Table 6 further mitigate some of the
reverse-causality and omitted variable endogeneity concerns in the panel regressions, as the
leverage changes in the natural experiment are driven by the eﬀect of commodity prices on
a ﬁrm's existing assets, which is outside of a ﬁrm's control.
An important assumption when using a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach in a natural
experiment framework is the parallel trends assumption. That is, in the absence of treatment,
would the treatment and control groups have behaved similarly. Table 4 provides evidence
that the treatment and control groups used are similar across a number of observable dimen-
sions, however, Table 7 takes an additional step in testing whether the treatment and control
groups behave similarly in time periods that did not experience negative leverage shocks.
In Table 7 I create placebo events in 2001 (three years after 1998) and in 2005 (three years
before 2008), to see whether treatment and control ﬁrms behave similarly in these other time
periods. I ﬁnd that the interaction coeﬃcient Treatmenti,t ∗ PlaceboPostt is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations. This suggests that in other time periods the
investment risk trends across these ﬁrms was similar or parallel.
One concern with using a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences framework in a natural experiment
setting is that many factors that inﬂuence investment decisions, in addition to leverage,
could be changing. In particular if changes in the value of a ﬁrm's existing assets has an
impact on its risk taking for a reason other than changes to leverage (e.g. worse investment
131
opportunities), it could be a concern for my identiﬁcation. To test whether this is the
case I report results in Table 8 which measure the eﬀect of prior period changes in reserves
due to commodity prices on investment risk taking. The coeﬃcients for this variable are
not statistically signiﬁcant and are close to zero, suggesting that prior period changes in
commodity prices are not of ﬁrst order concern in making decisions regarding investment
risk taking. I report results for both the full sample as well as for the subsample where the
years used in the natural experiment are excluded.
6 Conclusion
Whether ﬁrms engage in risk-shifting has been an open empirical question. Lack of data and
adequate measures of risk, and the endogeneity of leverage and risk taking have meant this
question has not been able to be addressed directly. I use a setting which has quasi-random
shocks to leverage and objective measures of investment risk, from SEC disclosures, to test
whether ﬁrms engage in risk-shifting. I ﬁnd that ﬁrms reduce risk, rather than increase risk,
when leverage is high and when they get close to distress.
Prior theoretical literature outlines several reasons for why ﬁrms may have incentives to
reduce risk taking in distress. Managers may have career reputational concerns which result
in a reduction in investment risk taking (Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992)). Firms too likely
have incentives to ensure that they have a good reputation to ensure access to debt markets
(Diamond (1989)), which can aﬀect their ability to pursue future positive NPV projects
Almeida et al. (2011). The evidence in this paper suggests that risk-mitigation incentives
outweigh risk-shifting incentives in investment decision making for the average ﬁrm.
132
References
Almeida, H., Campello, M., Weisbach, M. S., 2011. Corporate ﬁnancial and investment
policies when future ﬁnancing is not frictionless. Journal of Corporate Finance 17, 675
693.
Andrade, G., Kaplan, S. N., 1998. How costly is ﬁnancial (not economic) distress? evidence
from highly leveraged transactions that became distressed. Journal of Finance 53, 1443
1493.
Barnea, A., Haugen, R. A., Senbet, L. W., 1980. A rationale for debt maturity structure and
call provisions in the agency theoretic framework. Journal of Finance 35, 12231234.
Bharath, S. T., Shumway, T., 2008. Forecasting default with the merton distance to default
model. Review of Financial Studies 21(3), 13391369.
Diamond, D. W., 1989. Reputation acquisition in debt markets. Journal of Political Economy
97, 828862.
Eisdorfer, A., 2008. Empirical evidence of risk shifting in ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrm. Journal
of Finance 63, 609637.
Gormley, T. A., Matsa, D. A., 2011. Growing out of trouble: Corporate responses to liability
risk. Review of Financial Studies 24(8), 27812821.
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., 2001. The theory and practice of corporate ﬁnance: Evidence
from the ﬁeld. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187243.
Green, R. C., 1984. Investment incentives, debt, and warrants. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 13, 115136.
Hirshleifer, D., Thakor, A. V., 1992. Managerial conservatism, project choice, and debt.
Review of Financial Studies 5, 437470.
133
Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H., 1976. Theory of the ﬁrm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305360.
John, T. A., John, K., 1993. Top-management compensation and capital structure. Journal
of Finance 48, 949974.
Landier, A., Sraer, D., Thesmar, D., 2011. The risk-shifting hypothesis: Evidence from
subprime originations. Working Paper.
Merton, R. C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk and structure of interest
rates. Journal of Finance 29, 449470.
Parrino, R., Weisbach, M. S., 1999. Measuring investment distortions arising from
stockholder-bondholder conﬂicts. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 342.
Rauh, J., 2009. Risk shifting versus risk management: Investment policy in corporate pension
plans. Review of Financial Studies 22, 26872733.
Smith, C. W., Warner, J. B., 1979. On ﬁnancial contracting an analysis of bond covenants.
Journal of Financial Economics 7, 117161.
Welch, I., 2004. Capital structure and stock returns. Journal of Political Economy 114, 106
131.
134
R
es
er
ve
 I
nc
re
as
e 
D
ue
 t
o 
D
is
co
ve
ri
es
/E
xp
lo
ra
to
ry
 C
ap
ex
Density
F
ig
ur
e
1:
T
hi
s
fig
ur
e
pl
ot
s
th
e
de
ns
ity
fu
nc
tio
n
of
pr
ov
ed
re
se
rv
e
ad
di
tio
ns
fr
om
di
sc
ov
er
ie
s,
di
vi
de
d
by
E
xp
lo
ra
to
ry
(H
ig
h
R
is
k
C
ap
ex
).
T
he
ob
je
ct
iv
e
of
th
e
fig
ur
e
is
to
sh
ow
th
e
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
of
po
te
nt
ia
lp
ay
of
fs
fr
om
ex
pl
or
at
or
y
ca
pi
ta
le
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
fo
r
fir
m
s
in
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
ye
ar
s.
A
nu
m
be
r
of
10
on
th
e
ho
riz
on
ta
la
cc
es
s
ca
n
be
in
te
rp
re
te
d
as
$1
0
of
pr
ov
ed
re
se
rv
es
be
in
g
ad
de
d
in
a
ye
ar
in
w
hi
ch
$1
of
E
xp
lo
ra
to
ry
C
ap
ita
l
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
w
as
 m
ad
e.
135
T
ab
le
 1
: 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
St
at
is
ti
cs
 a
nd
 C
or
re
la
ti
on
s
P
an
el
 A
: 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
St
at
is
ti
cs
N
M
ea
n
S
td
 D
ev
p2
5
p5
0
p7
5
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e
R
is
k 
R
at
io
12
08
0.
32
0.
26
0.
12
0.
26
0.
46
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
M
ar
ke
t L
ev
er
ag
e
12
08
0.
28
0.
23
0.
10
0.
23
0.
41
B
oo
k 
L
ev
er
ag
e
12
08
0.
52
0.
23
0.
36
0.
52
0.
66
S
iz
e 
(A
ss
et
s 
in
 $
M
il
li
on
s)
12
08
2,
10
2.
46
5,
87
5.
16
52
.5
5
28
3.
10
1,
18
5.
76
P
ro
fi
ta
bi
li
ty
12
08
0.
17
0.
24
0.
08
0.
19
0.
30
S
ho
rt
 T
er
m
 D
eb
t/
T
ot
al
 D
eb
t
12
08
0.
10
0.
24
0.
00
0.
00
0.
05
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
B
oo
k
12
08
1.
49
1.
07
0.
93
1.
22
1.
68
M
er
to
n 
D
D
 D
ef
au
lt
 P
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
10
73
0.
08
0.
21
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
8
P
an
el
 B
: 
C
or
re
la
ti
on
s 
W
it
h 
O
th
er
 R
is
k 
P
ro
xi
es
R
is
k 
R
at
io
S
td
 D
ev
 o
f 
Q
ua
rt
er
ly
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 R
O
A
 
V
ol
at
il
it
y 
of
 M
on
th
ly
 E
qu
it
y 
R
et
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
us
ed
in
th
e
fi
rm
le
ve
lp
an
el
re
gr
es
si
on
s
us
ed
in
th
is
st
ud
y.
T
he
ri
sk
ra
ti
o
is
de
fi
ne
d
as
th
e
pr
op
or
ti
on
of
ca
pi
ta
l
in
ve
st
ed
in
hi
gh
ri
sk
pr
oj
ec
ts
(e
xp
lo
ra
to
ry
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
)
to
to
ta
l
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
.
M
ar
ke
t
le
ve
ra
ge
is
de
fi
ne
d
as
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
di
vi
de
d
by
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
pl
us
th
e
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
de
bt
(W
el
ch
20
04
).
B
oo
k
le
ve
ra
ge
is
de
fi
ne
d
as
to
ta
l
li
ab
il
it
ie
s
di
vi
de
d
by
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
In
or
de
r
to
be
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
a
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
m
us
t
1)
be
in
S
IC
13
11
(C
ru
de
O
il
an
d
N
at
ur
al
G
as
)
2)
be
U
.S
.
do
m
ic
il
ed
an
d
fi
le
a
10
-K
.
T
o
m
it
ig
at
e
ou
tl
ie
rs
bo
ok
le
ve
ra
ge
va
lu
es
ar
e
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
at
1,
an
d
pr
of
it
ab
il
it
y
an
d
m
ar
ke
t
to
bo
ok
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
at
1%
an
d
99
%
.
T
he
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
is
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
M
er
to
n 
(1
97
4)
 b
on
d 
pr
ic
in
g 
m
od
el
, a
s 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
by
 B
ha
ra
th
 a
nd
 S
hu
m
w
ay
 (
20
08
).
  F
ir
m
-y
ea
r 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 s
pa
n 
fr
om
 1
99
7 
th
ro
ug
h 
20
10
.
R
is
k 
R
at
io
S
td
 D
ev
 o
f 
Q
ua
rt
er
ly
 C
hg
 in
 R
O
A
 
V
ol
at
il
it
y 
of
 M
on
th
ly
 E
qu
it
y 
R
et
1.
00
0.
13
0.
10
1.
00
1.
00
0.
24
136
T
ab
le
 2
: 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
R
is
k 
an
d 
M
ea
su
re
s 
of
 D
is
tr
es
s 
an
d 
L
ev
er
ag
e 
- 
P
an
el
 R
eg
re
ss
io
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
M
ar
ke
t L
ev
er
ag
e i
,t-
1
-0
.1
18
**
[-
2.
32
]
B
oo
k 
L
ev
er
ag
e i
,t-
1
-0
.1
22
**
*
[-
2.
65
]
M
er
to
n 
D
D
 D
ef
au
lt
 P
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
i,t
-1
-0
.1
03
**
*
[-
2.
87
]
Q
4 
M
kt
 L
ev
 D
um
m
y i
,t-
1
-0
.0
45
**
-0
.0
69
**
[-
2.
26
]
[-
2.
40
]
Q
3 
M
kt
 L
ev
 D
um
m
y 
i,t
-1
-0
.0
25
[-
1.
06
]
Q
2 
M
kt
 L
ev
 D
um
m
y i
,t-
1
-0
.0
25
[-
1.
12
]
S
iz
e i
,t-
1
0.
04
5*
*
0.
04
2*
*
0.
04
8*
*
0.
04
1*
0.
04
4*
*
[2
.1
0]
[2
.0
3]
[2
.0
6]
[1
.9
6]
[2
.1
5]
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
B
oo
k i
,t-
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
9
0.
00
8
0.
00
6
0.
00
3
[0
.1
5]
[0
.7
6]
[0
.5
2]
[0
.5
1]
[0
.2
5]
P
ro
fi
ta
bi
li
ty
i,t
-1
-0
.1
20
**
*
-0
.1
19
**
*
-0
.1
49
**
*
-0
.1
15
**
*
-0
.1
18
**
*
[-
3.
11
]
[-
3.
07
]
[-
2.
99
]
[-
3.
01
]
[-
3.
08
]
F
ir
m
F
E
i
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
eF
E
t
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0.
06
7
0.
06
8
0.
07
8
0.
06
6
0.
06
7
N
12
08
12
08
10
73
12
08
12
08
R
is
k 
R
at
io
 =
 H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
C
ap
ex
/T
ot
al
 C
ap
ex
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
fi
rm
-l
ev
el
re
gr
es
si
on
s
w
hi
ch
do
cu
m
en
tt
he
ef
fe
ct
of
di
ff
er
en
tl
ev
er
ag
e
an
d
fi
na
nc
ia
ld
is
tr
es
s
m
ea
su
re
s
on
th
e
ri
sk
in
es
s
of
a
fi
rm
's
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
th
es
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
ri
sk
ra
ti
o
fo
r
fi
rm
i
in
ye
ar
t.
A
fi
rm
's
ri
sk
ra
ti
o
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
as
th
e
pr
op
or
ti
on
of
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
in
ve
st
ed
in
hi
gh
ri
sk
pr
oj
ec
ts
re
la
ti
ve
to
al
l
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fi
rm
le
ve
l
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
ti
m
e
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s.
S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fi
rm
,w
it
h
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
be
lo
w
th
e
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
es
.*
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l,
**
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l,
an
d
**
*
at
th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l.
R
is
kR
at
io
i,t
 =
 α
+
 β
1D
is
tr
es
s i
,t-
1
+
 C
on
tr
ol
s i
,t-
1
+
 T
im
eF
E
t +
 F
ir
m
F
E
i
+
 ε
i,t
R
is
kR
at
io
i,t
 =
 α
+
 β
1L
ev
er
ag
eD
i,t
-1
 +
 C
on
tr
ol
s i
,t-
1
+
 T
im
eF
E
t +
 F
ir
m
F
E
i
+
 ε
i,t
137
T
ab
le
 3
: 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
R
is
k 
P
ri
or
 t
o 
B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
(1
6 
B
an
kr
up
tc
ie
s 
in
 S
am
pl
e)
(1
)
(2
)
O
ne
 Y
ea
r 
P
ri
or
 to
 B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
D
um
m
y i
,t
-0
.0
76
*
-0
.1
18
**
[-
1.
92
]
[-
2.
08
]
T
w
o 
Y
ea
rs
 P
ri
or
 to
 B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
D
um
m
y i
,t
-0
.1
05
[-
1.
51
]
T
hr
ee
 Y
ea
rs
 P
ri
or
 to
 B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
D
um
m
y i
,t
-0
.0
34
[-
0.
41
]
S
iz
e i
,t-
1
0.
04
0*
0.
04
2*
*
[1
.9
0]
[2
.0
0]
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
B
oo
k i
,t-
1
0.
01
0
0.
01
0
[0
.8
2]
[0
.8
1]
P
ro
fi
ta
bi
li
ty
i,t
-1
-0
.1
13
**
*
-0
.1
13
**
*
[-
3.
00
]
[-
2.
99
]
Fi
rm
FE
i
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
eF
E
t
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0.
06
1
0.
06
4
N
12
08
12
08
R
is
k 
R
at
io
 =
 H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
C
ap
ex
/T
ot
al
 C
ap
ex
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
fi
rm
-l
ev
el
re
gr
es
si
on
s
th
at
do
cu
m
en
t
ho
w
in
ve
st
m
en
t
ri
sk
ch
an
ge
s
fo
r
a
fi
rm
in
th
e
ye
ar
s
pr
io
r
to
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
th
es
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
ri
sk
ra
ti
o
fo
r
fi
rm
i
in
ye
ar
t.
A
fi
rm
's
ri
sk
ra
ti
o
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
as
th
e
pr
op
or
ti
on
of
ca
pi
ta
le
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
sp
en
to
n
hi
gh
ri
sk
pr
oj
ec
ts
re
la
ti
ve
to
al
lc
ap
it
al
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
.
D
um
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
in
se
rt
ed
ba
se
d
on
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ye
ar
s
pr
io
r
to
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
,f
or
ex
am
pl
e
in
th
e
ye
ar
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
pr
io
r
to
de
cl
ar
in
g
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
"O
ne
Y
ea
r
P
ri
or
to
B
an
kr
up
tc
y
D
um
m
y"
is
eq
ua
lt
o
1,
an
d
eq
ua
lt
o
0
fo
r
al
lo
th
er
fi
rm
-y
ea
rs
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fi
rm
le
ve
lf
ix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
ti
m
e
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s.
S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fi
rm
,w
it
h
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
 b
el
ow
 th
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t e
st
im
at
es
. *
 in
di
ca
te
s 
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
0%
 le
ve
l, 
**
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 le
ve
l, 
an
d 
**
* 
at
 th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l.
R
is
kR
at
io
i,t
 =
 α
+
 β
1O
ne
Y
ea
rP
ri
or
to
B
an
kr
up
tc
yD
i,t
+
 β
2T
w
oY
ea
rs
P
ri
or
to
B
an
kr
up
tc
yD
i,t
+
 β
3T
hr
ee
Y
ea
rs
P
ri
or
to
B
an
kr
up
tc
h i
,t 
+
 C
on
tr
ol
s i
,t-
1
+
 T
im
eF
E
t +
 F
ir
m
F
E
i
+
 ε
i,t
138
T
ab
le
 4
: 
N
at
ur
al
 E
xp
er
im
en
t,
 P
re
-E
ve
nt
 T
re
at
m
en
t 
vs
. C
on
tr
ol
 C
om
pa
ri
so
n
P
an
el
 A
: 
F
ul
l S
am
pl
e
T
ot
al
A
ll
 F
ir
m
s
T
re
at
m
en
t F
ir
m
s
D
if
fe
re
nc
e
p 
va
lu
e
B
oo
k 
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
46
0.
62
-0
.1
6*
**
0.
00
L
og
 A
ss
et
s
19
.9
3
20
.2
2
-0
.2
9
0.
48
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
B
oo
k
1.
58
1.
61
-0
.0
3
0.
83
Pr
of
it
ab
il
it
y
0.
14
0.
15
-0
.0
1
0.
67
M
ar
ke
t L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
22
0.
30
-0
.0
8*
*
0.
04
M
er
to
n 
D
D
 D
ef
au
lt
 P
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
0.
01
0.
03
-0
.0
2*
0.
06
N
um
be
r 
of
 E
ve
nt
 F
ir
m
s
10
5
36
P
an
el
 B
: 
M
at
ch
in
g 
Sa
m
pl
e 
W
it
h 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
T
ot
al
C
on
tr
ol
 F
ir
m
s
T
re
at
m
en
t F
ir
m
s
D
if
fe
re
nc
e
p 
va
lu
e
B
oo
k 
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
60
0.
62
-0
.0
2
0.
76
L
og
 A
ss
et
s
20
.9
6
20
.2
2
0.
74
0.
11
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
B
oo
k
1.
48
1.
61
-0
.1
3
0.
57
Pr
of
it
ab
il
it
y
0.
11
0.
15
-0
.0
4
0.
11
M
ar
ke
t L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
34
0.
30
0.
04
0.
43
M
er
to
n 
D
D
 D
ef
au
lt
 P
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
0.
04
0.
03
0.
01
0.
52
N
um
be
r 
of
 E
ve
nt
 F
ir
m
s
36
36
N
um
be
r 
of
 U
ni
qu
e 
E
ve
nt
 F
ir
m
s
22
36
P
an
el
 C
: 
M
at
ch
in
g 
Sa
m
pl
e 
W
it
ho
ut
 R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
T
ot
al
C
on
tr
ol
 F
ir
m
s
T
re
at
m
en
t F
ir
m
s
D
if
fe
re
nc
e
p 
va
lu
e
B
oo
k 
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
56
0.
62
-0
.0
6
0.
15
L
og
 A
ss
et
s
21
.0
1
20
.2
2
0.
79
*
0.
08
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
B
oo
k
1.
48
1.
61
-0
.1
3
0.
53
Pr
of
it
ab
il
it
y
0.
13
0.
15
-0
.0
2
0.
47
M
ar
ke
t L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
28
0.
30
-0
.0
2
0.
64
M
er
to
n 
D
D
 D
ef
au
lt
 P
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
0.
01
0.
03
-0
.0
2
0.
40
N
um
be
r 
of
 F
ir
m
s
36
36
N
um
be
r 
of
 U
ni
qu
e 
E
ve
nt
 F
ir
m
s
36
36
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
un
iv
ar
ia
te
t-
te
st
s
w
hi
ch
co
m
pa
re
ob
se
rv
ab
le
va
ri
ab
le
s
of
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
an
d
co
nt
ro
l
gr
ou
ps
us
ed
in
th
e
na
tu
ra
l
ex
pe
ri
m
en
t
in
th
e
pr
e-
ev
en
ty
ea
r.
T
he
ev
en
ty
ea
rs
ar
e
li
nk
ed
to
ye
ar
s
in
w
hi
ch
ne
ga
ti
ve
co
m
m
od
it
y
pr
ic
e
sh
oc
ks
oc
cu
r,
in
th
is
ca
se
19
98
an
d
20
08
.
T
he
se
to
f
pa
ne
ls
be
lo
w
co
m
pa
re
pr
e-
ev
en
t
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
of
th
e
fi
rm
s
us
ed
(c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
as
of
ye
ar
en
d
19
97
an
d
20
07
).
Pa
ne
l
A
is
co
m
pr
is
ed
of
al
l
fi
rm
s
in
th
e
pr
e-
ev
en
t
ye
ar
s,
w
hi
le
P
an
el
s
B
an
d
C
re
ly
on
di
ff
er
en
t
m
at
ch
in
g
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
es
.
Pa
ne
l
B
an
d
C
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
ob
ta
in
in
g
m
at
ch
in
g
fi
rm
s
le
ss
af
fe
ct
ed
by
th
e
ne
ga
ti
ve
co
m
m
od
it
y
sh
oc
k
to
th
os
e
m
or
e
af
fe
ct
ed
by
it
ba
se
d
on
pr
e-
ev
en
tb
oo
k
le
ve
ra
ge
.
Pa
ne
lB
is
co
m
pr
is
ed
of
co
nt
ro
lf
ir
m
s
th
at
ar
e
m
at
ch
ed
w
it
h
re
pl
ac
em
en
tw
hi
le
P
an
el
C
is
co
m
pr
is
ed
of
co
nt
ro
lf
ir
m
s
w
hi
ch
ar
e
m
at
ch
ed
w
it
ho
ut
re
pl
ac
em
en
t.
D
if
fe
re
nc
es
in
gr
ou
p
m
ea
ns
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
al
on
g
w
it
h
p-
va
lu
es
, *
 in
di
ca
te
s 
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
0%
 le
ve
l, 
**
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 le
ve
l, 
an
d 
**
* 
at
 th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l.
P
re
-S
ho
ck
 C
om
pa
ri
so
n
P
re
-S
ho
ck
 C
om
pa
ri
so
n
P
re
-S
ho
ck
 C
om
pa
ri
so
n
139
T
ab
le
 5
: 
N
at
ur
al
 E
xp
er
im
en
t,
 E
ve
nt
 T
re
at
m
en
t 
vs
. C
on
tr
ol
 C
om
pa
ri
so
n
P
an
el
 A
: 
F
ul
l S
am
pl
e
T
ot
al
A
ll
 F
ir
m
s
T
re
at
m
en
t F
ir
m
s
D
if
fe
re
nc
e
p 
va
lu
e
S
ho
ck
ed
 B
oo
k 
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
54
0.
98
-0
.4
4*
**
0.
00
M
er
to
n 
D
D
 D
ef
au
lt
 P
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
0.
24
0.
44
-0
.2
0*
**
0.
00
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
40
0.
54
-0
.1
4*
**
0.
01
P
an
el
 B
: 
M
at
ch
in
g 
Sa
m
pl
e 
W
it
h 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
T
ot
al
C
on
tr
ol
 F
ir
m
s
T
re
at
m
en
t F
ir
m
s
D
if
fe
re
nc
e
p 
va
lu
e
S
ho
ck
ed
 B
oo
k 
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
68
0.
98
-0
.3
0*
**
0.
00
M
er
to
n 
D
D
 D
ef
au
lt
 P
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
0.
18
0.
44
-0
.2
6*
**
0.
00
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
37
0.
54
-0
.1
7*
**
0.
00
P
an
el
 C
: 
M
at
ch
in
g 
Sa
m
pl
e 
W
it
ho
ut
 R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
T
ot
al
C
on
tr
ol
 F
ir
m
s
T
re
at
m
en
t F
ir
m
s
D
if
fe
re
nc
e
p 
va
lu
e
S
ho
ck
ed
 B
oo
k 
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
62
0.
98
-0
.3
6*
**
0.
00
M
er
to
n 
D
D
 D
ef
au
lt
 P
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
0.
22
0.
44
-0
.2
2*
**
0.
00
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
40
0.
54
-0
.1
4*
*
0.
02
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
un
iv
ar
ia
te
t-
te
st
s
w
hi
ch
co
m
pa
re
ob
se
rv
ab
le
va
ri
ab
le
s
of
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
ta
nd
co
nt
ro
l
gr
ou
ps
us
ed
in
th
e
na
tu
ra
l
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ti
n
th
e
ev
en
t
ye
ar
.
T
he
ev
en
t
ye
ar
s
ar
e
li
nk
ed
to
ye
ar
s
in
w
hi
ch
ne
ga
ti
ve
co
m
m
od
it
y
pr
ic
e
sh
oc
ks
oc
cu
r,
in
th
is
ca
se
19
98
an
d
20
08
.
T
he
se
t
of
pa
ne
ls
be
lo
w
co
m
pa
re
ev
en
t
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
of
th
e
fi
rm
s
us
ed
(c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
as
of
ye
ar
en
d
19
98
an
d
20
08
).
T
he
co
m
po
si
ti
on
an
d
m
at
ch
in
g
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
of
P
an
el
A
,
P
an
el
B
,a
nd
P
an
el
C
ar
e
th
e
sa
m
e
as
T
ab
le
4.
D
if
fe
re
nc
es
in
gr
ou
p
m
ea
ns
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
al
on
g
w
it
h
p-
va
lu
es
,*
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l,
**
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 le
ve
l, 
an
d 
**
* 
at
 th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l.
P
os
t-
S
ho
ck
 C
om
pa
ri
so
n
P
os
t-
S
ho
ck
 C
om
pa
ri
so
n
P
os
t-
S
ho
ck
 C
om
pa
ri
so
n
140
T
ab
le
 6
: 
N
at
ur
al
 E
xp
er
im
en
t,
 E
ff
ec
t 
of
 L
ev
er
ag
e 
Sh
oc
k 
on
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t 
R
is
k:
 D
if
fe
re
nc
e-
in
-D
if
fe
re
nc
es
(P
re
-S
ho
ck
 v
s 
P
os
t-
Sh
oc
k,
 T
re
at
m
en
t 
=
 H
ig
h 
L
ev
er
ag
e 
Sh
oc
k 
F
ir
m
s 
vs
. C
on
tr
ol
 =
 L
ow
 L
ev
er
ag
e 
Sh
oc
k 
F
ir
m
s)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
P
os
t i,
t
T
re
at
m
en
t i,
t
T
re
at
m
en
t i,
t*
P
os
t i,
t
-0
.2
41
*
-0
.2
37
**
-0
.1
72
**
*
-0
.1
86
**
*
-0
.0
94
*
-0
.1
12
**
[-
1.
83
]
[-
2.
25
]
[-
2.
93
]
[-
3.
08
]
[-
1.
95
]
[-
2.
34
]
S
iz
e i
,t-
1
-0
.0
35
0.
05
4
0.
08
9
[-
0.
38
]
[0
.7
8]
[1
.3
6]
P
ro
fi
ta
bi
li
ty
i,t
-1
-1
.4
98
**
-0
.6
88
-0
.2
77
[-
2.
04
]
[-
1.
66
]
[-
0.
80
]
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
B
oo
k i
,t-
1
0.
05
3
0.
03
5
-0
.0
02
[0
.6
4]
[0
.5
3]
[-
0.
06
]
F
ir
m
E
ve
nt
F
E
i
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
eF
E
t
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0.
18
8
0.
32
0
0.
11
9
0.
18
7
0.
03
1
0.
06
1
N
14
4
14
4
14
4
14
4
28
2
28
2
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
re
su
lt
s
fr
om
a
re
gr
es
si
on
fo
rm
of
di
ff
er
en
ce
s-
in
-d
if
fe
re
nc
es
.
T
he
fi
rs
t
di
ff
er
en
ce
is
pr
e-
sh
oc
k
vs
.
po
st
-s
ho
ck
,
w
hi
le
th
e
se
co
nd
di
ff
er
en
ce
is
hi
gh
le
ve
ra
ge
sh
oc
k
vs
.l
ow
le
ve
ra
ge
sh
oc
k.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
th
es
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
ri
sk
ra
ti
o
of
fi
rm
i
at
ti
m
e
t.
F
ir
m
s
ar
e
di
vi
de
d
in
to
tr
ea
tm
en
t
an
d
co
nt
ro
l
gr
ou
ps
ba
se
d
on
th
e
ef
fe
ct
of
th
e
co
m
m
od
it
y
sh
oc
k
on
le
ve
ra
ge
.
F
or
th
e
fi
rm
s
th
at
ha
ve
im
pl
ie
d
bo
ok
le
ve
ra
ge
in
th
e
to
p
qu
ar
ti
le
du
e
to
th
e
co
m
m
od
it
y
sh
oc
k,
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
T
re
at
m
en
t
is
eq
ua
l
to
1
an
d
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
T
he
tw
o
le
ve
ra
ge
sh
oc
ks
us
ed
in
th
is
re
gr
es
si
on
ar
e
in
19
98
an
d
20
08
,
th
e
ye
ar
s
of
th
e
sh
oc
ks
ar
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
fr
om
th
e
sa
m
pl
e,
th
er
ef
or
e
th
e
pr
e-
po
st
co
m
pa
ri
so
ns
co
m
pa
re
19
97
(p
os
t
=
0)
to
19
99
(p
os
t
=
1)
an
d
20
07
(p
os
t
=
0)
to
20
08
(p
os
t
=
1)
.
(1
)
an
d
(2
)
re
po
rt
re
gr
es
si
on
es
ti
m
at
es
fo
r
th
e
m
at
ch
ed
sa
m
pl
e
w
it
h
re
pl
ac
em
en
t,
(3
)
an
d
(4
)
re
po
rt
es
ti
m
at
es
fo
r
th
e
m
at
ch
ed
sa
m
pl
e
w
it
h
re
pl
ac
em
en
t,
(5
)
an
d
(6
)
re
po
rt
es
ti
m
at
es
fo
r
al
l
fi
rm
s
in
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
du
ri
ng
th
e
ev
en
t
ye
ar
s.
C
on
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
ha
ve
be
en
pr
ev
io
us
ly
de
fi
ne
d,
af
te
r
th
e
sh
oc
k
oc
cu
rs
th
es
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
fi
xe
d
at
th
ei
r
la
st
pr
e-
ev
en
t
va
lu
es
,
as
th
ey
ar
e
af
fe
ct
by
th
e
sh
oc
k
(f
or
ex
am
pl
e
th
e
si
ze
co
nt
ro
lu
se
d
fo
r
th
e
19
99
po
st
pe
ri
od
is
ba
se
d
on
ye
ar
en
d
19
97
si
ze
).
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
in
th
es
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
ri
sk
ra
ti
o
fo
r
fi
rm
i
in
ye
ar
t.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fi
rm
-e
ve
nt
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
ti
m
e
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s.
S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fi
rm
,
w
it
h
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
be
lo
w
th
e
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
es
.
*
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
0%
 le
ve
l, 
**
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 le
ve
l, 
an
d 
**
* 
at
 th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l.
D
if
fe
re
nc
es
-i
n-
D
if
fe
re
nc
es
A
ll
 F
ir
m
s
M
at
ch
ed
 W
it
ho
ut
 R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
M
at
ch
ed
 W
it
h 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 T
im
eF
E
t
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 T
im
eF
E
t
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 T
im
eF
E
t
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 F
ir
m
E
ve
nt
F
E
i
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 F
ir
m
E
ve
nt
F
E
i
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 F
ir
m
E
ve
nt
F
E
i
R
is
kR
at
io
i,t
 =
 α
+
 β
1P
os
t i,
t
+
 β
2T
re
at
m
en
t i,
t +
 β
3T
re
at
m
en
t i,
t*
 P
os
t i,
t
+
 C
on
tr
ol
s i
,t-
1
+
 T
im
eF
E
t +
 F
ir
m
F
E
i
+
 ε
i,t
141
T
ab
le
 7
: 
P
la
ce
bo
 S
ho
ck
: 
D
if
fe
re
nc
e-
in
-D
if
fe
re
nc
es
(P
re
-P
la
ce
bo
 S
ho
ck
 v
s 
P
os
t-
P
la
ce
bo
 S
ho
ck
, T
re
at
m
en
t 
F
ir
m
s 
vs
. C
on
tr
ol
 F
ir
m
s)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
P
os
tP
la
ce
bo
i,t
T
re
at
m
en
t i,
t
T
re
at
m
en
t i,
t*
P
os
tP
la
ce
bo
i,t
0.
08
8
0.
08
2
0.
09
2
0.
02
4
0.
01
1
-0
.0
34
[0
.8
2]
[0
.7
9]
[1
.3
7]
[0
.3
7]
[0
.2
1]
[-
0.
55
]
S
iz
e i
,t-
1
0.
11
5
-0
.1
26
0.
14
2
[0
.7
4]
[-
1.
12
]
[1
.5
7]
P
ro
fi
ta
bi
li
ty
i,t
-1
-0
.4
76
-1
.0
06
**
-0
.7
76
*
[-
0.
73
]
[-
2.
69
]
[-
1.
99
]
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
B
oo
k i
,t-
1
-0
.0
51
-0
.0
06
0.
01
2
[-
0.
58
]
[-
0.
18
]
[0
.3
0]
F
ir
m
E
ve
nt
F
E
i
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
eF
E
t
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0.
04
3
0.
11
9
0.
07
8
0.
27
8
0.
08
4
0.
16
9
N
92
92
84
84
20
6
20
6
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 F
ir
m
E
ve
nt
F
E
i
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 F
ir
m
E
ve
nt
F
E
i
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 F
ir
m
E
ve
nt
F
E
i
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
es
ti
m
at
io
ns
fr
om
a
re
gr
es
si
on
fo
rm
of
di
ff
er
en
ce
s-
in
-d
if
fe
re
nc
es
.
T
he
fi
rs
t
di
ff
er
en
ce
is
th
e
pr
e-
pl
ac
eb
o
sh
oc
k
vs
.
po
st
-p
la
ce
bo
sh
oc
k,
w
hi
le
th
e
se
co
nd
di
ff
er
en
ce
is
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
fi
rm
s
us
ed
in
T
ab
le
6
vs
.t
he
co
nt
ro
l
fi
rm
s
us
ed
in
T
ab
le
6.
P
la
ce
bo
sh
oc
ks
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
m
ov
in
g
th
e
19
98
sh
oc
k
th
re
e
ye
ar
s
fo
rw
ar
d
to
20
01
an
d
th
e
20
08
sh
oc
k
th
re
e
ye
ar
s
ba
ck
w
ar
d
to
20
05
(N
ot
e:
da
ta
is
no
t
av
ai
la
bl
e
fo
r
ha
vi
ng
a
pl
ac
eb
o
sh
oc
k
in
19
95
,s
o
I
m
ov
e
th
e
pl
ac
eb
o
ev
en
t
th
re
e
ye
ar
s
fo
rw
ar
d
in
st
ea
d)
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
th
es
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
ri
sk
ra
ti
o
of
fi
rm
i
at
ti
m
e
t.
T
he
m
at
ch
in
g
an
d
sa
m
pl
e
co
m
po
si
ti
on
fo
r
(1
)
to
(6
)
is
th
e
sa
m
e
as
w
ha
t
is
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
T
ab
le
6.
 
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fi
rm
-e
ve
nt
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
ti
m
e
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s.
S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fi
rm
,
w
it
h
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
be
lo
w
th
e
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
es
. *
 in
di
ca
te
s 
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
0%
 le
ve
l, 
**
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 le
ve
l, 
an
d 
**
* 
at
 th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l.
D
if
fe
re
nc
es
-i
n-
D
if
fe
re
nc
es
M
at
ch
ed
 W
it
h 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
M
at
ch
ed
 W
it
ho
ut
 R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
A
ll
 F
ir
m
s
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 T
im
eF
E
t
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 T
im
eF
E
t
A
bs
or
be
d 
by
 T
im
eF
E
t
R
is
kR
at
io
i,t
 =
 α
+
 β
1P
os
tP
la
ce
bo
i,t
+
 β
2T
re
at
m
en
t i,
t +
 β
3T
re
at
m
en
t i,
t*
 P
os
tP
la
ce
bo
i,t
+
 C
on
tr
ol
s i
,t-
1
+
 T
im
eF
E
t +
 F
ir
m
F
E
i
+
 ε
i,t
142
T
ab
le
 8
: 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
R
es
er
ve
 C
ha
ng
es
 o
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
R
is
k 
- 
P
an
el
 R
eg
re
ss
io
n
F
ul
l S
am
pl
e
E
xc
lu
di
ng
 N
at
ur
al
 E
xp
er
im
en
t Y
ea
rs
(1
)
(2
)
R
es
er
ve
 C
ha
ng
e/
A
ss
et
s i
,t-
1
0.
00
9
-0
.0
02
[0
.4
2]
[-
0.
11
]
S
iz
e i
,t-
1
0.
06
1*
**
0.
07
9*
**
[2
.8
6]
[3
.3
3]
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
B
oo
k i
,t-
1
0.
00
8
-0
.0
04
[0
.5
1]
[-
0.
20
]
P
ro
fi
ta
bi
li
ty
i,t
-1
-0
.1
72
**
*
-0
.2
71
**
*
[-
3.
35
]
[-
3.
71
]
S
ho
rt
T
er
m
D
eb
t/
T
ot
al
D
eb
t i,
t-
1
-0
.0
65
-0
.0
55
[-
1.
44
]
[-
0.
80
]
F
ir
m
F
E
i
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
eF
E
t
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0.
08
2
0.
10
7
N
10
70
63
8
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
fi
rm
-l
ev
el
re
gr
es
si
on
s
w
hi
ch
do
cu
m
en
t
th
e
ef
fe
ct
of
re
se
rv
e
ch
an
ge
s
on
th
e
ri
sk
in
es
s
of
a
fi
rm
's
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
.
R
es
er
ve
ch
an
ge
s
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
a
fi
rm
's
pr
io
r
ye
ar
ch
an
ge
in
re
se
rv
es
du
e
to
co
m
m
od
it
y
pr
ic
es
sc
al
ed
by
as
se
ts
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
th
es
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
ri
sk
ra
ti
o
fo
r
fi
rm
i
in
ye
ar
t.
A
fi
rm
's
ri
sk
ra
ti
o
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
as
th
e
pr
op
or
ti
on
of
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
in
ve
st
ed
in
hi
gh
ri
sk
pr
oj
ec
ts
re
la
ti
ve
to
al
l
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
.
S
pe
ci
fi
ca
ti
on
(1
)
re
po
rt
s
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
,1
99
7
to
20
10
,w
hi
le
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
(2
)
ex
cl
ud
es
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
ye
ar
s
us
ed
in
th
e
na
tu
ra
l
ex
pe
ri
m
en
t,
19
97
-1
99
9
an
d
20
07
-2
00
9.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fi
rm
le
ve
l
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
ti
m
e
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s.
S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fi
rm
,w
it
h
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
be
lo
w
th
e
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
es
.*
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l,
**
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l,
an
d
**
*
at
th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l.
R
is
k 
R
at
io
 =
 H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
C
ap
ex
/T
ot
al
 C
ap
ex
R
is
kR
at
io
i,t
 =
 α
+
 β
1R
es
er
ve
C
ha
ng
e i
,t-
1
+
 C
on
tr
ol
s i
,t-
1
+
 T
im
eF
E
t +
 F
ir
m
F
E
i
+
 ε
i,t
143
T
ab
le
 A
pp
en
di
x 
A
: 
E
ff
ec
t 
of
 E
xp
lo
ra
to
ry
 C
ap
ex
 o
n 
R
es
er
ve
s 
A
dd
it
io
ns
 f
ro
m
 D
is
co
ve
ri
es
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
C
ap
ex
/A
ss
et
s i
,t
0.
42
8*
**
0.
48
9*
**
0.
53
5*
**
0.
54
4*
**
0.
46
5*
**
[4
.0
2]
[3
.7
0]
[3
.5
4]
[3
.5
7]
[2
.7
9]
H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
C
ap
ex
/A
ss
et
s i
,t-
1
0.
05
7
0.
17
0*
0.
19
9*
0.
09
3
[0
.7
3]
[1
.6
7]
[1
.7
3]
[0
.8
3]
H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
C
ap
ex
/A
ss
et
s i
,t-
2
0.
16
7
0.
18
1
-0
.0
13
[1
.5
8]
[1
.1
3]
[-
0.
11
]
H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
C
ap
ex
/A
ss
et
s i
,t-
3
0.
15
0
-0
.0
23
[1
.0
8]
[-
0.
19
]
H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
C
ap
ex
/A
ss
et
s i
,t-
4
0.
01
4
[0
.1
5]
F
ir
m
F
E
i
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
eF
E
t
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0.
19
8
0.
23
8
0.
23
6
0.
23
7
0.
21
1
N
11
27
99
9
83
7
69
6
57
3
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
fi
rm
-l
ev
el
re
gr
es
si
on
s
w
hi
ch
do
cu
m
en
t
th
e
ef
fe
ct
of
hi
gh
ri
sk
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
of
di
ff
er
en
t
la
gs
on
re
se
rv
es
ad
de
d
fr
om
di
sc
ov
er
ie
s.
T
he
ob
je
ct
iv
e
is
to
m
ea
su
re
w
hi
ch
la
g
of
ca
pe
x
is
m
os
t
im
po
rt
an
t
fo
r
pr
ov
ed
re
se
rv
es
ad
de
d
in
a
gi
ve
n
ye
ar
.
F
or
ex
am
pl
e,
in
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
(1
)
re
se
rv
es
ad
de
d
in
a
gi
ve
n
ye
ar
ar
e
re
gr
es
se
d
on
th
e
hi
gh
ri
sk
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
(e
xp
lo
ra
to
ry
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
)
sp
en
t
in
th
at
ye
ar
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fi
rm
le
ve
l
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
ti
m
e
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s.
S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fi
rm
,
w
it
h
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
be
lo
w
th
e
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
es
.
*
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
0%
 le
ve
l, 
**
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 le
ve
l, 
an
d 
**
* 
at
 th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l.
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
=
 R
es
er
ve
s 
A
dd
ed
 F
ro
m
 D
is
co
ve
ri
es
/A
ss
et
s
R
es
er
ve
s 
A
dd
ed
 F
ro
m
 D
is
co
ve
ri
es
i,t
 =
 α
+
 β
1H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
C
ap
ex
i,t
+
 T
im
eF
E
t +
 F
ir
m
F
E
i
+
 ε
i,t
144
T
ab
le
 A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
R
is
k 
an
d 
C
om
po
si
ti
on
 o
f 
L
ev
er
ag
e 
an
d 
O
th
er
 M
ea
su
re
s 
of
 D
is
tr
es
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
Se
cu
re
d 
D
eb
t/(
T
ot
al
 D
eb
t +
 T
ot
al
 E
qu
ity
) i,
t-
1
-0
.1
82
**
[-
2.
54
]
U
ns
ec
ur
ed
 D
eb
t/(
T
ot
al
 D
eb
t +
 T
ot
al
 E
qu
ity
) i,
t-
1
-0
.1
12
*
[-
1.
71
]
B
an
k 
D
eb
t/(
T
ot
al
 D
eb
t +
 T
ot
al
 E
qu
ity
) i,
t-
1
-0
.1
64
**
[-
2.
38
]
N
on
 B
an
k 
D
eb
t/(
T
ot
al
 D
eb
t +
 T
ot
al
 E
qu
ity
) i,
t-
1
-0
.1
26
**
[-
2.
01
]
Sh
or
t T
er
m
 D
eb
t/(
T
ot
al
 D
eb
t +
 T
ot
al
 E
qu
ity
) i,
t-
1
-0
.1
09
**
[-
2.
04
]
L
on
g 
T
er
m
 D
eb
t/(
T
ot
al
 D
eb
t +
 T
ot
al
 E
qu
ity
) i,
t-
1
-0
.1
46
*
[-
1.
71
]
C
ov
en
an
t V
io
la
tio
n i
,t-
1
-0
.0
25
[-
1.
22
]
Z
-S
co
re
i,t
-1
0.
00
4
[0
.6
0]
Si
ze
i,t
-1
0.
04
9*
*
0.
05
1*
*
0.
04
4*
*
0.
04
6*
0.
03
5
[2
.0
6]
[2
.2
1]
[2
.0
9]
[1
.9
5]
[1
.6
5]
M
ar
ke
t t
o 
B
oo
k i
,t-
1
-0
.0
01
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
6
0.
01
1
[-
0.
05
]
[0
.1
5]
[0
.1
5]
[0
.5
1]
[0
.9
1]
Pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y i
,t-
1
-0
.1
35
**
*
-0
.1
29
**
*
-0
.1
19
**
*
-0
.1
01
**
-0
.1
19
**
*
[-
2.
94
]
[-
2.
86
]
[-
3.
10
]
[-
2.
18
]
[-
2.
94
]
Fi
rm
FE
i
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
eF
E
t
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0.
08
2
0.
08
0
0.
06
7
0.
07
1
0.
06
0
N
10
56
10
72
12
08
90
7
12
07
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
fi
rm
-l
ev
el
re
gr
es
si
on
s
w
hi
ch
do
cu
m
en
tt
he
ef
fe
ct
of
di
ff
er
en
tc
om
po
ne
nt
s
of
le
ve
ra
ge
on
a
fi
rm
's
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
(p
ro
po
rt
io
n
of
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n
th
at
is
ba
nk
de
bt
vs
no
n
ba
nk
-d
eb
t,
se
cu
re
d
vs
un
se
cu
re
d,
or
sh
or
t
te
rm
vs
lo
ng
-t
er
m
).
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
th
es
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
ri
sk
ra
tio
fo
r
fi
rm
i
in
ye
ar
t.
A
fi
rm
's
ri
sk
ra
tio
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
as
th
e
pr
op
or
tio
n
of
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
in
ve
st
ed
in
hi
gh
ri
sk
pr
oj
ec
ts
re
la
tiv
e
to
al
l
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s.
Sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
(4
)
re
po
rt
s
ch
an
ge
s
in
in
ve
st
m
en
tr
is
k
af
te
r
a
ne
w
co
ve
na
nt
vi
ol
at
io
n,
w
hi
le
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
(5
)
re
po
rt
s
ch
an
ge
s
in
in
ve
st
m
en
tr
is
k
re
la
tiv
e
to
a
fi
rm
's
A
ltm
an
(1
96
8)
Z
-
sc
or
e.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fi
rm
le
ve
l
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
tim
e
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fi
rm
,
w
ith
t-
st
at
is
tic
s
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
be
lo
w
th
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t e
st
im
at
es
. *
 in
di
ca
te
s 
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
0%
 le
ve
l, 
**
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 le
ve
l, 
an
d 
**
* 
at
 th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l.
R
is
k 
R
at
io
 =
 H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
C
ap
ex
/T
ot
al
 C
ap
ex
R
is
kR
at
io
i,t
 =
 α
+
 β
1D
eb
t V
ar
ia
bl
e i
,t-
1
+
 C
on
tr
ol
s i
,t-
1
+
 T
im
eF
E
t +
 F
ir
m
F
E
i
+
 ε
i,t
145
